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Investigating the Effects of Corporate Governance of Banks in 
Nigeria: A Grounded Theory Approach 
Umar Abbas Ibrahim               
Abstract 
This thesis investigates the phenomena that underlie corporate governance practices 
in the Nigerian banking sector (NBS); the purpose is to understand the nature of 
corporate governance and the factors influencing it. It offers a response to a number 
of concerns raised about the effectiveness of banks’ corporate governance practices, 
especially before the consolidation reform and during the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis. Culture and leadership are identified as providing the most suitable theoretical 
framework for this study, and through grounded theory (GT), an empirical study is 
undertaken to identify the nature of corporate governance practices in banks, the 
factors that influence such practices and the outcomes of this influence. The GT 
methodology is used in the following ways: First, a comparative analysis is performed 
in the open coding stage, based on first and second series of semi-structured 
interviews and focus group discussions conducted with the executive managers of the 
24 quoted banks in Nigeria, officials from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), 
representatives of the Nigerian Deposit and Insurance Corporation (NDIC), and 
other stakeholders. The open coding leads to the development of eight open 
categories, their properties and dimensions based on the responses garnered from the 
interviews and focus groups.  
 
Second, through axial coding, the identified open categories are subsumed into higher 
categories, and the relationships among these categories are established by means of 
the paradigm model. The paradigm model provides the basis for the development of a 
substantive GT. Third, through the selective coding process, based on a third series of 
semi-structured interviews that identify human action and a lack of leadership as core 
categories, relationships with other sub-categories are verified, which eventually 
leads to the presentation of the substantive theory of corporate governance for banks. 
This theory perceives corporate governance practice in banks to be affected by human 
actions and a lack of leadership. This substantive theory is then explored in relation 
to the formal theories of culture and leadership; this offers an understanding of the 
corporate governance of banks in Nigeria and explains the relevance of the formal 
theories more clearly. Furthermore, the idea of the social contract in relation to 
cooperation and trust is presented as a tool with which to address free-rider issues. 
The use of GT is extended to explore the phenomena underlying corporate 
governance in the given context, providing a better understanding of the influence of 
culture and leadership in corporate governance theorising. Finally, this thesis is the 
first attempt to combine the GT methodology, corporate governance and the theories 
of culture and leadership, and to offer insight into how to address the identified issues 
using the social contract strategy through trust and cooperation, making it a useful 
guide on corporate governance for banks.   
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 Introduction Chapter 1.
 
 Background of the Study 1.1
 
In the seven years since 2006, when the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks was 
introduced, Nigeria’s banking industry has continued to witness systematic corporate 
failures that are regarded as forming one of the worst scandals in recent history. The 
widely advanced reasons for this are not substantially different from those blamed for the 
problems the banks experienced in the 1980s and 1990s, and before the “consolidation”1 
of the banks from 89 in 2004 to 25 in 2006. The latter reform was widely welcomed, and 
intended to strengthen the banks’ capital base, ensure safety and soundness to enable the 
sector to contribute to the economic growth of the state, and more importantly rebuild 
public confidence in the sector. In the wake of recent events concerning banks in Nigeria, 
however, there has been renewed thinking about alternative methods of corporate 
governance for banks, that might incorporate the underlying reasons for their persistent 
failure, and that will work in practice. As elsewhere, the continual emergence of corporate 
scandals is seen to have been generated by complex interactions among internal and 
external actors in the corporate environment (Turlea et al., 2010).  
 
Contemporary thinking about the development and refinement of corporate governance 
frameworks in response to managerial power and abuses can be traced back to Berle and 
Means’ (1932) seminal work on the effects of the separation of ownership and control, 
published soon after the 1929 US stock market crash. Since then, corporate governance 
                                            
1
 Consolidation can be viewed as a reduction in the number of banks and other deposit-taking institutions 
with a simultaneous increase in the size and concentration of the consolidated entities (BIS, 2001). However, 
as in many other countries, banking reforms through “consolidation” have been implemented in Nigeria at 
different times and for different reasons. 
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issues have continued to evolve in public companies in many countries, resulting in the 
emergence of different governance systems and frameworks. Arguments for the necessity 
of banks having effective corporate governance practices are based on the following: (1) 
Banks’ role in developing critical tools for industrial expansion, (2) their use in capital 
allocation, (3) the ramifications for firm operations and (4) their use in stimulating 
economic growth through the restoration of public confidence (Levine, 2003). Moreover, 
banks often have peculiar features and complexities that distinguish them from non-
banking organisations (Levine, 2004; Cocris and Ungureanu, 2007; De Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008). These peculiarities require banks to be paid special attention, and to 
have a corporate governance framework that is broader or more integrative than the 
traditional system in order to address the myriad corporate governance issues in the sector 
(Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Muranda, 2006; Mullineux, 2006; Barth et al, 2007; Tomasic, 
2011).  A history of successive bank failures has demonstrated this point. 
 
Even at the international level, there has been an increased focus on bank standards by 
international financial agencies, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the 
Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), in recognition of the 
weaknesses prevalent in the governance frameworks of most countries, particularly the 
developing states of Africa. For instance, Rossouw’s (2005) analysis of corporate 
governance development across the African continent notes that Nigeria is yet to adopt an 
inclusive model of corporate governance that reflects accountability to a wide range of 
stakeholders. Indeed, this has been one of the driving forces behind many of the 
unprecedented reforms in Nigeria, such as the recapitalisation, deregulation, privatisation, 
and restructuring or consolidation of institutions. The central objectives of these reforms 
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were to improve banks’ market discipline and encourage efficient resource allocation so as 
to ensure economic growth (World Bank, 1989)
2
. In spite of the reforms and regulatory 
measures carried out so far, banks in developing countries in Africa have, in recent times, 
witnessed financial scandals, frauds and distress linked to weak financial and legal 
institutions (Okeahalam, 2004).  According to the Global Finance Report (GFR, 2012)
3
 of 
the 500 safest banks in the world, none is from Africa, despite the size of the continent’s 
total asset base and the regulatory frameworks that have been put in place under various 
regimes to ensure the stability and soundness of the banking sector there. 
 
Muranda (2006) contended that the weak institutional frameworks and, recently, the 
persistent corporate fraud are due to overall weaknesses in the internal control 
mechanisms of boards and their internal audit committees. As Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
posited, rather than governments and regulators exerting a “helping hand” to ease market 
failures, sadly, they are quite often accused of using a “grabbing hand” to satisfy their 
political objectives. This provides evidence of the lack of effective governance policies in 
most countries. Moreover, there is little research attention paid to corporate governance in 
the banking sector compared to non-banking institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Notwithstanding the justifications offered for the need for regulations in banking sector 
governance (La Porta et al., 2002; Macey and Miller, 1995), recent events indicate that 
neither bank regulations that empower direct supervision nor those based on 
recapitalisation curb banking failures (Barth et al., 2006; Ariely, 2009).  
                                            
2
 The World Bank (1989, p.26) emphasised that ‘the biggest difference between rich and poor countries is 
the efficiency with which they have used their resources, as such, their financial system’s contribution to 
growth lies precisely in its ability to increase that efficiency’. 
 
3
 The GFR is based on the long-term credit ratings of Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch, and the total 
assets of banks. The evaluation is a recognised and trusted standard of credit worthiness across the entire 
financial world.  
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Indeed, to some degree, this view has been echoed in the academic literature that points to 
the limits of law or regulation, and the centrality of corporate culture in explaining 
corporate conduct (Tomasic, 2011). As Boone and Johnson (2010, p.5) remarked, ‘it is 
hard to believe that regulatory reform will succeed, when it has failed so enormously - and 
repeatedly - in the past’. In the Nigerian banking sector, despite the optimism associated 
with the economic and regulatory reforms, corporate failures continue to occur. These 
have been attributed to the weak corporate governance system and, in many cases, the 
reactive and piecemeal strategies adopted by the supervisory authorities (Wilson, 2006). 
Previous literature on corporate governance theory in Nigeria has focused on shareholder 
activism, family stockholding, the economic and legal reasons for corporate performance 
in the financial services industry, auditing competence and performance in corporations, 
and issues relating to the tenure of the board of directors (Okike, 2007; Ogujiuba and 
Obiechina, 2011). Most of these studies were based on the economic models and legal 
rules of other, developed countries, which often fail when applied in less developed 
countries (Hill, 2004). Even with the recent developments in corporate governance 
mechanisms made by many countries, the new mechanisms still fail to recognise the 
complex nature of corporate governance practice and how it can affect or be affected by 
human nature and environmental dynamics (Sears and Funk, 1991; Letza et al., 2008; 
Wiseman et al., 2012).  
 
It is the need to overcome these oversights that has led to a broader governance 
perspective being widely advocated for specific organisations, and especially banks 
(Macey and O’Hara, 2003). To achieve this, an exploration of non-economic elements is 
essential so as to provide an understanding of the phenomena that underlie governance 
failures (Arun and Turner, 2004; Smith et al., 2006; Letza et al., 2008). Moreover, there 
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are differences in the governance systems of different world economies. As Rwegasira 
(2000, p.265) observed, while in Western economies the market-based systems permit a 
low degree of ownership, limited bank holdings and freely flowing, reliable and timely 
information about the business and financial affairs of a company, ‘a number of these 
features are not readily realizable in Africa, at least for the time being’. Even though 
researchers continue to debate which is the best corporate governance system for countries 
and organisations, many agree that there is a need to evolve and refine corporate 
governance systems so as to reflect issues peculiar to specific environments or 
organisations (Sonnenfeld, 2002; Daily et al., 2003; Arun and Turner, 2004; Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). This is also evidently the case in Africa, where the culture and 
political economy is not homogeneous across countries (Rossouw, 2005). 
 Motivation for the Study 1.2
 
The global financial crisis that has affected most of the world’s economies has instigated 
new thinking over the future of banking organisations around the world, including those in 
Nigeria. Indeed, the global concern about the quality of corporate governance in banks has 
led to the intensification of collaborative efforts at national, regional and international 
levels, with the aim of improving standards. Many countries have responded with 
modifications to the existing legislation related to banking, while others have introduced 
codes of governance that are not substantially different from the previous regulations. The 
main motivation for this study stems from a desire to explore the underlying factors that 
may have a significant influence on the corporate governance mechanisms of banks. 
Various theories are incorporated from research on culture and leadership, allowing the 
researcher to identify whether either or both have an influence in this context. The 
extensive literature review conducted shows a clear lack of a comprehensive framework 
regarding the dynamic link between cultural values and leadership dimensions, and the 
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development of corporate governance for banks in any one country across time. Moreover, 
corporate governance is a process, and represents an important element of banking services 
worldwide; as such, this is an appropriate time to investigate the happenings and events of 
corporate governance in the banking sector. The main research aim led to a number of 
objectives that are addressed by the research questions (presented in sections 1.3 and 1.4 
respectively). These aspects have significant institutional and policy implications, as 
highlighted in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
 Aims and Objectives of the Study 1.3
 
In consideration of the special features and significant role of banks, the overall purpose of 
this thesis is to investigate the effects of corporate governance in Nigerian banks, and 
develop a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks in Nigeria. Another aim is 
to contribute to knowledge and add to the existing literature on corporate governance 
through the grounded theory (GT) methodology. More specifically, the objectives are to 
a) review the extant empirical and theoretical studies related to corporate 
governance and its practice, especially in the banking industry, 
b) identify why banks in Nigeria continue to fail despite reforms and the 
introduction of a Code of Corporate Governance, 
c) determine how culture and leadership influence corporate governance in the 
banking sector, 
d) identify the challenges posed by the new Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks,  
e) develop a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks in Nigeria, and 
7 
 
f) to recommend possible ways of addressing the identified findings within the 
banking sector.   
 Research Questions 1.4
 
The research questions for this thesis were developed following the review of the extant 
literature on the corporate governance of banks, which identified a gap in the research on 
effective corporate governance for the banking industry. In order to achieve the objectives 
set out for this thesis in section 1.3, the main questions relate to the following: Why has 
corporate governance practice for banks not been redesigned and how may this be 
achieved? More specifically, the following sub-questions are asked: 
 
a) How effective is the existing Code of Corporate Governance for Banks? 
b) Why do banks continue to fail in spite of the various reforms and regulatory 
frameworks? 
c) How does culture affect corporate governance issues such as the disclosure of 
information, compliance with the regulatory provisions or any other internal or 
external control mechanism in the banking sector? 
d) To what extent does the leadership of the banks affect the realisation of best 
corporate practice? 
e) What are the challenges for the corporate governance of banks in Nigeria?  
 
These questions formed the basis of the semi-structured questions asked during the series I 
and II interview sessions and, to a certain extent, contributed to the questions asked during 
the focus group discussion. The details of these questions were worked out via the GT 
procedure of constant comparison, which enabled the researcher to refine the questions as 
the interviews progressed. 
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 Data and Methodology 1.5
 
In the absence of any prior corporate governance studies on alternative governance 
frameworks for banks in Nigeria, this thesis aims to reduce this gap in the literature 
through the investigation of corporate governance practices in the 24 banks that survived 
the 2004-2006 banking reforms in the country
4
. In particular, the thesis focuses on aspects 
of board behaviour, responsibilities and structure, internal control, and the disclosure of 
information, and looks at whether culture and leadership have any influence within the 
banking sector. Data were collected from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), which has 
regulatory and supervisory responsibility for banks in Nigeria, and the Nigeria Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (NDIC), whose role complements that of the CBN. The data cover 
the critical components of corporate governance, as seen by the regulatory authorities in 
Nigeria. The study uses semi-structured interviews with the executive managers from the 
listed banks, officials from the CBN and NDIC, and other stakeholders. A focus group 
conducted with various stakeholders was also used as a data source. The data collection 
process began with a set of ten statement questions, based on a Likert scale from 1 to 5, on 
corporate governance practices within the banking sector
5
. This was only intended to 
sensitise the target participants to the topic of study, and was also a way of gaining access 
to participants for the face-to-face interviews.  
 
After acceptance was obtained from the target participants, the data collection proceeded 
via a GT methodology, which led to the development of a substantive theory of corporate 
governance for banks. The study started with data generation and analysis through coding 
processes. Glaser (1992) stated that ‘the grounded theory approach is a general 
                                            
4
 These post-consolidation banks are listed in Appendix A. 
 
5
 A sample of the Likert-type questions is provided in Appendix B. 
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methodology of analysis linked with data collection that uses a systematically applied set 
of methods to generate an inductively driven theory about a substantive area’ (p.16). 
Unlike other approaches to qualitative research, GT emphasises theory development 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which is the main aim of this thesis. Strauss and Corbin’s 
methodological approach of open, axial and selective coding through constant comparison 
was adopted because of its convenience and applicability to this study, and it is also 
consistent with the qualitative research design adopted. 
 An Overview of the Thesis 1.6
 
For ease of comprehension, the thesis has been divided into five components: The first is 
this introductory chapter, which gives the background, motivation, objectives and an 
outline of the thesis. This is followed by Parts I, II and III, which deal with the literature 
review, the methodology, data collection and coding, and the data analysis and theory 
development, respectively. Each of these contains several chapters. The final component is 
Chapter 10, which offers conclusions, implications for practice, the contributions made by 
the study and areas for future research. Further details of the ten chapters of this thesis are 
provided below. 
 
Introduction to the Thesis 
Chapter 1 outlines the background of the study, its main aim and objectives, and the 
research questions. It also explains the researcher’s key motivations for undertaking the 
study, the data collection and methodology employed, and provides an overview of the 
thesis. 
Part I: Literature Review 
This part contains three chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of the extant theoretical and 
empirical literature on corporate governance, focusing on providing definitional clarity of 
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the terms “corporation”, “governance” and “regulation”, as a basis for understanding the 
concept of corporate governance from different perspectives. This chapter also discusses 
the most relevant theories of corporate governance, including agency theory, as well as the 
shareholder and stakeholder models. Next, the chapter highlights major corporate 
governance practices around the world. Given the various criticisms of both theories and 
practices that are blamed for the emergence of scandals and abuses in all spheres of 
corporations, the chapter develops an argument regarding the need for an alternative 
corporate governance system that reflects the types of corporate issues that emerge within 
specific organisations and countries.  
 
In Chapter 3, the review of corporate governance is narrowed specifically to banks, the 
focus of this study. The chapter also reviews the corporate governance of banks in 
developing countries, as a foundation for understanding the theoretical and practical 
significance of the research area. After that, the evolution of corporate governance in 
Nigeria is dealt with, and a profile of the country’s banking industry provided. Next, the 
chapter discusses corporate governance practice in Nigerian banks through three distinct 
dimensions: (1) regulations and the code of corporate governance, (2) internal control 
governance and (3) the disclosure of information. The aim of Chapters 2 and 3 is to 
highlight the development of corporate governance and the continued debate and 
criticisms regarding the various theories and practices that have resulted in profound 
problems for corporations. Through this process, a gap in the literature is identified, 
suggesting the need for an alternative theory of corporate governance for banks in Nigeria.  
 
Chapter 4 reviews culture and leadership, which form the conceptual framework that 
guides this study. It reviews the concept of culture and the significance of its theories, and 
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the theories and definitions of leadership. It also discusses culture and leadership 
conceptualisations as a possible theoretical framework in which to address the underlying 
corporate governance phenomenon. Next, it examines the significance of social contract 
theory in the context of cooperation and trust, as a strategic approach to addressing the 
phenomenon of corporate governance in banks. The chapter concludes with a reflection on 
the relevance of the proposed theoretical framework to this study.  
 
Part II: Research Methodology, and Data Collection and Coding 
This part comprises Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 provides an account of the methodology 
used and reviews the research design, paradigms of inquiry, approaches and strategies. To 
address the knowledge gaps identified in Part I relating to alternative means of corporate 
governance for banks, the chapter discusses the constructivist paradigm of inquiry and the 
social constructionism paradigm of inquiry used in the research. The chapter further 
clarifies on the distinction between the constructivist and interpretivist paradigms of 
inquiry and their relationship to the GT approach. The chapter then discusses GT and its 
philosophical roots, and identifies it as an appropriate method for this study, particularly in 
terms of discovering the nuances of corporate governance practice in banks. The 
application of GT should ensure that the theory emerging from this study meets the 
requirements of good science in terms of generalisability, reproducibility and rigour 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Howell, 2000). Next, the chapter discusses the main 
differences between the two founding approaches to this methodology, those of Glaser 
(1978, 1992) and Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998), and provides some justifications for 
employing Strauss and Corbin’s version in this study. Finally, the chapter describes the 
application and procedures of the GT approach chosen for this research. 
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Chapter 6 explains the methods used for data collection and coding. It describes the site 
selection and data sampling, and then the data collection process, which involved semi-
structured interviews and a focus group discussion. It goes on to explain specifically why 
interviews and focus groups are significant data collection techniques in qualitative 
research, and for this study. This lays the foundation for the data analysis. Finally, it 
highlights how, through the process of coding, the collected data were used to develop a 
substantive GT that formed the basis of the analysis in Part III.  
 
Part III: Data Analysis and Theory Development 
This part deals with the data analysis and the emergence of the substantive theory, and 
comprises Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Chapter 7 deals with the detailed open-coding analysis of 
the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. The interviews and focus 
groups were conducted based on research questions that were, in turn, formulated in 
response to a ten-statement survey, which was carried out for the purpose of gaining 
access and discovering essential areas of investigation. Chapter 7 also discusses the semi-
structured interview questions, and the processes and analysis of the open coding, 
followed by the focus group analysis and the development of open codes. It explains how, 
through the GT approach, the data collection and analysis proceeded simultaneously, 
generating eight open categories – corporate transformation, code/regulation, improving 
competence, internal control mechanisms, lack of transparency, self-interest, enforcement, 
and organisational factors – that formed the basis of the substantive theory. In line with 
GT procedures, these eight categories formed the basis of the axial coding process 
discussed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 8 covers two stages of the GT analytic process: axial and selective coding. The 
axial coding involved reassembling the eight fractured, open categories that emerged 
during the open coding stage. In other words, they were rearranged and linked together 
into a coherent overall system (Howell, 2000). This chapter explain how the eight open 
categories resulted in six main categories: corporate control mechanisms, human action, 
code/regulation, lack of leadership, enforcement, and competency. These main categories 
were also related to each other through the application of paradigm model components 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In fact, the application of the paradigm model in this thesis 
helps to demonstrate how the structure and process are intertwined through the axial 
process. 
 
Selective coding is the final analytic procedure of the GT approach. It is used to identify 
the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Chapter 8 explains the process used to verify and validate the data obtained from the final 
stage of the semi-structured interviews (series III), conducted using a discriminate 
sampling process among the participants. The purpose of this process was to ascertain the 
credibility of the data gathered in the previous interview series I and II. The questions 
asked were on specific categories, which led to the emergence of two core categories: 
human action and lack of leadership. The chapter goes on to explain the division of these 
core categories into subcategories, and presents a diagrammatical figure showing how the 
core categories are integrated with the subcategories, to enrich the explanation and 
development of a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks based on the 
categorisation and analysis of the participants’ opinions. The developed substantive theory 
forms the basis of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 9 focuses on the substantive GT, and explains the details of it, illustrating the 
extent to which human action and a lack of leadership influence corporate governance in 
the banking sector. The chapter discusses the relevance of culture and leadership to 
corporate governance research, and reviews the study of corporate governance using the 
identified theoretical framework. It also highlights the limitations of the extant literature, 
linking culture and leadership to the study of corporate governance. In addition, the 
chapter explores the substantive theory within the culture and leadership framework, and 
highlights the relationship between it and formal theories of corporate governance, which 
is illustrated by Figure 9.1. In addition, the chapter proposes the social contract, through 
cooperation and trust, as a strategic tool through which to actualise the findings of the 
substantive GT developed in this thesis.  
 
Concluding Chapter 
Chapter 10 brings the thesis to a close, offering the overall conclusions, its implications to 
practice and the contributions of the thesis, its limitations and suggested areas for further 
research. It starts with an overview of the research and the theory that has emerged from it, 
and then presents the contributions the study makes to knowledge, in terms of 
methodology, theory and practice. Then, it discusses the implications of the findings of the 
substantive theory for practice, and the limitations of the study. The chapter also concludes 
by proposing areas for further research. 
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  The Concepts, Theories and Practice of Chapter 2.
Corporate Governance 
 
 Introduction 2.1
The evolution of corporate governance is as old as capitalism, and can be linked to the 
seminal work of Adam Smith in 1776, particularly his famous exposition of the invisible 
hand of completion as guiding an economic system based on individual self-interest, 
although he did not use the phrase as it is known today (Morch and Steier, 2005). Even 
though theories relating to corporate governance development and the areas it 
encompasses have been drawn from a variety of disciplines, contemporary discourse about 
corporate governance issues came to light with the seminal critique of managerial 
corporation and ownership by Berle and Means in 1932. The increasing numbers of 
corporate scandals in the last decade, and the recent global financial crisis, particularly in 
the banking sector, have once again renewed the debate on the fundamentals of corporate 
governance (Polo, 2007). This debate has raised questions, not only about regulatory 
frameworks as an internal control mechanism for banks, but also on the effectiveness of 
the existing legal and economic mechanisms in curtailing managerial discretions (Tomasic, 
2011).  
 
Indeed, the rapid evolution of corporate governance in both policy and practice has now 
become a concern of stakeholders, as they search for an alternative approach to 
contemporary corporate governance issues, especially for banking organisations. In laying 
the foundations for an understanding of corporate governance, this chapter provides an 
overview of three key terms – corporation, regulation and governance – often used to 
explain the concept, role and function of corporate governance. This is followed by a 
presentation of the diverse definitions of corporate governance and some of the relevant 
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corporate governance theories and practices that have evolved over time. In addition, the 
chapter presents a justification of an alternative corporate governance research agenda, the 
purpose of which is to provide some general conceptual and theoretical background to the 
study. A reflection of the chapter is presented in the final section. 
 Definitions of Key Terms 2.2
 
Corporate governance issues are described differently at different levels but commonly 
include the following key terms: regulation, corporation and governance. The 
development of a corporate governance framework therefore requires an understanding of 
the meaning of these terms and their application in corporate governance studies. 
 Defining the Corporation 2.2.1
 
Many scholars have defined corporations in relation to regulation or economic activity. 
One of the early concepts described the corporation as ‘an artificial person’ (Soderquist, 
1999, p.375), later refined to ‘a constellation of relationships having varied and varying 
hierarchical structure’ (p.376). Expanding this concept, Sternberg (2004) considered the 
corporation to mean a separate legal person that has owners who determine its purposes 
and who are ultimately entitled to control it. Thus, ‘in exchange for contributing capital 
and bearing the residual risk of the corporation to the extent of the value of their shares, 
the owners (shareholders) should benefit from the corporation’s profit (via dividends or 
capital gains), and its ultimate control through voting rights’ (Sternberg, 2004, p.37). 
Meanwhile, rejecting the conventional concepts of the corporation that had been proposed, 
Post et al. (2002, p.17) posited that:  
 ‘a corporation is an organisation engaged in mobilising resources for productive 
uses in order to create wealth and other benefits (and not to intentionally destroy 
wealth, increase risk, or cause harm) for its multiple constituents or stakeholders’.  
 
18 
 
The authors explained that the core image of a corporation has to include the “society” that 
created the corporate form because ‘conformance with broad social norms and values is an 
inherent requirement for the corporate system as a whole’ (Post et al., 2002, p.13). For 
Monks and Minow (2004, p.4), a corporation is 
‘a mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute capital, 
experience, and labour, for the maximum benefits of all of them....the investor to 
participate in the profits....without taking responsibility for the operations. The 
management to run the corporation without taking the responsibility of providing 
funds....the independent entity must still relate to a wide variety of “constituents” 
including its directors, managers, employees, shareholders, customers, creditors, 
suppliers....the community and the government...each of these relationships affects 
the direction and focus of the corporation’. 
 
 
 
This implies that, within the framework of the law, the essence of why corporations are 
established can be anything their owners choose, but is subject to regulation in the relevant 
jurisdictions. As Cooper and Burrell (1988, cited in Letza et al., 2008, p.22) stated, ‘the 
corporation is a bounded social system and is normatively rational’. This means, Letza et 
al. (2008, p.22) explained, the corporation can be ‘either the aggregate of individual units 
or a collective entity as a naturally existent entity’. Although, a corporation can simply be 
a collective name for its members and their aggregate rights, not all corporations are set up 
by their owners solely to make a profit. Some corporations are set up to engage in 
charitable activities and others are set up as “not-for-profit” businesses. 
 Defining Regulation 2.2.2
 
The term “regulation” has been given a multitude of definitions in the wider sphere of 
legal and socio-economic activities (Den Hartog, 1999). From the politico-economic 
perspective, regulation can be described as ‘different systems of economic organisation 
and the legal forms which maintain them’ (Majone, 1990, pp.1-2). As legal instruments for 
the implementation of socio-economic policy objectives, Den Hartog (1999) explained, 
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the main feature is their focus on how individuals or organisations can be compelled by 
governments, through sanctions, to comply with prescribed behaviour. This means that 
those measures relate to the sustained and focused control exercised by an established 
public agency (Selznick, 1985). Regulation is also considered to be a legislative mandate 
over activities that are generally regarded as desirable to society. On what constitute 
desirable activities, Majone (1996) claimed that market activities can only be regulated if 
societies consider such activities worthwhile in themselves, and hence in need of 
protection as well as control. This proposition has been put forth as the essence of 
regulation in general (Ogus, 1994; Majone, 1996; McGowan and Seabright, 1995). In fact, 
the growth of regulation indicates the expansion of rights and privileges in a society 
(Dicey, 1962). 
 
However, regulating an industry requires knowledge of its operations, the ability to shift 
requirements as the conditions of the industry dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures 
upon the appearance of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to reach 
conclusions regarding policy (Landis, 1966). As a result of corporate activities and the 
complexity of society, there have been delineations made between different types of 
regulatory approaches, such as social, economic or financial (Ogus, 1994; Viscusi, 1996). 
Financial regulation is concerned with three areas: products, intermediaries and markets 
(Howell, 2001). Financial regulation, particularly for banking, that stems from the basis of 
economic theory (Stigler, 1971), has been extended to cover wider activities (Barth et al., 
2004). For instance, the regulation of banks refers to a body of specific rules or agreed 
behaviour, either imposed by some government or other external agency, or self-imposed 
by explicit or implicit understanding within the corporate whole (Llewellyn, 1986).  
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In contrast, social regulation deals with such matters as health and safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection (Ogus, 1994), and their regulatory application differs 
even among countries or regions that share common socio-economic principles. As 
Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009) concluded, institutional weaknesses in developing 
countries will make the optimal regulatory policies different from those of developed 
economies; as such, each entity must implement specific and functional regulations that 
reflect its own needs and the local circumstances. These weaknesses range from limited 
regulatory capacity and ability to implement policy, to limited commitment and fiscal 
efficiency, to accountability, which have been evidenced to varying degrees in developing 
countries (Barth et al., 2004). 
 Defining Governance 2.2.3
 
The term “governance” is commonly but imprecisely used and assumes different meanings 
for different users. It has been defined as ‘the exercise of authority, control, management, 
power of government’ (World Bank, 1991, p.1) or as ‘an effort to implement the study of 
good order and workable arrangements’ (Williamson, 2005, p.1). The latter explained that 
good order includes both the spontaneous order in the market, and international order, 
whilst workable arrangements refer to modes of organisation. Rhodes (1996, p.660) 
stipulated that governance is made up of ‘self-organising and inter-organisational 
networks characterised by interdependence, resource-exchange, rules of the game, and 
significant autonomy from state’. Rhodes’ concept of governance is thus drawn from 
public policy and administration, which he interchangeably refers to as government. 
However, Rosenau (1995, p.13) saw governance as ‘systems of rule at all levels of human 
activity…in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions’. 
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From an institutional perspective, governance has been defined as ‘the setting of rules, the 
application of rules and the enforcement of rules’ (Feeny, 1993, p.172). In a broader sense, 
it has been described as ‘the determination of the broad uses to which organisational 
resources will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in 
organisations’ (Daily et al., 2003, p.371). Indeed, the consensus view is that governance is 
all about ‘patterns of organisational interactions involving multiple inter-dependent actors 
from the state, market and civil society with the aim of satisfying collective human needs 
in a complex, dynamic environment’ (Kooiman, 2003, p.11). It can therefore be argued 
that the concept of governance can be located within three areas, namely, (a) governance 
in the global space or global governance, which deals with issues outside the direct 
activity of individual governments, (b) governance in the national space or within a 
country (Barnett and Duvall, 2005) and (c) governance in the corporate space, which 
constitutes the activities of incorporated and non-incorporated organisations that are 
accountable to a board of directors (Mueller, 1992). It is therefore the combination of the 
concepts of corporation, regulation and governance that variously determine how 
corporate governance is perceived and functions, which also depend largely on what the 
corporation exists for (Vinten, 1998) and the issues it tends to address (Iskande and 
Chamlou, 2000).  
 Defining Corporate Governance 2.2.4
 
The term corporate governance was first used by Eells (1960, p.108) to mean ‘the structure 
and functioning of a corporate policy’. Since then, many of the issues around corporate 
governance have been explained in a variety of ways. For instance, in the finance literature 
the idea is ‘concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed 
investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claims 
holders’ (Becht et al., 2002, p.1). For Letza, et al. (2008, p.18), corporate governance is 
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‘concerned with the regulation, supervision, or performance and conduct oversight of the 
corporation’. Although Monks and Minow (2008) described corporate governance as the 
relationships among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations, Keasey et al. (1997, p.2) argued for the inclusion of ‘the structures, processes, 
culture and systems that engender the successful operation of the corporations’ in the 
definition of corporate governance. To achieve organisational success, Aguilera et al. 
(2008, p.1) opined that corporate governance must ensure that ‘executives respect the 
rights and all interests of company stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders 
accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and 
distribution of wealth invested in the firm’. 
 
Due to an increasing number of corporate scandals over the years, recent definitions of 
corporate governance have focused on regulations and codes of good governance practice 
around the world (Letza et al., 2004). For instance, the Cadbury Committee Report (1992, 
p.15) defined corporate governance as ‘the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled’. Similarly, the OECD (1999) defined corporate governance as the 
structure of relationships and corresponding responsibilities among a core group consisting 
of shareholders, board members and managers, designed to foster the competitive 
performance required to achieve the corporation’s primary objectives. Indeed, the OECD’s 
definition is widely regarded as well-balanced and the most acceptable concept because it 
places responsibility on the board to ensure strategic guidance, implementation and 
monitoring (Nwanji and Howell, 2007). Recently, Sun et al. (2011, p.8) expanded the 
concept of corporate governance to mainly involve ‘four-level legal, cultural and 
institutional arrangements, including regulatory governance, market governance, 
stakeholder governance and internal or shareholder governance’. As the authors explained, 
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corporate governance systems relate ‘to the whole set of regulatory, market, stakeholder 
and internal governance’ (ibid). Despite the proliferation of corporate governance concepts 
in the literature, there is little agreement over its definition, scope or constituent parts 
(Ruhanen et al., 2010). Indeed, the scope of corporate governance in its context has 
continued to generate varying views that have led to the development of several theories 
(Klapper et al., 2005). The most relevant of these theories are considered in the next 
section. 
 Theories Relevant to Corporate Governance 2.3
The evolution of corporate governance is essentially bound to the evolution of the theory 
of the firm (Sun, 2007). Ever since the South Sea Bubble in the seventeenth century, 
which led to the revolutionising of business law and practice in the UK, and the seminal 
critique of the corporation by Berle and Means following the stock market crash of 1929 
in the US, corporate governance issues have generated increasing concern among 
researchers. This has led to the development of several theoretical approaches relating to 
corporations (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991; Freeman, 1984; Hawley and William, 1996; Learmount, 2002; Crane and 
Matten, 2004; Clarke, 2004). These theories range from agency theory (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which expanded into what Hawley and 
Williams (1996) identified as the simple finance model, to the stakeholder model, the 
shareholder model and the political model. The finance model was discussed in Shleifer 
and Vishny’s (1997) study of corporate governance. More recently, Learmount (2002) 
presented the “economic approach” and the “organisational approach” to corporate 
governance.  
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Other theories include transaction cost theory, in which the firm is viewed as a governance 
structure (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), the resource dependency theory, which 
addresses the role of boards in organisations (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and ethics-related 
theories (Maisenbach, 2006). Of all these theories, agency theory is the main one applied 
in corporate governance studies (Daily et al., 2003). In fact, some of the other theoretical 
perspectives mentioned above are intended to complement rather than substitute for 
agency theory (Daily et al., 2003). Even though agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory are the three major theories recognised (Clarke, 2004), recent work on 
corporate governance theories can be categorised into two contrasting paradigms: the 
shareholder and stakeholder models (O’Sullivan, 2000; Letza et al., 2004). These two 
models have also been the subject of debate regarding the purpose of the corporation, its 
associated structure of governance arrangements, and what guides corporate practice and 
objectives or its limitations regarding current corporate issues and management. As such, 
the understanding of these theories and their significance to the current discourse is 
fundamental. 
 Agency Theory 2.3.1
 
The concept of agency theory was first outlined by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). Later it 
was refined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their explanation of the firm as a nexus of 
contracts between different factors of production:  
‘a contract under which one or more persons called the principal(s) engage another 
person called the agent to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent’ (p.308). 
 
 
 
Generally, most of the agency models in the literature have been concerned with contracts 
(Fama and Jensen, (1983a), managerial discretion (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1997) or incentive contracts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to 
Eisenhardt (1989a, p.58) agency theory is principally concerned with 
‘resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships, (1) an agency 
problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict 
and (2) when it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify how the agent is 
actually doing’  
 
 
 
Fundamentally, agency theory holds that, in the modern corporation, in which share 
ownership is widely held, managerial actions depart from those required to maximise 
shareholder returns (Berle and Means, 1932). Hence, the popularity of agency theory in 
corporate governance research is due to two main reasons. First, large corporations 
involve two groups of participants, the managers and the shareholders, and the interests of 
each are assumed to be clear and consistent. Second, it relates to the notion that humans 
are self-interested, thus unwilling to forgo personal interests for the interests of others 
(Daily et al., 2003). Moreover, the applicability of agency theory goes beyond the 
boundaries of its original domain of finance and economics, as it also dominates 
discussions in accounting, law, management, political science and sociology (Eisenhardt, 
1989a; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Although it is argued that agency theory provides 
significant insights into the workings of firms and the effects of regulatory control on the 
contractual relationships of managers, particularly with regard to the effects of their 
actions on the wider group of stakeholders and investors, the theory’s underlying 
assumptions have come under severe criticisms in recent times (Learmount, 2002).  
 
Learmount (2002) observed that theorists tend to see the firm principally in contractual 
terms, guided by the assumption of utility-maximising self-interested human behaviour, 
and this position makes the protection of investors’ capital the main issue for corporate 
governance. In addition, R.H. Frank (1994) argued that the theory failed through its 
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inability to consider the demands of social existence and that it creates the conditions that 
encourage the type of behaviour it purports to protect against (see also Ghoshal and Moran, 
1996). Despite the relevance of agency theory to the understanding of corporate 
governance issues, particularly to organisational thinking in terms of the treatment of 
information and risk implications (Eisenhardt,1989a), supporters of the theory have also 
admitted that agency theory presents a partial view of the world. Although it is valid, they 
say, it also ignores a significant portion of the complexity of the organisations in which the 
managers operate, and by extension discounts the effects of socially embedded 
relationships in economic exchange (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). This implies that 
agency theory can only be effective when it is complemented with other theoretical 
perspective. Finally, while agency theory provides a unique, realistic and empirically 
testable perspective on problems and allows them to be studied in a broad sense 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a), recent corporate governance discussions have been based on two 
broad paradigms – stakeholder theory and shareholder theory. Each of these two 
paradigms were developed on the basis of some assumptions about the nature of the 
corporation, the governance structure and its purpose (T. Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Letza and Sun, 2002).  
 Stakeholder Theory 2.3.2
 
The stakeholder theory on the management of an organisation can be traced back to the 
work of Clark (1916), Dodd (1932) and Berle and Means (1932). During the 1930s, 
corporations identified four major interest groups that they had to consider: customers, 
employees, the general public and shareholders (Preston, 1990). In the 1980s, Freeman 
(1984) initiated a new way of thinking about business organisations by explaining the 
relationship of the firm to its external environment, and its behaviour within this 
environment. He argued that the stakeholder concept relates to ‘all of those groups and 
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individuals that can affect, or are affected by the accomplishment of the organizational 
purpose’ (Freeman, 1984, p.25). This implies that the stakeholder approach explains how 
executives can use the concept, framework, philosophy and processes of stakeholders to 
manage their organisations more effectively. This further indicates that stakeholder theory 
leans towards the managerial conceptions of organisational strategy and ethics, reflecting 
the realisation that the interests and influence of individuals or groups, both within and 
outside of the organisation, need to be taken into consideration when evaluating threats 
and opportunities for change (T. Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Evan and Freeman, 1993). 
 
Essentially, stakeholder principles suggest that firms should have multiple objectives and 
managers should make decisions that take the interests of all stakeholders into account. In 
support of this principle, the World Bank (1999) stated that the manager’s job is to retain 
the support of all stakeholder groups, balancing their interests, while making the 
organisation a place where stakeholder interests can be maximised over time. However, 
critics of stakeholder theory are of the view that it is incompatible with business for a 
number of reasons: First, “responsibilities and objectives” are not synonymous but are 
made one in stakeholder theory (Ansoff, 1965). Second, it can also be seen to precludes 
the activity of business as traditionally been known and, this could make better corporate 
governance and business conduct unrealisable (Sternberg, 1997). In other words, the 
theory is intrinsically incompatible with substantive objectives of business, and 
undermines not only private property rights but also corporate accountability. Thirdly, 
opponents of this model argue that the current institutional restraints on managerial 
behaviour based on the notions of self-regulation and market discipline are ineffective and 
simply inadequate to prevent corporate assets from being used in the ways dictated by the 
managerial interests (Letza et al., 2004). Moreover, stakeholder theory provides no 
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structure for restraining managers’ interests in cases where executive pay is enhanced by 
the directors’ stock option schemes that have proven to be very valuable. Such schemes 
allow directors to become personally very rich through option gains if the share price 
grows and by other means if it does not (Keasey et al., 1997). In such cases, the only 
restraint on executive pay seems to rest on the modesty of the executives themselves, 
which is a commodity in increasingly short supply.  
 
In defence of the theory, Freeman (1984) proposed a framework comprising three levels of 
stakeholder analysis: rational, process and transactional. At the rational level, he suggested 
that it is necessary to gain an understanding of who the stakeholders of the corporation are 
and what their perceived stakes are. At the process level, it is necessary to understand how 
the corporation manages its relationships with its stakeholders and whether these processes 
fit in with the rational stakeholder map of the corporation. At the transactional level, one 
must understand the set of transactions or bargains between the corporation and its 
stakeholders and deduce whether these negotiations fit with the stakeholder map and the 
corporation’s objectives. Despite Freeman’s defence, it is still found that successful 
transactions with stakeholders are built on the understanding of the legitimacy of the 
stakeholders, which is often varying and difficult to control. The theory is also unable to 
explain how corporate boards and management are supposed to determine the trade-off 
between the objectives of the firm and the interests of stakeholder groups.  
 
Moreover, many of the determinants of value creation for shareholders (through higher 
stock prices) are outside the control of individual CEOs, as market prices rise and fall in 
bull and bear markets and, often, this depends on complex factors such as competition in 
the product markets, speculative behaviour, and the availability of system liquidity and 
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control (Eturk et al., 2008). Furthermore, stakeholder theory presumes that there is a clear-
cut, stable and homogeneous boundary between stakeholder groups, and between 
stakeholder legitimacy and illegitimacy, and clear managerial perceptions of stakeholder-
corporation relationships (Friedman and Miles, 2002). Finally, there is the problem related 
to the identification of stakeholder groups in large and complex organisations (Mitchell et 
al., 1997) and changes to stakeholder composition over time (Elias and Cavana, 2003), 
both of which make effective strategic management difficult. As Sun (2007, p.9) 
concludes, ‘in practice, stakeholders' interests are so diverse and conflicting that not only 
are they incompatible between stakeholder groups, but also within a single group’. As 
such, stakeholder theory does not provide a suitably precise formula for weighing and 
balancing competing considerations. This suggests that there could be variations in 
delineating stakeholder obligations among different communities due to local customs, 
legal systems and economic goals, even when such corporations are viewed as enduring 
social institutions with personalities, characters and aspirations of their own, and with 
proper public interests (Kay and Silberstein, 1995). 
 Shareholder Theory 2.3.3
 
In some contrast to stakeholder theory, shareholder theory is concerned with the 
maximisation of shareholder value or wealth, which corporations are expected to achieve 
by generating the largest possible flow of earnings over the long term (Friedman, 1970). 
According to him 
‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business – that is to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits as long as it 
engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud’ (p.7). 
 
 
In essence, the idea of shareholder theory is based on the market economy, holding that 
the purpose of the corporation can be anything its owners choose (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998). As Sternberg (2004) stated, 
although the corporation is a separate legal entity, it is, however, a slave to its owners (the 
shareholders), who determine its purpose and are ultimately entitled to control it. In her 
explanation, and indeed in the eyes of all proponents of shareholder theory, profit 
maximisation is the main aim of all businesses. The proponents of the theory hold that any 
business that gives up the purpose of maximising the owners’ wealth becomes a non-
business. This concept shows that the main principle of shareholder theory centres on the 
“capitalist system”, which is defined as an economic system combining the private 
ownership of production enterprises with competition between them in the pursuit of 
profits (Nwanji and Howell, 2007). These perspectives of shareholdership are based on the 
traditional Anglo-American doctrine of principal-agent theory, which leans towards the 
economic objectives of the firm. 
 
Nordberg (2008) noted that, at least since the 1980s, the theory’s focus has been on 
measuring the financial rewards delivered to the shareholders through a combination of 
cash (dividends and share buy-backs) and capital gains achieved in public or private 
equity markets. As Collier and Roberts (2001, p.68) argued, ‘any corporate governance 
model that coincides with the conception that the firm is for the shareholders’ benefit 
should be considered as guidance of the management of the corporation’. The features of 
shareholder theory, which include the finance model (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and 
the myopic market model (Syke, 1994), are centred on the maximisation of shareholder 
profits. The shareholder model, therefore, has the advantage of containing three essential 
features of governance, namely, private ownership, competition and the profit motive, 
which have also been the dominant principles guiding corporate governance practice in 
public firms.  
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Indeed, Carver, (2007, p.1) asserts that  
 ‘Corporate governance exists for one reason and one reason alone: to ensure that 
shareholders’ value is maximised...and to the extent a board fails in this, no matter 
how many useful things it accomplishes, it has failed. To the extent it succeeds in 
this, no matter that it accomplishes nothing else it has succeeded’. 
 
 
 
These underlying features of the shareholder model require two basic components, 
accountability and communication. Accountability relates to how those entrusted with the 
day-to-day management of a company’s affairs are held to account by the shareholders 
and other providers of finance. Communication refers to how an organisation 
communicates that accountability to the wider world, including the shareholders, potential 
investors and regulators. However, since control is in the hands of the managers, a moral 
hazard exists in which the agents may act in ways that do not serve the interests of the 
owners. In this regard, Keasey et al. (1997) expressed the view that even the use of 
defensible incentive mechanisms such as share options can be seen as a symptom of the 
breakdown of governance. Perhaps that is why the common law practice in Anglo-
American economies provides a three-tier hierarchical governance structure, consisting of 
the shareholders’ general meeting, the board of directors and the executive managers, in an 
attempt to secure shareholders’ interests, often called ‘the mechanism of checks and 
balances’ (Letza et al., 2004, p.243). It is also one of the reasons why, recently, 
shareholder-oriented governance models have been recognised and reflected in the 
corporate governance policy documents and codes of best practice of many countries, 
based on the Cadbury Committee Report (1992), the Sarbanes-Oxley Report (2002), and 
the OECD (1999) principles. Indeed, the codes of the US and the UK, from which many 
countries draw their frameworks, are based on shareholder theory and the price 
mechanism, which states that shareholders are the owners of the company, and they should 
benefit from the company’s profits and bear the risk of losses incurred by the company.  
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Critiques of shareholder theory have appeared following the systemic corporate scandals 
that have taken place recently in most Anglo-Saxon western countries, shattering the 
standard and predominant economic theory that human beings usually make rational 
decisions and that the market’s invisible hand is trustworthy. For Ariely (2009), human 
beings are fundamentally irrational and are motivated by unconscious cognitive biases of 
self-interest and greed. As indicated earlier, corporate governance issues prevail because 
agents or managers may not always act in the best interests of the shareholders when 
control is separated from ownership (Berle and Means, 1932). It is also argued that 
managers usually make optimal decisions only if appropriate incentives are given and they 
are adequately monitored (Bonazzi and Islam, 2007). In defence of shareholder theory, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that governance has two broad dimensions: First, it 
should achieve the general monitoring of managerial performance and ensure that 
managers are accountable to the company’s shareholders. Second, it should encompass 
mechanisms for motivating management to maximise the value of the shareholders’ 
wealth. As such, the governance structure, codes of governance, compliance and 
performance should all be aimed at ensuring that the company’s management acts in the 
shareholders’ best interests (Durisin and Puzone, 2009).  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) further argued that two conditions must ensue in order for a 
governance mechanism to be effective. Firstly, does the device serve to narrow the gap 
between managers’ and shareholders’ interests? Secondly, does the mechanism have a 
significant impact on corporate performance and value? However, even when firms are in 
equilibrium with respect to their internal governance systems, there may not be a 
meaningful relationship between any individual mechanism and corporate performance. 
Generally, corporate governance that is based on shareholder theory induces, compels and 
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otherwise motivates a corporation’s managers to keep the promises they have made to the 
investors, that is to act in accordance with the legitimate, investment-backed expectations 
of the investors (Macey, 2008; see also Charreaux and Desbrieres, 2001).  
 
Critics of shareholder theory contend that corporations that subscribe to this model are 
often concerned with short-term market value as opposed to the long-term value of the 
company. For instance, Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argued that competitive myopia and 
pre-occupation with short-term gains as opposed to the pursuit of long-term wealth has 
been the principal feature of the shareholder model. The polarised debate between 
shareholder theory and stakeholder theory is not unexpected in a culturally and 
economically diverse world, where nations can be expected to place different amounts of 
emphasis on the relative importance for corporations of shareholder profits versus 
stakeholder obligations. Despite the competing and conflicting diagnoses of, and solutions 
to, corporate governance issues, the application of these models to the emerging crisis in 
organisations has not been realised. In an attempt to evolve an alternative governance 
mechanism, different governance practices have been initiated around the world. 
 Corporate Governance Practices 2.4
Mueller (1966, p.11) claimed a half-century ago that ‘there is no accepted theory of 
governance’, and since then there has been an on-going debate over whether corporations’ 
boards should follow the shareholder or the stakeholder model (Letza and Sun, 2002). As 
Letza and Sun (2002, p.52) explained, this lingering debate represents ‘a polarised 
conceptualisation and theorising in a continuum of how corporate governance is 
understood’, by organisations, agencies and actors in evolving their governance 
mechanisms. This further suggest that there is no universally accepted approach that “fits 
all”, even within nations. Broadly, the corporate governance models that exist are often an 
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amalgamation of the legal, institutional and regulatory environment, and these factors 
influence the corporate governance practices that are common around the world (Maassen, 
1999)
6
. These include the Anglo-Saxon model, the Germanic model, the Japanese model 
and the Latin model (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Franks and Mayer, 1992). In developing 
countries, including those in Africa, a mixture of these is often used, depending on the 
political and historical past of the country. These practices are discussed in the following 
sections. 
 The Anglo-Saxon Model 2.4.1
 
The Anglo-Saxon system stems from the concept of a fiduciary relationship between the 
shareholders and the managers, based on the principle of market capitalism. It is 
commonly practised in the US, the UK, Canada and Australia. Firms in these countries are 
expected to commit themselves to the priority of maximising shareholders’ wealth, and 
hence a strong mechanism is needed to protect shareholders’ interests (Franks and Mayer, 
1990). This, however, does not imply the complete convergence of governance models in 
these countries, just that they follow a similar doctrine and show similar characteristics, 
due to their historical and economic links. According to Roe (1994), this governance 
principle is based on dispersed ownership, and characterised by strong managers and weak 
owners, which creates passive shareholdership. It is argued that the Anglo-Saxon system is 
founded on the belief that self-interest and decentralised markets can function in a self-
regulating and balanced manner (Cernat, 2004). 
 
Corporations in countries that follow the Anglo-Saxon model are usually governed by a 
single board of directors comprising both internal and external members (Weimer and 
                                            
6
This does not mean that, when these models are followed, the corporate structures are better and should be 
mimicked, but simply shows that alternative structures and processes are possible. 
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Pape, 1999). In this case, the role of external or non-executive directors is limited to 
supervising and advising the managerial directors on major policy decisions, in line with 
the best interests of the shareholders (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). Such an arrangement 
allows the democratic principle to apply, while ensuring a strong stock market and an 
active external discipline mechanism (FIBV, 1996). Significant features of this 
governance system include issues relating to the takeover market, such as mergers, tender 
offers, proxy fights, leveraged buy-outs, and managerial reputation and status (K. Martin 
and McConnell, 1991). Furthermore, in this system, Ooghe and De Langhe (2002) noted, 
most of the shares are in the hands of agents of financial institutions (at least 50 per cent) 
rather than private individuals (who hold only 20-30 per cent). Owing to regulations in 
Anglo-Saxon systems, many financial institutions are not allowed to hold shares in 
publicly listed corporations on their own behalf; instead, they mainly act as agents. 
Regarding the managerial aspect of governance, the Anglo-Saxon model for the most part 
involves great managerial power, but also leads to problems with free-riding, over-
investment, control and a short-term perspective (Clarke, 2009).  
 
Over the years, the governments of the US and the UK have taken a closer interest in 
attempting to improve their respective corporate governance mechanisms in response to 
various corporate disasters (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992; Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002; 
Cernat, 2004). These reform initiatives have been aimed at preventing corporate 
malpractice and ensuring that corporate governance protocols evolve or are strengthened 
so as to protect shareholders. However, these reforms have not prevented banks and 
corporations from falling victim to the “invisible hand” of corporate managers, as has been 
evident from the downfall of many banks, particularly in the developed economies (Boone 
and Johnson, 2010).  
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The Anglo-American system is entrenched in market solutions that focus on short-termism 
(Charkham, 1994; Macey and Miller, 1995). This is due to the system’s reliance on 
takeovers, proxy fights and boardroom coups to control agency costs (Roe, 2001; Porter, 
1997). This implies that the market is not a reliable indicator of corporate performance, 
because it often misprices assets. There is also a belief that the model is fundamentally 
flawed due to its inconsistency with reality (Boone and Johnson, 2010) and its tendency 
for risk taking, which has been a major cause of corporate failure in recent times in the UK, 
the US and many other countries that have adopted the Anglo-American Model. Although 
the countries following the Anglo-American system have striking similarities, there are 
still extensive differences between the governance models practised in the UK and the US 
(Cernat, 2004). For instance, independent outside directors make up the majority of the 
boards in the US, while the notion that the board is there to oversee the executive 
management is constantly challenged in the UK (Brountas, 2004). In practical terms, the 
power to enforce fiduciary duties is weak in the UK compared to in the litigious US where 
there have been numerous lawsuits against directors (Rickford, 2003). 
2.4.2 The Germanic Governance System 
 
The Germanic system considers corporations to be autonomous economic entities 
comprising coalitions of various participants, such as shareholders, corporate management, 
employees, suppliers of goods and services, suppliers of debt and customers, all striving 
for the continuity of the firm as a whole (Moerland, 1995a). In their studies, Edwards and 
Fischer (1994) and Kaplan (1997) found that most of the countries that follow this system 
(the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria and Denmark) have a 
two-tier board system comprising a management board and a supervisory board. Under this 
system, the supervisory board monitors the competence of the management board. From a 
practical point of view, it also gives advice to the management board on major policy 
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decisions, and possesses the authority to appoint or dismiss the management board 
(Weimer and Pape, 1999). The Germanic model allows companies with 2,000 employees 
or more to include employee representatives in about half of the supervisory board seats 
(Weimer and Pape (1999). This significant feature gives the employees the right to 
participate in decision making, which is reflected in the workers’ rights over working hours, 
holidays and dismissals. In other words, the influence of independent shareholders on the 
managerial decision making is limited. This is in contrast to the traditional trademark of 
the Anglo-Saxon system, of “one share, one vote”. Furthermore, large banks are often very 
influential stakeholders in the corporations in Germanic countries. There are almost no 
restrictions on banks holding large blocks of shares in non-financial firms, unlike in the US 
where the practice is legally restricted (Weimer and Pape, 1999). However, the ownership 
structure in Germanic countries may have been responsible for inactive markets for 
corporate control, since this concentration of ownership is likely to have influenced 
managerial actions. Significantly, it also suggests that the economic relationship among the 
stakeholders is generally a long-term one (ICMG, 1995).  
2.4.3 The Latin Governance System 
 
The Latin governance system lies somewhere in between the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic 
models, but has a closer resemblance to the latter. The system is commonly practised in 
Italy, Spain and France (Weimer and Pape, 1999) but firms in France have the option to 
choose either a one-tier board system as in the US and UK, or a two-tier board system as in 
Germany. The ICMG Report (1995) found that around 98 per cent of the listed companies 
in France had chosen the one-tier board system, thereby leaning towards the Anglo-Saxon 
model. Similarly, shareholders in the Latin system have more influence than in the 
Germanic system. In the Latin system, shareholders can appoint and dismiss the 
management board with a 50 per cent share of the voting rights, but such influence is still 
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less decisive than that in the Anglo-Saxon system. One of the fundamental principles of 
French law is that directors can be removed by the shareholders at will (ICMG, 1995). In 
addition, the countervailing influence of employees over managerial actions is less 
institutionalised than it is in the Germanic system (De Jong, 1991). 
 
Shareholder influence in Latin countries stems from financial holdings and cross-
shareholdings, as well as government and family control. In France and Spain, 
shareholding by banks is as important and common as it is in Germany but Italy’s system 
is closer to the Anglo-Saxon system in this regard as her banks are not allowed to hold 
securities on their own behalf (Moerland, 1995a). The stock markets play a less important 
role in the economies of Latin countries than they do in Anglo-Saxon countries. Empirical 
studies have found that, despite the absence of active corporate control, there have been 
more hostile takeovers in this system than in the Germanic one (Moerland, 1995b). This 
governance system also features a concentrated ownership structure and this explains the 
absence of the market for corporate control (OECD, 2004). For example, the ICMG Report 
(1995) indicated that the five largest shareholders held on average 48 per cent of their 
companies in France, while in Italy they held an average of 87 per cent. Finally, as in the 
Germanic system, performance-based compensation is not very common in the Latin 
system. 
2.4.4 The Japanese Governance System 
 
The Japanese model is driven by a cultural dimension of corporate governance: “family 
values” are the dominant characteristics (Weimer and Pape, 1999) and as such the system 
places little emphasis on litigation (ICMG, 1995). The board structure of firms comprises 
a board of directors, an office of representative directors and an office of auditors (Aoki, 
1984). Firms also set up an informal sub-structure of the board of directors, which can 
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include both members and non-members of the board. According to Aoki (1984), Japanese 
firms are viewed as a coalition of the body of employees and the body of shareholders, 
integrated and mediated by the management. Thus, the model allows employees and 
shareholders to exert great influence on managerial decisions. Shareholders are considered 
to be important stakeholders but, for cultural reasons, their role is different from those in 
the systems practised in most Western countries (ICMG, 1995). The emphasis of the 
system is that the shareholders should make a long-term commitment to the keiretsu (a 
system of interlocking ownership of corporations) in which they participate.  
 
Keiretsu refers to the cultural values of “trust and dependence” that have historically been 
embedded in Japanese society (Yokota, 2009). The keiretsu concept can be thought of as 
both an economic and a sociological organisation. As Yakota (2009) explained, it is used 
as a group or family of affiliated companies that form a tight-knit alliance to work for each 
other’s mutual benefit, and has become part of the Japanese corporate culture of business 
relationships. This, Gilson and Roe (1993) argued, allows the main Japanese banks to 
monitor their debtors effectively, aiming to prevent business failure and substituting for a 
robust corporate control market. Similarly, Zielinski and Holloway (1991) observed that, 
under this system, shareholders hold shares for symbolic reasons only, since they are 
considered to be a ticket for admission into the corporate network. This is in contrast to the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, where the value of the shareholder’s investment (i.e. voting rights, 
dividends and capital gains) is considered to be the sum total of the business relationship. 
Although the Japanese model evolved through their successful bank-led economic policy, 
the level of discipline in the banking industry later eroded the function of the banks as 
corporate governance players (Corbett, 1994; Okumura, 2004). As in many cases of 
emerging economies, such failures were due to ‘excess capital supply and accelerated 
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financial technologies’ (Okumura, 2004, p.3). However, the presence of keiretsu and the 
concept of long-term employment have ensured a preference for long-term and stable 
economic relationships in the Japanese system (Weimer and Pape, 1999).  
2.5 Governance Practices in Developing Countries 
Corporate governance practices in developing countries can be said to mirror the mix of 
models used in developed countries, with the precise combination used depending on the 
nation’s historical past, or global, political and economic pressure, and the effects of 
dependence on international bodies (Siddiqui, 2010). In developing countries, the concept 
of the firm is mostly oriented towards large shareholder benefits and family ownership, 
while, for the board, the single-tier system is favoured, dominated by the founders in an 
economy with poor market control (Oman et al., 2003). Studies suggest that the failure of 
corporate governance practices in developing and transition economies has been due to the 
application of governance systems from developed economies (Iskander and Chamlou, 
2000). Furthermore, there have been several arguments advanced regarding the lack of 
enforcement of codes in developing countries, where such codes exist (Berglof and Pajuste, 
2005). For instance, several World Bank reports have indicated that the overall regulatory 
systems in developing countries are not only poor in terms of meeting the aspirations of 
stakeholders and resolving conflicts, but are also unreliable due to weaknesses in the 
institutional and legal systems (ROSC, 2004). The combination of these constraints 
hinders the ability and incentives of small shareholders to monitor corporate managers 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002).  
 
The problem is yet more worrisome since the board of directors seldom represents the 
interests of minority shareholders in developing countries. Except in economies with very 
good minority shareholder protection, the problem becomes still more apparent when the 
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control is either with the state or with families (La Porta et al., 1999). Past attempts by the 
World Bank and the IMF to ensure effective control and management of corporations in 
developing and transition economies have so far had very little success. One of the reasons 
for this is that most of these measures have not taken into consideration the fundamental 
features of each individual country (Dyck, 2001). For instance, the privatisation schemes 
initiated by the World Bank in Russia, the Czech Republic and other Eastern European 
countries failed because they were attempted before the necessary legal and institutional 
reforms had been put in place to provide adequate protection for minority shareholders 
(Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). Although these countries have started to evolve their 
corporate governance mechanisms, these measures are only aimed at improving corporate 
governance practice in their specific environments. 
2.6 Governance Systems in Africa 
The development of corporate governance systems in continental Africa is still in its 
infancy (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003). According to Inyang (2009), what is currently 
available in Africa mostly consists of corporate governance codes influenced by 
international bodies and agencies, such as the OECD principles, the pronouncements made 
by the Commonwealth Association of Corporate Governance (CACG), and various reports 
originating from developed economies (Wanyama et al., 2009). However, there have been 
attempts by corporations in Africa to attain global standards of best practice through policy 
initiatives, in collaboration with the global and predominantly Western-oriented agencies 
(D.H. Scott, 2007). It is is believed that this step is critical in helping developing countries, 
including those in Africa, to rebuild their competitiveness, restore investor confidence and 
promote sustainable economic growth.  
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However, as Inyang (2009) argued, the lack of prior broad-based studies on corporate 
governance issues in Africa is a major problem, and this explains why the international 
initiatives based on Western models continue to fail. Although it has been argued that 
improvements in corporate governance in Africa can only be attained when financial and 
regulatory structures are in place (Lynham et al., 2006), such improvements will only be 
sustainable if wider social/political factors are considered (Rossouw, 2005). In fact, in an 
analysis of corporate governance development in Africa, Rossouw (2005) notes that, to 
date, all African countries, except Nigeria, have adopted an inclusive model of corporate 
governance that reflects accountability to a wide range of stakeholders. Despite external 
intervention and domestic reforms, corporate governance failures continue to manifest in 
all spheres of corporations.  
 
Also, learning from the failure of other corporate governance models, based on developed 
economies’ data and circumstances, that have been imposed in some developing countries, 
there have been suggestions that an alternative corporate governance system should be 
developed in Africa to reflect her socio-political and economic environment, for example 
the culture, legal system and political structure, so as to ensure compliance and 
enforcement (Okike, 2007; Wanyama et al., 2009). For instance, Wanyama et al. (2009) 
concluded that attempts to improve governance standards in a particular nation require 
more than the simple publication of codes of best practice. Rather, they should consider a 
wide range of contextual factors, including those at the political and cultural levels. As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.739) concluded, ‘corporate governance systems in most 
countries ranging from poor developing countries, to transition economies, to some rich 
European countries …lack some essential elements of a good system’. The authors 
explained that, in designing a corporate governance system, it is not whether one should 
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emulate the US, Germany or Japan, but rather that one should evolve a mechanism that 
works best for one’s own firm or country.  
2.7 A Search for an Alternative Corporate Governance System 
The evolution of corporate governance theories and practices shows their shortcomings in 
terms of addressing emerging corporate issues. Contemporary studies on comparative 
corporate governance were initially centred on analysing how different systems lead to 
competitiveness for corporations. However, new events suggest a shift in focus towards 
systems tailored to specific organisational issues. The increasing feeling is that an 
alternative corporate governance system should balance the spirit of enterprise with greater 
accountability in corporations, through a social process as opposed to the traditional 
economic and legal basis used to develop formal governance structures (McCarthy and 
Puffer, 2002; Okike, 2007; Learmount, 2002; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; 
Brountas, 2004; Letza et al., 2008; Rossouw, 2005; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Tomasic, 2011). For 
instance, the envisaged system must consider the corporation’s complexity, its ability to 
comply with regulations, its cultural setting and many other environmental factors 
(Brountas, 2004). As Letza et al. (2008) stated, corporate governance is an evolving social 
phenomenon rather than a purely economic or mathematical reality; as such, its scope and 
applicability need to be redefined. Moreover, corporate governance in its essence is not 
about rules and regulations, but the way people work together in a given environment 
(Sonnenfeld, 2002). In addition, the wide range of corporate governance theories and 
practices across the globe suggest that they have shifted to encompass countries’ 
distinctive economic purposes, socio-political factors and other institutional structures. As 
Letza et al. (2008) concluded, as a business process, corporate governance cannot be 
isolated from the socio-economic system, culture, legislation, power and other institutional 
factors if it is to succeed.  
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These arguments add to the view that the corporate governance mechanism is a process 
and the aim should therefore not be any fixed place on the continuum; instead, the 
mechanism should be continuously judged and adjusted in response to emerging events 
(Allen, 2005). As Zingales (2000) indicated, effective corporate governance does not rest 
on the merit of the theories and practice but on how well it responds to the changing nature 
of organisations. Justifying a revisit of the search for an alternative corporate governance 
mechanism that would reflect institutional specificity, Macey and Miller (1995) warned 
that, rather than investing resources in copying other systems, each system would profit by 
focusing on, and repairing, its own peculiar problems. Even more, the corporate 
governance mechanism should be seen as a continuous process of ordering and controlling 
actions and activities generated in corporate inter-relational webs through collectively 
constructed governing rules and instruments. As Sun et al. (2011) concluded, it is 
justifiable to evolve new corporate governance thinking beyond the constraints of 
traditional governance modes. However, except for few studies that utilised GT previously 
namely: (1) Xiao et al. (2004) on the role of the supervisory board in China, (2) Goddard 
and Assad (2006) on the phenomenon of accounting in non-governmental organisations, 
(3) Nwanji (2005) on the ethical implications of corporate governance, and (4) Sorour 
(2011) on the exploration and analysis of corporate governance practice. All of these 
studies focused either on a limited way of improving organisations or developing 
governance practice based on ethical or institutional theories, which are different from the 
set objectives of this study. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to lay a foundation for this research by looking at corporate 
governance from different perspectives, including the problems it has generated over time. 
The chapter commenced with an attempt to provide an overview of the theoretical and 
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empirical literature on corporate governance, following the initial description of 
governance problems in Berle and Means (1932). It then presented diverse definitions of 
the corporation, governance and regulation, as a basis for understanding the different 
perspectives through which corporate governance concepts, theories and systems have 
developed, so as to give clarity to the research question under investigation. The evolution 
of relevant corporate governance theories – agency, stakeholder and shareholder – and the 
debates and criticisms they have generated, were also discussed. There followed an 
illustration of the main corporate governance practices used around the world, including 
those used in developing countries. Overall, this chapter acknowledges the variously 
identified shortcomings of the traditional models and practices, and points to the need for 
an alternative corporate governance theory that can be adapted to specific nations or 
organisations. While this chapter has provided an understanding of various corporate 
governance issues and limitations, it is in this space that GT can add value – as existing 
governance practices have evidently failed. The next chapter focuses on corporate 
governance specifically within the banking sector, which forms the basis of this thesis. 
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 The Corporate Governance of Banks Chapter 3.
 
 
 Introduction 3.1
 
The previous chapter gave a broad perspective of the concepts involved in corporate 
governance. It also highlighted the relevant theories and practices of corporate governance, 
with particular emphasis on the search for an alternative governance system. This chapter 
deals with the corporate governance of banks, which is the central focus of this thesis. The 
importance of banks for countries’ finances and for spurring economic growth helps to 
explain the particularities of their corporate governance (Ungureanu, 2008). Moreover, 
banks have a major role to play in the functioning and governance of other firms, such as 
making credit and liquidity available in difficult market conditions, especially in times of 
crisis (Handley-Schachler et al., 2007; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). These 
responsibilities increase the importance and complexity of banks’ corporate governance. 
Indeed, ‘all economic areas can be significantly affected by disorders in the banking 
industry’ (Turlea et al., 2010, p.384) and this can have disastrous consequences for entire 
countries. These specialities make it critical that banks are provided with a corporate 
governance mechanism capable of ensuring the efficiency and stability of the sector (K. 
Alexander, 2006).  
 
This chapter is presented in two sections. The first section is an overview of corporate 
governance in the banking sector, with a focus on the issues that have been identified with 
banks’ corporate governance practices. This part further explores some of the theoretical 
and empirical attention given by researchers to corporate governance practices in banks, 
and the increasing challenges faced in developing economies, and especially in African 
countries. The second section deals with the corporate governance of banks in Nigeria. It 
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starts with a brief discussion of the evolution of corporate governance in the country, as a 
basis for understanding how this relates to the banking industry. It also gives a brief 
profile of the Nigerian banking sector, with reference to its development and the literature 
relating to corporate governance practices. In addition, the chapter discusses regulatory 
frameworks, issues relating to internal control, and the current state of corporate 
governance in the sector, which in sum demonstrate the necessity of exploring alternative 
governance systems for Nigerian banks. The chapter is concluded with a reflection on its 
contents.   
   The Corporate Governance of Banks: An Overview 3.2
 
Since commercial banks have diversified into investment banking and insurance, and vice 
versa, determining a clear concept of a bank has become problematic within social science 
and business discourse. From a generic perspective, banks can have a broad range of 
stakeholders, and their scope of activity may not be the same in every country (Barth et al., 
2006). In both developed and developing economies, banks are relied upon to perform the 
crucial roles of financial intermediation, facilitating the implementation of monetary 
policies, and the provision of an efficient payment system. Moreover, banks are unique 
due to two distinct features (Levine, 2003; Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Staikouras, 2007; 
Cocris and Ungureanu, 2007) and as such require special governance mechanisms. The 
first feature is their “greater opaqueness”, meaning that their information flow is complex 
and this makes it more difficult to design contracts that align the interests of managers and 
shareholders (Levine, 2003). This feature also constrains the capacity of the shareholders 
to monitor the decisions of the managers. Indeed, the imperfect information and 
misaligned incentives between these two parties often leads to principal-agent problems, 
since in such situations the principal cannot monitor the agent’s actions sufficiently.  
 
48 
 
The second feature is the heavy regulatory system that applies to banks (Ungureanu, 2008). 
In many economies, banks are much more heavily regulated than non-banking firms, and 
in many regimes this impedes the natural corporate governance mechanism (Caprio and 
Levine, 2002). For instance, Caprio and Levine (2002) indicated that deposit insurance 
reduces monitoring by insured depositors, reduces banks’ desire to raise capital from large, 
uninsured creditors who would have an incentive to monitor them, and increases the banks’ 
incentive to shift bank assets into risky investments, all of which affect the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. Furthermore, Caprio and Levine (2002, p.5) argued that ‘ownership 
concentration is an important mechanism for preventing managers from deviating too far 
from the interest of owners’. Indeed, on bank governance, Laeven and Levine (2009) 
concluded that ignoring ownership structure will render ineffective policies on capital 
regulation, deposit insurance and activity restrictions on banks’ risk taking.  
 
Considering the wider interests represented by banks, Macey and O’Hara (2003) argued 
that the corporate governance mechanisms envisaged for banks should consider depositors 
as well as shareholders, as they may suffer the highest risk. They further advised that such 
mechanisms should consider both the causes of an individual bank’s instability and the 
systemic risk it faces. Indeed, in commercial banks, the managers, the regulators, and 
claimants on the firm’s cash flows, such as investors and depositors, all pose unique 
corporate governance problems (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). Although previous corporate 
governance frameworks for banks draw on regulatory and market mechanisms, based on 
arguments relating to their features and complexities (Turlea et al., 2010), the recent 
global financial crisis that began in the most sophisticated banks, operating in the most 
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developed governance environments in the world
7
, such as the US and the UK, showed the 
limits of such frameworks (Ard and Berg, 2010). Indeed, the consequences of the crisis for 
banks and the overall economies of developing countries, particularly those in Sub-
Saharan Africa,
8
 were unprecedented (IMF, 2009).  
 
The top reasons advanced for the crisis, among the list of governance failures, include the 
following: The first was the lack of effective risk governance (OECD, 2009). Risk 
governance is generally defined as ‘board and management oversight of risk and attendant 
configuration of internal systems for identifying, measuring, managing, and reporting risk’ 
(Ard and Berg, 2010, p.2). Second was that ‘the crisis was rooted in the allocation of risks 
and the lack of transparency’ (Moslein, 2011, p.285). Third was that it was due to the 
effect of ‘the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, triggered by the bursting of a housing 
bubble in late 2006’ (Sun et al., 2011, p.2). Finally, Yeoh (2010) claimed that it was due to 
a combined effect of microeconomic conditions, bad corporate governance, and loose 
regulatory oversight. The Angelides Report (2011, p.xvii) concludes that ‘the financial 
crisis was the result of human action and inaction, not of Mother Nature or computer 
models gone haywire’, and as such was avoidable’. In fact, other causes of the crisis also 
include: (1) issues relating to market participation, (2) weak underwriting standards and (3) 
issues relating to policy-makers, regulators and supervisors (Sun et al., 2011).        
 
As Levine (2004) noted, the apparent array of regulations on banks came about either 
through qualitative regulations or as a necessary consequence of reforms or crises. In 
                                            
7
 By the end of October 2008 more than half a trillion dollars had been lost in subprime investments by 45 
major international banks, with the highest losses recorded by Citigroup in the US ($66.6bn) and the lowest 
by AXA in France ($1.1bn) (Clarke, 2011). 
 
8
 Sub-Saharan Africa comprises 47 of the 54 independent states in Africa, including Nigeria. 
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addition, empirical evidence suggests that, even with the regulation, banking opaqueness 
provides strong incentives for the collusion
9
 and other non-competitive behaviour that 
takes place in some economies (Mullineux and Terberger, 2006).  This further overcomes 
the justification of code or regulations in resolving corporate governance issues (K. 
Alexander, 2010; Ariely, 2009; Barth et al., 2006; Tomasic, 2011).  In affirming the limits 
of regulation, Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, conceded as 
to the errors that had been made in regulation and remarked, ‘I made a mistake in 
presuming that self-interests of organisations especially banks and other lending 
institutions, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders’ 
equity in the firms’ (Andrews, 2008)10. In addition, Boone and Johnson (2010) expressed 
the view that the long-term failure of regulation to check financial collapses reflects the 
deep political and operational difficulties involved in creating appropriate regulatory 
frameworks for institutions. They contended that, as a result of this shortcoming, the new 
regulations under Basel 3 would fail, just as Basel 1 and Basel 2 had failed. Young and 
Thyil (2011, p.379) added that ‘codes and governance structure are useless if they exist 
only on paper’.  
 
Reviewing corporate failure in banks, K. Alexander (2010, p.33) argued that an efficient 
corporate governance framework for banks should rely less on the strict application of 
statutory codes and regulatory standards, and more on ‘developing flexible, internal 
compliance programmes that fit the particular risk level and nature of the bank’s business’. 
In order to achieve this, however, the regulators must play an active role along with the 
bank’s management in designing internal control systems and risk management practices 
                                            
9
 Ariely (2009) pointed out that collusion often occurs between boards of directors and inside management, 
and sometimes with the foreknowledge of regulatory agencies or their members. 
 
10
 Part of Alan Greenspan's testimony to the US Congress’ House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform on the root causes of the subprime bubbles that triggered the global financial crisis. 
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that seek to achieve an optimal level of protection for shareholders and the broader 
economy. Similarly, on the continued failures of the banks, Tomasic (2011, p.69) argued 
for ‘a more radical review of prevailing corporate governance and self-regulatory 
strategies for banks than has occurred to date’. For Young and Thyil (2011, pp.381-2), the 
key variables that impact upon effective governance in addition to laws and regulation are 
‘behaviour and organisational culture, ethics and code of conduct, human resources 
management and leadership, decision-making structures, and shareholders and 
stakeholders’. Indeed, these comments add to the conclusion of Kirkbride and Letza (2004, 
p.87) that, despite the general support for codes of practice, there is still ‘the need to 
consider the proper relationship between the company law and the non-statutory standards 
of corporate behaviour’. Such arguments also support the suggestion by Macey and 
O’Hara (2003) that the corporate governance of banks not only requires broader 
consideration of the indigenous features of the firms being governed but should also vary 
on the basis of national boundaries.  
 Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Countries 3.3
 
While there has been an upsurge in the literature on corporate governance developments 
across the globe (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2004), there is still a 
gap in the literature on corporate governance developments in the developing economies 
(Arun and Turner, 2004). Although progress is gradually being made in some developing 
countries (Mallin and Jelic, 2000; Apreda, 2001), there is little evidence of such 
developments in Africa, with the exception of South Africa and some North African 
countries (Oman, 2001; King Report, 2002; Okeahalam, 2006). Indeed, current studies on 
banking governance are mostly based on US and European issues, thereby neglecting 
banks in developing counties (Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; Arun and Turner, 2004), and 
especially African countries (Okeahalam, 2006). The increasing wave of deregulated 
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policy and the continued corporate failure in the banking sectors of developing countries 
have drawn scholars, including stakeholders, to seek ways to resolve the impasse on 
effective banking governance (Reaz and Arun, 2006). Though the history of severe 
banking failures is long, previous attempts to improve the corporate governance system for 
banks have not been encouraging (Caprio and Levine, 2002), despite their dominant role 
in the development of financial systems within less developed or efficient financial 
markets (Arun and Turner, 2004).  
 
However, in an attempt to produce corporate governance frameworks that meet certain 
international standards, developing countries have, at different times, embarked on various 
liberalisation policies and reforms, through privatisation and divestment, which have 
reduced the role of economic regulation (Reed, 2002). Analysts of banking failures in 
developing countries have associated them with weaknesses in ownership structure, poor 
control mechanisms, moral hazards, transparency and disclosure problems, insufficient 
monitoring and supervision, and poor compliance. Indeed, these attributes together justify 
the need for effective corporate governance for banks (Chahine and Safieddine, 2008). 
Furthermore, despite the recent raising of concerns and the interventions made by 
international agencies such as the World Bank through the Basel Committee, the OECD, 
and the ROSC, aimed at addressing critical corporate governance deficiencies in banks, 
there is still evidence that an effective corporate governance mechanism for banks is far 
from being settled on. Indeed, one of the problems is that the policies and mechanisms that 
have been initiated are based on data obtained from developed countries (Ard and Berg, 
2010), rather than on any attempt to uncover the underlying phenomena affecting 
governance practices within each individual environment and institution. 
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Moreover, current studies on emerging corporate governance issues show that the 
problems are manifestly higher in developing countries, and are becoming increasingly so 
(Reaz and Arun, 2006). Though prudential regulation is essentially expected to safeguard 
and restrain the management of banks from acting inappropriately in a way that could 
affect the interests of stakeholders, three points should be made: Firstly, such safeguards 
have been hampered by poor legal protection, which provides the management with an 
opportunity to abuse the regulations (Arun and Turner, 2004). Secondly, even where 
prudent reforms exist, they have not been effective in preventing crises in banks, due to a 
lack of accurate and timely accounting information (Brownbridge, 2002). Thirdly, 
corporate governance failures have continued even where the government has provided 
guarantees in the form of explicit or implicit deposit insurance to encourage depositors. 
Moreover, there is evidence that banks’ managers see such commitments as an incentive 
to opportunistically increase their irrational risk taking (Caprio and Levine, 2002). 
 
Although one of the purposes of regulation in developed economies is to restrict the 
concentration of bank ownership and prevent outsiders from purchasing substantial stakes 
in banks, such regulations have failed to restrict the large amount of family ownership in 
developing countries. Indeed, recent research shows that significant number of banks and 
finance corporations in many countries around the world are family owned (Caprio et al., 
2007). For instance, more than two-thirds of banks in the Philippines and Indonesia are 
family owned (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2012) and about a third of the companies listed in 
the Fortune 500 are family businesses (Lee, 2004). In fact, Fama and Jensen (1983b) and 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) argued that family businesses have the advantage that 
they are better at disciplining managers and other employees. The authors contended that 
family business ownership allows for a high level of trust and commitment, which may 
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result in greater efficiency and higher profitability. However, such corporate performance 
can be affected where there are conflicts between the family and the business (Lee, 2006). 
Moreover, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that it is often difficult to prevent families from 
expropriating minority shareholders, especially in countries with weak legal protection or 
where corrupt practice is entrenched in the system. Such problems are often prevalent in 
the developing countries of Africa (Gatamah, 2008).   
 
The recent events in the banking sector, which began in Europe and the US, have further 
broadened contemporary thinking on the sorts of systems that should be adopted for banks, 
beyond simple economic and legal modelling. One of the long-argued reasons for 
broadening the scope is to do with the fact that existing codes of governance in developing 
countries draw their roots from the political and legal environments of Western economies 
(Llewellyn, 2005). Such mechanisms have been found unsuitable for developing countries, 
particularly for curbing the dereliction of responsibilities by directors and managers and 
ensuring transparency in financial and non-financial reporting (Coombes and Wong, 2004). 
Oman (2001) asserted that one issue that complicates the corporate governance of banks in 
developing economies is the ‘activities of distributional cartels’ (p.20). These cartels 
consist of corporate insiders who have very close links with, or partially constitute, the 
governing elite, and they undermine the credibility of investors’ legal protection. In many 
cases, these internal cartels may also prevent or slow any proposed reforms that could 
improve the human and financial capacities of the banks, as many of the reforms go 
against the interests of insiders. 
 
In the banking industry, effective internal corporate governance is highly dependent on 
boards and the characteristics of their individual directors (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2005). 
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It can be argued that the overall responsibility falls on them to monitor and evaluate 
management, and ensure that laws and guidelines are complied with, and ethics upheld 
(McKendall et al., 1999). Iskander and Chamlou (2000) asserted that a key to good 
corporate governance for any modern corporation is an informed and well-functioning 
board of directors. However, in many developing countries, boards’ behaviours have been 
central to the corporate governance problems experienced recently (Chahine and 
Safieddine, 2008). While Nigerian banks have unfortunately not escaped the 
unprecedented corporate failures, early theoretical studies have not covered the country’s 
current bank-related corporate governance issues.  
 The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 3.4
 
In his review of corporate governance in the Third World, Yakasai (2001) observed that, 
prior to the independence of Nigeria in 1960, and in the early 1970s, there was little 
challenge to management's prerogative in the running of corporate enterprises and, as such, 
there was neither any demand for independent and off-site supervision, nor the need for 
the transparent disclosure of information. He argued that ‘there was little or no cause for 
intervention in matters of accountability and corporate power games, except for the 
compliance with the corporate law that regulated corporate governance’ (Yakasai, 2001, 
p.238). It could also be argued that, even though salient corporate governance issues 
emerged, most were resolved through the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 
1990, or similar earlier legislation. This suggests that issues relating to the regulation, 
control and governance of businesses in Nigeria are largely contained within the 
provisions of company legislation, which has its roots in the nation’s colonial past (Okike, 
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2007). With the emergence of the indigenisation
11
 of corporations in 1977, and the 
proliferation of many financial and non-financial corporations in the 1980s, corporate 
governance issues began to emerge.  
 
While previous corporate governance discourse concentrated on issues relating to the 
ownership and control structure, the voting rights of shareholders, corporate social 
responsibility and the board of director’s tenure and composition (Adenikinju and 
Ayorinde, 2001; Okike, 2007), recent corporate failures in the financial sector have 
renewed interest in the need for reform in both private and public corporations (Wilson, 
2006; Ahmed, 2007), especially in the banking industry in Nigeria. This is because most 
of the initiatives from institutional and regulatory bodies have only reviewed the existing 
legislations or codes of governance, which has limited the process to legal and economic 
model reforms. It is therefore not surprising that, even after the bank reforms in the post-
consolidation era of 2006, there is still evidence of bank failures and unresolved corporate 
governance issues (Nworji et al., 2011). Perhaps the renewed public discourse will lead to 
the provision of a special form of corporate governance for banks that will ensure best 
governance practice.  
 Profile of Banks in Nigeria  3.5
 
Modern banking in Nigeria dates back to 1892, when the African Banking Corporation 
was set up in the then-British colony of Lagos. Then, in 1894, the Bank for British West 
Africa was established and in the same year acquired the African Banking Corporation 
(First Bank of Nigeria, 2006). Other banking institutions were subsequently established, 
such as Barclays Bank DCO in 1925 and the British and French Bank for Commerce and 
                                            
11
The indigenisation policy was introduced through the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of 
1972 and revised in 1977. The main aim was the diffusion of shareholdings through the disinvestment of 
foreign ownership of corporations to Nigerians.  
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Industry in 1949, all held by expatriates. Along with this colonial legacy came the 
establishment of smaller, indigenous banking institutions, including the National Bank of 
Nigeria Ltd in 1933, and the Agbonmagbe Bank Ltd (now Wema Bank) in 1945. The 
CBN, the sole regulatory body in the country, was established in 1959, when it assumed 
the responsibility for the supervision of banks and other aspects, similarly to what goes on 
in other countries around the world. Today’s banking sector is therefore a product of 
several transformations that took place soon after Nigeria gained independence from Great 
Britain in 1960 (Nworji et al., 2011).  
 
The first significant transformation took place through the indigenisation programme in 
1977, which led to the diffusion of shareholdings that provided a basis for state ownership 
(Nworji et al., 2011). Until then, foreign shareholdings had formed the dominant pattern, 
with some, largely fragmented, share ownership by Nigerians. The practice then was based 
on weighted voting schemes that allowed control to remain with foreign partners with 
block share ownership. The second transformation of the banks occurred through a series 
of reforms undertaken after the indigenisation era, as the number and functions of banks 
increased, and alongside various governance failures. The banking reforms have typically 
been carried out for two reasons: The first was to create the right incentives for banks and 
to encourage them to empower other private corporations. This was carried out through 
extensive privatisation of state-owned enterprises as well as the liberalisation of the 
financial sector. The government’s role was limited to providing the right environment for 
private sector-led growth. The second reason was to reposition the banks in response to 
observed weaknesses that had led to a series of collapses of organisations. Generally, the 
main post-indigenisation banking reforms can be grouped into four stages, as summarised 
in Table 3.1 below:  
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Table 3-1 Main Post-Indigenisation Banking Reforms 
 
 
Period Purpose Outcome 
 
1986-93 
Deregulation of banking 
industry to remove government 
intervention through ownership 
and encourage private 
participation. 
Federal and state ownership and 
control of the banks ceased. 
 
1993-98 
Re-introduction of regulations 
due to wide corporate failures. 
Designed to manage the level 
of distress in the sector. 
Perceived to be successful, with a 
reduction in the growth of banks 
within the period. 
 
1999 
Liberalisation of the financial 
sector through the adoption of 
distress resolution 
programmes. This led to the 
introduction of universal 
banking. 
Increased the scope of banking 
activities in retail banking and 
non-banking financial markets. 
 
2004-date 
To address structural and 
operational weaknesses 
identified within the banking 
sector through consolidation. 
Expected to solve emerging 
corporate governance issues 
affecting the banking industry. 
  
        (Source: Soludo, 2004; CBN, 2006; Yakasai, 2001; Somoye, 2008; Nworji et al., 2011). 
 
 
 
While the transformations expanded the scope of banking activities, the banks experienced 
increasing numbers of corporate failures during the same period. Table 3.2 shows the fall 
in the number of banks from 114 in 1991 to 22 in 2011 due to the failures. 
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 Table 3-2 Nigerian Banks by Years of Key Reforms 
 
 
Year No of Banks 
1991 
2004* 
2006 
2007 
2011 
114 
89 
25 
24 
22 
 
   
  (Sources: Adelegan, 2005; Somoye, 2008; NDIC Report, 2010) 
  
Note: * Gives the number of banks in 2004 before the consolidation reform 
 
 
During the last major reform through consolidation, in 2004-2006, the number of banks 
was reduced from 89 to 25. After the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance 
for Banks in 2006, the number was further reduced to 24 by 2007. Following the re-
emergence of corporate malpractices in some banks in 2008-2010, the number of banks 
was reduced again, through acquisitions, to 22 by 2011. Despite the reforms and the 
consolidation, there is evidence that corporate governance issues are still unresolved in the 
banking system (Wilson, 2006; Somoye, 2008). As the later explained, in most aspects, 
the post-consolidation governance mechanism process appears to lack any integration of 
ideas or the involvement of wider stakeholders. He further observed that the enormous and 
unprecedented corporate governance problems experienced in the banking industry are 
due to the fact that previous reforms were not market-driven but rather induced by the 
government and uncertified balance sheets. This is in contrast to the consolidation of the 
banks in Asia, which was based on competitiveness and market forces that have ended up 
creating an atmosphere in which banks simply cannot afford to have weak balance sheets 
or inadequate corporate governance (Deloitte, 2005).  
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In his review of the state of affairs in the banking sector, Sanusi (2010b, p.7) stated: 
‘Consolidation created bigger banks but failed to overcome the fundamental 
weaknesses in corporate governance in many of these banks. Some banks were 
engaging in unethical and potentially fraudulent business practices and the scope 
and depth of these…. governance malpractices within banks, was unchecked at 
consolidation’. 
 
 
Sanusi explained that some banks failed because the boards ignored these inexcusable 
practices for reasons that included the following: being misled by executive management, 
participating themselves in obtaining unsecured loans at the expense of depositors, and not 
having the capability to enforce good governance on management (Sanusi, 2010b). 
Contrary to our expectations, evidence has shown that banking reform through 
consolidation is incapable of restoring banks’ financial stability and soundness (Somoye, 
2008). 
 The Corporate Governance of Banks in Nigeria 3.6
 
Until 2006, there was no governance mechanism for the banks except for the company law 
that guided their operations; there was also little concern from researchers on the need for 
appropriate corporate governance for banks. According to Wilson (2006), the observance 
of principles of corporate governance by banks has come about through a combination of 
voluntary and mandatory mechanisms. The voluntary mechanism is the Code of Best 
Practice for Public Companies (SEC, 2003), which is designed to entrench good business 
practices and standards for boards and directors, CEOs and auditors of listed companies, 
including banks. On the other hand, the mandatory corporate governance provisions 
relating to banks are contained in CAMA (1990) and the related regulations that 
supplement it. The reliance on the ability and willingness of the banks to comply with the 
provisions of these codes of governance, and of the regulators to enforce them, explains 
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why there have been continued corporate governance issues in banks, which have also 
affected the financial industry as a whole.  
 
The spate of banking failures in the 1990s and early 2000 indicates an absence of 
authoritative guidelines on what the boards of directors of banks in Nigeria should actually 
do in terms of specific functions and tasks. This, in effect, indicates the ineffectiveness of 
the NDIC, which was established in 1991 to rescue the banks. Indeed, according to the act 
establishing it, the NDIC was meant to complement the CBN in terms of monitoring 
responsibilities. According to Yakasai (2001), the main process of governance in Nigerian 
banks consists of three parts: composition, in terms of competence, knowledge, experience 
and business network; strategy, in terms of organising the board, running the board, and 
the teamwork and tenure of board members; and action, in terms of responsibility, 
commitment, performance indicators, monitoring and evaluation. Each of these roles has 
experienced problems, largely due to human and behavioural issues in relation to the 
regulatory frameworks. Reiterating this position, the ROSC Report (2011, p.1)
12
 
concluded: 
‘A number of banks in Nigeria exploit loopholes in the accounting and auditing 
practices, and the weak capacity of the regulatory bodies and weak enforcement, 
to boost their balance sheets. These weaknesses contributed to Nigeria’s banking 
sector crisis.’ 
 
 
Indeed, reports of this nature were part of the reason for the consolidation of the banks in 
2004 and the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance in 2006 to ensure 
compliance. In his maiden address aimed at kick-starting what was expected to be the birth 
                                            
12
 ROSC (2011) was produced under the remit of the World Bank. In collaboration with the country’s 
stakeholders, it assessed the implementation of Nigeria’s accounting and auditing practices, and identified 
ways of strengthening the institutional framework. 
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of corporate governance for banks, the Governor of the CBN stated that consolidating and 
strengthening the banks would constitute the first phase of the reform, designed to 
‘ensure a diversified, strong and reliable banking sector which will ensure the safety 
of depositors’ money, play active developmental roles in the Nigerian economy, and 
be competent and competitive players in the African regional and global financial 
system’ (Soludo, 2004, p.2).  
 
 
According to him, the consolidation would imbibe ‘best corporate governance 
practice’ (Soludo, 2004, p.7).  
   Banks’ Corporate Governance Practice in Nigeria 3.7
 
Unlike in some developing countries, there is no clear-cut system or model-based 
governance for banks in Nigeria, except that obtained from previous legislation. The 
experiences of the last two decades have raised questions about the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance practices of banks in the country. Many have associated the 
weaknesses to the lack of an adequate framework and other institutional and political 
factors and supervisory mechanisms (Ogunleye, 2002). Others have advanced reasons 
related to the inhibitive policy environment and management problems (Ebhodagbe, 1994; 
Nworji et al., 2011). There is also a widespread and seemingly uncontrollable trend for 
malpractices, combined with passiveness on the part of stakeholders, including the 
regulators (Sanusi, 2010b). In view of these weaknesses, revisiting corporate governance 
practice from the perspectives of regulation, effective internal control and the level of 
disclosure could provide a critical insight into the nature of the corporate governance 
issues that are arising in the banking sector. These specific concerns are discussed in the 
following sections: 
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  Regulations and the Code of Governance for Banks 3.7.1
 
The concept of regulation refers to the rules and regulations established by law in relation 
to the management, supervision and control of the activities of the banking industry 
(similar concepts were discussed in Chapter 2). Prior to Nigeria’s independence in 1960, 
issues related to the corporate governance of banks were controlled and managed by the 
Company Ordinance of 1922 and later the 1968 Companies Act, which extensively 
mirrored the UK Companies Act of 1948 (Okike, 2007). Over time, inadequacies were 
noticed in the 1968 act, which led to the enactment of what is now called CAMA (1990). 
The central provisions of CAMA were substantially related to the management, 
supervision and control of the business of companies
13
. Indeed, the provisions of CAMA 
are not substantially different from those of the previous acts. This implies that CAMA 
(1990), as an instrument of corporate governance practice in Nigeria, is based on UK 
corporate law, which is fashioned along the lines of the Anglo-Saxon model. There have 
been doubts expressed over whether rules based on UK corporate law can sufficiently 
resolve corporate issues in Nigeria, or reflect the Nigerian business environment (Okike, 
2007; Adegbite, 2010).  
 
In responding to calls for the implementation of global corporate governance standards by 
countries due to the requirements of trade and international capital markets, Okike (2007, 
p.188) advised that ‘there is the need to appreciate the differences in the socio-economic 
environments in which businesses operate’. She added that it would be unwise to assume 
that corporate governance issues would be resolved by a framework that mirrored the legal 
values of “our colonial past”, particularly in terms of entrenched principles. In this way, 
she implied that the global search for corporate governance standards should be aligned 
                                            
13
 Under CAMA (1990), a company is defined as including all banks and any other corporations registered 
and practising in Nigeria. 
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with the aspirations of each specific environment. As Charkham (1994) stated, foreign 
systems of corporate governance reflect those countries’ histories, assumptions and value 
systems. He advised that countries should be allowed to identify the most appealing 
mechanisms in which the universal principles can be accepted and applied.  
 
In addition to CAMA (1990), corporate governance practice in Nigerian banks is also 
guided by the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA), 1991, the Investment 
and Securities Act (ISA) of 1999, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s 
Code of Corporate Governance (SEC, 2003)
14
. More recently, a post-consolidation Code 
of Corporate Governance has been produced, aimed specifically at banks (CBN, 2006). 
Both the SEC (2003) and CBN (2006) codes evidently reflect some features of the OECD 
principles and Basel Committee guidelines. It should be noted that the corporate 
governance codes are documents that state the rules and procedures for governing and 
managing corporations, and as such are instituted by self-regulating professional bodies 
with the consent of the relevant government regulatory agencies (Dabor and Adeyemi, 
2009; D. H. Scott, 2007; Classens and Bruno, 2007). 
 
Although compliance with the provisions of all the legislative acts and codes of corporate 
governance for banks is mandatory in Nigeria (Wilson, 2006), this requirement has not 
been translated into action. Moreover, these instruments can only invoke best practice if 
they incorporate the means for monitoring the compliance of corporations (Reed, 2002). 
Often, this lack has been blamed on corporations’ boards of directors (Inyang, 2009). 
However, it should be noted that the existence of corporate governance mechanisms does 
not necessarily lead to good corporate governance practices, as many of the corporate 
                                            
14
 SEC (2003) is also referred to as the Peterside Report (2003). 
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scandals in African countries and elsewhere have proven (Rossouw, 2005; Gatamah, 
2008). As La Porta et al. (1998) stated, in many cases the extent to which a country’s laws 
protect investors’ rights, and the extent to which these laws are enforced, explains the 
extent to which corporate governance evolves in that country.  
 
The trend of corporate scandals, especially in the banking industry, indicates that good 
corporate governance goes beyond rules and regulations (Ariely, 2009; Barth et al., 2006). 
This was further echoed during the 16
th
 Nigerian Economic Summit, when some CEOs of 
corporations concluded that weak corporate governance and individual regulatory 
frameworks have been the main cause of poor corporate governance in Nigeria, despite the 
existing laws (Vanguard Newspaper, 2010). Supporting this argument, a bank 
performance assessment report carried out by the CBN in 2008 indicated that, out of the 
25 post-consolidation mega-banks, only 15 (or 60%) were found to be healthy, 8 (or 32%) 
were in distressed, and 2 (8%) were adjudged to be undercapitalised (CBN Report, 2008). 
This further revealed the inadequacy of the existing rules and codes of corporate 
governance to effectively monitor the banks (Sanusi, 2010a; This Day Newspaper, 2009). 
For instance, Sanusi (2010a) explained, the legal and regulatory framework has failed to 
cover issues relating to margin lending activity in the banking sector, thereby allowing the 
actions of the corporate heads to dictate performance. ROSC (2011) also indicated that the 
Nigerian regulatory frameworks are not as comprehensive as they need to be.  
 
In fact, many studies have suggested that, in terms of good corporate governance, the 
consolidation of the banks was only the first step towards ensuring stability, but not in 
itself enough to significantly improve the performance of the participating banks (Berger 
et al., 1999; Amel et al., 2003). For instance, Amel et al. (2003) argued that, even though 
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the consolidation of banks may exploit economies of scale, ‘it does not significantly 
improve cost and profit efficiently, and on average, does not generate significant 
shareholder value’ (p.18). They explained that practitioners of consolidation often 
advocated this reform approach without understanding the differences between the 
econometric factors and bankers’ beliefs. Moreover, even when consolidation may 
improve management quality, such gains are often diminished by organisational 
diseconomies of scale (Amel et al., 2003).  
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the consolidation reforms made on the basis of the 
capital base in Nigerian banks did not improve performance. For instance, Sulaimon et al. 
(2011) argued that big banks with huge capital bases, such as the Union, Oceanic and 
Intercontinental banks, were among the troubled banks in 2009, while banks with smaller 
capital bases, such as the Skye, Ecobank and Standard Chartered banks were classified as 
healthy by the CBN in 2009. More worrisome than this is that the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks introduced by the CBN in 2006 appears to be influenced by a 
number of internal and external regulatory frameworks. These influences are illustrated in 
Figure 3.1 below: 
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The central box represents the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks that was 
introduced in 2006. Around the central box are shown the various regulatory frameworks 
that influenced the development of the Code. Internally, there are the reports of established 
committees, and regulatory acts and instruments introduced by the government, including 
CAMA, BOFIA, the SEC Act (SECA), the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the 
NDIC. Externally, there are the international agencies – the BCBS, ROSC, the OECD, the 
CACG, the UK’s Cadbury Report, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the South African 
King’s Report – that have variously influenced the reports and codes of governance for 
Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks in 
Nigeria (CBN, 2006) 
CAMA 1990 
SEC 2003 
BOFIA 1991 
NDIC 1991 
ROSC, BASEL, OECD, 
CACG, Cadbury Report 
1992, Sarbanes Oxley Act, 
and the King’s Report 
CAC 1993 
SECA 1988 
 
Figure 3-1 Development of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria 
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corporations in Nigeria. While the international agencies have been involved in the 
governance process in an attempt to ensure that global standards of corporate governance 
are met, the Cadbury Report and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have been used as references in 
the establishment of previous and existing corporate governance guides for banks. These 
amalgamated provisions have evidently proved difficult to enforce, and to comply with, 
due to numerous insufficiencies. The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria 
is presented in Appendix D. 
 Internal Control Mechanisms 3.7.2
 
Internal governance mechanisms are a critical feature of bank management, and are 
particularly used to ensure the safeness and soundness of the industry. One of the most 
important aspects of the internal governance of banks is the supervision and monitoring of 
banks’ activities by their boards of directors. Boards are identified as the primary internal 
control agents and their responsibilities include monitoring management behaviour, 
formulating strategic decisions that may have a considerable impact on the owners, and 
ensuring that all involved act in the best interests of the corporation (Waldo, 1985; BCBS, 
1999, Psaro and Seamer, 2002; McKendall et al., 1999; Stanwick and Stanwick, 2005; 
Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010). This implies that they have the legal authority to ratify 
and monitor managerial initiatives, evaluate the performance of top managers, and reward 
or penalise their performance where necessary (Waldo, 1985). Indeed, there is an 
understanding that effective corporate governance rests on the boards of directors, whose 
roles involve both the conformance and performance of their firms. In explaining 
conformance and performance, Tricker (1994, p.147) stated: 
‘The conformance roles include accountability to the shareholders and 
stakeholders and the monitoring through questioning, judging and supervising 
management. Performance roles here refer to the strategy formation – developing 
plans for interaction with external environment, profit strategy and policy making 
through establishing rules, norms to [meet the] strategic goals of the firm’. 
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To help boards carry out their responsibilities, various provisions of the law and codes of 
governance empower them to set up audit committees. These are independent from the 
external auditors but have a similar purpose. The board’s audit committee is the most 
important aspect of its supervisory role, and also serves as the principal point of contact 
between the statutory external auditor and the company, particularly helping to improve 
the quality of the external audit processes (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 1999; Smith Report, 
2003). CAMA (1990) provides that the existence of the audit committee should result in 
improved confidence in the overall system of corporate governance. Although the 
regulations and codes set out guidelines aimed at achieving good corporate governance 
practices in banks, it is entirely up to the boards of directors and indeed the management to 
ensure their success. The CBN (2006) stated, for example, that the board should be 
accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of the bank.  
 
This indicates that the entire internal control process is affected by the board of directors 
through the senior management and the various structures it is allowed to set up. Therefore, 
good corporate governance practice rests on the compliance with and enforcement of the 
provisions set out in the rules and guidelines provided by the codes of governance. As 
Wilson (2006) stated, effective risk management in banks is inseparably related to good 
corporate practice. According to Olayiwola (2010, pp.185-86), the 2008 post-
consolidation assessment of banks’ performance along various corporate governance 
dimensions, including compliance with and enforcement of rules and codes of governance, 
based on 30 responses, produced the following findings: 
a) ‘Fair conduct of shareholders’ meetings was indicated. 
b) As many as 95% of respondents indicated that there was no meaningful 
compliance with the existing regulations towards achieving best practice. 
c) Only 35% indicated that audited annual and interim accounts were published 
promptly and were reliable. 
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d) Overall, there was a general acceptance that good governance is healthy for banks’. 
 
These results give an insight into the enormity of the corporate governance problems in 
the banking industry in Nigeria. Corroborating this report, the Governor of the CBN 
remarked, 
‘CEOs were found to have set up special purpose vehicles to lend money to 
themselves for stock price manipulation or the purchases of estates all over the 
world. In another bank, the management set up 100 fake companies for the 
purpose of perpetrating fraud’ (Sanusi, 2010b, p.7).  
 
 
In line with this observation, Adegbite (2010, p.261) added that ‘from time past, bank 
directors have become used to using their positions to defraud their organisations and this, 
in many cases, led to the collapse of such banks’. Indeed, it was this concern that led 
Yakasai (2001) to conclude that the issues in the banks are mostly to do with the activities 
of the boards, which are so varied and deceptively intractable. In many cases, he asserted, 
‘the more critically you look, the less you see’ (Yakasai, 2001, p.241). This casts further 
doubt on the ability of the current leadership of the boards of banks to deliver the expected 
responsibilities that are entrenched in the regulatory framework. In an attempt to address 
some of these emerging issues, the CBN was compelled to carry out some changes 
affecting the composition of the boards of directors of nine banks
15
 with a view to 
improving their internal control and monitoring systems. This step was taken under the 
belief that good corporate governance is driven by good board practices and that the 
boards of directors would continue to be the drivers of the internal governance systems of 
firms (Gillan, 2006). 
                                            
15
In 2009, due to continued public outcry, the CBN carried out major changes within the boards of the banks. 
However, current events suggest that the issue is not about reforming the boards but understanding the 
underlying reasons for their behaviour.  
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 Corporate Information Disclosure 3.7.3
 
Information disclosure is a statutory requirement under company law and other provisions 
relating to the governance of banks. Indeed, it is an international standard practice and an 
essential aspect of the accountability and communication of the stewardship of the board 
of directors. Tricker (1984, p.123) explained that disclosure of information involves 
‘an ex gratia act, by those with knowledge, to convey information to others ...with 
the intention to orientate, or to motivate, to create a climate of understanding, 
acceptance, involvement and participation, or to reach a consensus between 
otherwise conflicting views’. 
 
 
 
In business and accounting terms, disclosure is seen as a motivational tool used by certain 
people who are referred to as decision makers to stimulate action. Acts of disclosure are 
also associated with “transparency”, which relates to unfettered access to timely and 
reliable information on decisions and performance (UNESCO, 2006). Indeed, this is one 
of the main principles of corporate governance (OECD, 1999). Compelled by corporate 
governance guidelines, banks are expected, through their boards of directors, to make the 
required disclosures, not even by compulsion but by commitment. Holsti (1969, p.24) 
explained that communicating information involves six elements, namely ‘source or 
sender, encoding process, channel, messages, information, and recipient’. Above all, the 
information presented should be considered for its relevance, completeness, comparability, 
comprehensibility and timeliness if it is to be useful for business purposes. The CBN 
(2006) specifically stated that banks are encouraged to make robust disclosures beyond the 
statutory requirements in BOFIA, CAMA and other applicable laws. On this note, the 
CBN (2006, sec.6.1.3) provides that the CEOs and Chief Finance Officers of banks should 
continue to certify in each statutory return to the CBN that 
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‘the report does not contain any untrue statement of material fact, and the financial 
statements and other financial information in the report fairly represent in all 
material respects the financial conditions and results of operations of the bank as of, 
and for, the periods presented in the report’.   
 
 
As, Olayiwola (2010, p.186) observed, with attempts to boost banks’ incomes under 
intense competition, malpractices have resurfaced. These include the ‘round-tripping of 
forex, excessive customer charges, falsification of records…adoption of un-ethical 
methods to poach customers’. Confirming this gross lack of transparency and the return to 
the behaviour of the pre-consolidation era, Sanusi (2010b, p.8) stated that 
‘banks’ reports to the CBN and investors were often inaccurate, incomplete and 
late, depriving the CBN of the right information to effectively supervise the 
industry and depriving investors of the information required to make informed 
investment decisions’. 
 
 
He also explained that some banks were manipulating their books by colluding with other 
banks to artificially enhance their financial positions and, therefore, stock prices. There are 
also reports of sharp practices involving converting non-performing loans into commercial 
papers and bank acceptances, and the setting up of off-balance-sheet special purpose 
vehicles to hide losses. The array of profound corporate governance issues in the banks 
clearly demonstrates the need for an alternative corporate governance mechanism that can 
deal with these issues and that will be mutually implementable by all those responsible for 
governance practice. 
 Conclusions 3.8
 
The aim of this chapter has been to review the literature on the corporate governance of 
banks, which is the main focus of this thesis. This chapter builds upon the previous chapter, 
which reviewed broader corporate governance theories and practices around the globe. 
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While presenting an extant review of bank governance, this chapter has also highlighted 
the significance of banks and why their effective governance is essential. It has further 
exposed the fundamental problems of corporate governance that have resulted in 
numerous bank scandals. This chapter also describes the governance of banks in 
developing countries, with a view to establishing an understanding of its evolution and 
practice in Africa, and especially in Nigerian banks. It has briefly reviewed the evolution 
of corporate governance in Nigeria and presented a profile of the banking sector as a basis 
for the ensuing investigation. The purpose of the review was to highlight the numerous 
issues facing banking governance and to reaffirm the justifications for this research project. 
Indeed, it provides a justification of the need for an alternative corporate governance 
method for banks, for which the traditional theories and practices reviewed in the previous 
chapter were found inadequate. The review and the fundamental issues it raises guided the 
identification of theoretical thought on culture and leadership as a more suitable 
underpinning for this study. The next chapter therefore discusses the relevance of these 
theories to corporate governance research, and to achieving the overall purpose of this 
thesis: developing a corporate governance theory for banks.  
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 Culture and Leadership: A Theoretical Chapter 4.
Framework 
 
 
 Introduction  4.1
 
 
Several works, including the relevant empirical and theoretical studies reviewed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, suggest the need for an alternative corporate governance mechanism for 
specific organisations, especially for the banking sector (Barth et al., 2006; Macey and 
O'Hara, 2003; Reaz and Turner, 2006; Aquilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Tomasic, 
2011). As a result, in this study, a culture and leadership theoretical framework is 
identified as providing us with a unique opportunity to comprehend the reasons for the 
corporate failures in the industry, particularly in developing countries such as Nigeria. The 
reason for using a framework such as this is that culture provides a frame of reference or 
logic by which leadership behaviour can be understood (Dorfman et al., 2006). As Schein 
(2004, p.1) concluded, ‘culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin’, and both 
are intrinsic to an institution (Howell, 2009). This chapter aims to present an overview of 
culture and leadership and their theoretical relevance to gaining a better understanding of 
the underlying issues of corporate governance. The chapter further demonstrates how the 
interaction of culture and leadership can provide an alternative framework that may 
resolve some of the shortcomings of the existing corporate governance practices 
highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
The chapter starts with a review of concepts related to culture, its theories and its practice, 
and also concepts and theories surrounding leadership and the significance of 
transformation theory for resolving organisational and group problems. In particular, it 
highlights the relevance of the transformational leadership style, as proposed by a number 
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of authors, including Burns (1978), Bass and Avolio (1993, 1994), Covey (1992) and Bass 
(1990). This chapter also examines the links between culture and leadership, in terms of 
their conceptualisation and their relevance to organisations, as presented by Schein (2004) 
and Hofstede (2001). In order to provide a strategic basis for the implementation of an 
alternative approach to good governance, this chapter also discusses the links between, 
and relevance of, social contract theory and trust. The chapter concludes with a reflection 
on the significance of both leadership and culture to the development of a corporate 
governance mechanism. 
 Culture: Concepts, Theories and Practices 4.2
 
Culture is a broad term that involves a diffuse set of ideas that can vary from the very 
inclusive “human-made” part of the environment to a shared meaning of a system 
(Sheweder and Levine, 1984). This entails actual behaviour as well as interpretations of 
behaviour, and those social, political and other factors that influence an individual’s 
behaviour and attitude, which are then translated into his/her actions (P. B. Smith et al., 
2002). Although culture has been defined in a great number of ways (Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn, 1952; Geertz, 1993; Hofstede, 2001), no single definition has been agreed 
upon by researchers as yet. For instance, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952, p.181) defined 
culture as 
‘consisting of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and 
transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, 
including their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their 
attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products 
of action, on the other, as conditioning elements in a future action’.  
 
 
For Geertz (1993, p.89), culture is ‘a historically transmitted pattern of meanings 
embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by 
means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and 
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attitudes toward life’. Geertz goes on to say that it is ‘an active and constructive dimension 
of social life rather than just a dull mechanism for ensuring social integration’ (Geertz, 
1993, p.216). From this perspective, culture can be explained as the blueprints through 
which people give their world meaning in all spheres. In his conclusion, Hofstede (2001, 
p.9) defined culture as, ‘the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another’. According to Hofstede, one’s 
mental programmes lie within the social environment in which one grew up and within the 
life experiences one has collected, which we know as one’s culture. 
 
As such, the understanding and effects of culture can only be relevant when the meaning is 
narrowed down to manageable proportions. Indeed, it is the cutting down to size of the 
culture concept that has ensured its continued importance in theory development, 
especially when one’s environment is said to guide one’s decisions by setting the 
preconditions for one’s behaviour (Perera, 1989; Bimberg and Snodgrass, 1988). Although 
cultural theory focuses on a direct articulation between the personality of the individual 
and the structure of the social system (Parsons, 1991), it is not sufficient to develop and 
present a cultural theory, unless such a theory is aimed at explaining certain phenomena 
(Geertz, 1993). Geertz further argued that its theoretical formulation, or conceptualisation 
must be ‘directed toward the task of generating interpretations of matters already in hand, 
not towards projecting outcomes or deducing future states of a determined system’ ( p.26). 
 
In other words, the deeper meaning and implications of cultural theory must seek to 
explicate the native actors, understand their actions, and determine what this tells us about 
how a particular society works (Edgar and Peter, 2002; Geertz, 1973). As S. H. Schwartz 
(1999) asserted, cultural value theory must be capable of understanding and explaining 
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existing problems and providing a guide as to how to solve them. Arguably, also, such 
theory can only be achieved through the novel line of interpreting the phenomenon to 
explicate its virtues, since culture and social structure are different abstractions of the 
same phenomenon (Geertz, 1993). The causation exposed by Geertz is also put forward by 
many other researchers, including Trompennar, (1993), Hofstede (2001), P. Smith (2001), 
and P. B. Smith et al. (2002). For instance, Hofstede (1991, p.8) states that ‘values are 
broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others’, and these are reflected in 
the societal norms and behaviours of people living in the same society or nation, which 
lead to a sequence of reactions to daily life events and situations, be they personal or 
institutional.  
 
In fact, it is the identified behaviours, attitudes or norms that ‘help to explain some of the 
more seemingly incomprehensible and irrational aspects of what goes on in groups and 
organisations’ (Schein, 2004, p.22). Both Schein and Hofstede saw culture as instrumental 
to studies in human behaviours that explain our world and place, since shared beliefs 
specify both what motivates people and what should motivate people (Kohn, 1990; S. H. 
Schwartz, 1999). Despite the criticisms about the concepts and theories of culture within 
the organisational field, Wong and Birnbaum-More (1994) took the view that Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions of power distance and uncertainty avoidance were still relevant.  
Perhaps, as Schein (2004) mentioned, this is because there is not yet a single pre-eminent 
point of view or methodology regarding the theoretical development of culture, rather a 
rich mixture of ideas and approaches drawn from social psychologists.   
 Leadership: Concepts and Relevant Theories 4.3
 
Although it is easy to identify leadership, it is often difficult to define precisely what 
leadership is. Moreover, even when assessing leadership, it becomes clear that it is an 
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enigmatic concept that requires some discussion (Howell, 2009). This is because there are 
almost as many definitions of leadership as there are leadership theories (Fiedler et al., 
1971). For instance, Bass (1990) claimed that, leadership can be conceived as a focus of 
group processes, as a matter of personality, as a matter of inducing compliance, as the 
executive of influence, as a particular behaviour, as forms of persuasion, as a power 
relation, as an instrument to achieve goals, as an effect of interaction, as differentiated 
goals, as the initiation of structure, and as any combination of these. In its simplification, 
Antonakis et al. (2004, p.5) indicated that leadership is about 
‘influencing process – and its resultant outcomes – that occurs between a leader 
and followers and how this influencing process is explained by the leader’s 
dispositional characteristics and behaviours, the followers’ perceptions and 
attributions of the leader, and the context in which the influencing process occurs’. 
 
 
 
This implies that the term leadership is based on the perspective from which it is being 
discussed (Bass, 1990; Schein, 2004; Yukl, 2010; Munley, 2011). Although there may be 
variations in the definitions of leadership used, two notions that underlie most of them are 
“process and influence” (Hunt, 2004). Indeed, the driving elements of process and 
influence explain why leadership is vital for effective organisational and societal 
functioning (Bass, 1990), and they can be seen in the various leadership theories 
developed to address issues and their implications (Zaccaro, 2001; Doh and Stumpt, 2005). 
Due to the broad nature and application of leadership, early studies grouped leadership 
theories into four main categories: essentialist theories, relational theories, critical theories 
and constructionist theories (Bolden and Kirk, 2009). The essentialist leadership theories 
rely on an objectivist paradigm and seek to identify and define what “leadership” is in 
universal terms, thus focusing on predictable leadership traits and behaviours (Stogdill, 
1974; Hersey and Blanchard, 1977; Bass, 1985). In relational theories, it is believed that 
leadership resides not within leaders themselves but in their relationships with others 
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(Kuada, 2010). For critical theorists, the focus is on the underlying dynamics of power and 
politics within organisations (Collinson, 2011). In other words, they emphasise the social 
and psychological processes that characterise the performance of leadership functions in 
organisations. Finally, the constructionist theorists construct shared meanings that enable 
people to make sense of their predicaments (Kuada, 2010).  
 
However, recent research has generally been based on two leadership perspectives – 
transformational and transactional. The transformational leadership model is described as 
binding people around a common purpose through self-reinforcing behaviours gained 
from successfully achieving a task (Bass, 1985; Avolio et al., 1995). Transformational 
leaders motivate and inspire their followers by identifying new opportunities, providing 
meaning and challenges, and articulating a strong vision of the future. They are said to be 
enthusiastic and optimistic while communicating clear and realistic expectations by 
demonstrating organisational commitment and sharing their visions with their subordinates 
for the good of the organisation (Oke et al., 2009). Conversely, the transactional leadership 
model stresses the specific benefits that subordinates will receive when they complete 
agreed tasks (Kuada, 2010; Ardichvili and Kuchinke, 2002). Specifically, the transactional 
model focuses on the exchange of favours that occurs between leaders and followers, and 
on the rewarding of good or punishing of poor performance (Fiedler, 1967).  
 
Burns (1978) stated that the difference between transformational and transactional 
leadership is simply related to what the leaders and followers offer one another. Both 
theories provide some intellectual support for the view that leadership styles, models and 
behaviours in one environment may be distinctly different from those elsewhere, without 
necessarily being ineffective. This is because the attributes seen as characteristic of leaders 
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may vary from place to place, and such distinctions are embedded in the culture of a 
society (Den Hartog et al., 1999). Moreover, despite the clear differences, Bass (1985) 
further argued that both transformational and transactional leadership principles can be 
found in all parts of the globe and in all forms of organisations and that, therefore, the two 
approaches are not at opposite ends of a bipolar dimension. However, in this research, the 
ideals of transformational leadership are used as the basis for the conceptualisation of 
leadership.   
 The Relevance of the Transformational Leadership Model 4.3.1
 
As a process by which ‘leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of morality 
and motivation’ (Burns, 1978, p.20), this model supports the proposition that leadership is 
a process of transformational influence (Bass, 1990). From the early works of M. Weber 
(1947) to modern works by Burns (1978), Bass (1985), Kanungo (1988), Conger (1990), 
and Schein (2004), the exploration of transformational leadership in both theory and 
practice has followed a variety of approaches, especially in studies of upper-level leaders’ 
behaviours (Hunt, 1999). In contrast to the self-interested motivation of transactional 
leadership, transformational leadership moves followers beyond self-interest to self-
actualisation, and involves charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation and individual 
consideration (Bass, 1985). Overall, transformational leadership is based on a compelling 
vision, strong personal values, and the demonstration of an exemplary character. 
 
Of significance here is the context in which leadership behaviour becomes related to the 
culture in an organisation or society. Burns (1978) was of the view that transformational 
leadership has a greater impact than transactional in all cultures and organisations. He 
argued that transformational leaders have goals that transcend their own self-interests, and 
work towards the common good of their followers. In other words, the transformational 
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leader shapes, alters and elevates the motives, values and goals of the followers in order to 
achieve significant changes. This presupposes that transformational leaders possess 
principles that may ultimately transform both themselves and their followers into persons 
who jointly adhere to model’s values. Building upon Burns’ (1978) ideas, Covey (1992) 
and Bass and Avolio (1994) agreed that transformational leadership relates to building on 
the human need for meaning, and the transformation of the followers’ self-interest. That is, 
it goes beyond their self-interest for the good of the group.  
 
Moreover, this type of leadership is believed to incorporate aligned internal structures and 
systems so as to reinforce overarching values and goals, an orientation towards long-term 
goals based on human values and principles, and a focus on mission and strategies. Bass 
and Avolio (1994) argued that transformational leaders display a sense of power and 
competence and develop the activities of the group towards a compelling vision of the 
future. This style of leadership also emphasises the importance of trust, beliefs and values, 
and often takes a value-based approach within the social context in which such aspects are 
situated (Diaz-Saenz, 2011). As Alvesson (2011, p.152) stated, ‘leadership is not just a 
leader acting and a group of followers responding in a mechanical way, it is a complex 
social process in which meanings and interpretations of what is said and done are crucial’. 
In other words, the transformational leader constructs a culture that fosters effective 
management, and achieves this by defining and instilling in the followers the belief that 
‘they can affect, if not control, their environment, including government regulation, 
market competition and technological change’ (Sashkin, 2004, p.194).  
 Culture and Leadership: Conceptualisation and Synthesis 4.4
 
Studies have identified that cultural attitude, belief systems and values define a leader’s 
behaviour as well as that of the followers (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005). While empirical 
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studies have provided support for the link between leadership and cultural context 
(Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 2004; Alvesson, 2011; S. Alexander et al., 2011), such links have 
been explained only in relation to specific events. As Schein (2004) argued, leadership and 
culture are elements of an institutional process through which behaviour is transformed 
and refined. This is premised on the reasoning that organisations disseminate behaviours 
that provide accepted values and norms for new recruits and on-going decision making, as 
well as for daily interactions. Similarly, since leadership is ‘about shaping beliefs, desires, 
and priorities’ (S. Alexander et al., 2011, p.xix), culture can be the most important social 
and contextual factor, influencing a leader’s capacity to influence others’ norms and 
behaviour within an institution (Schein, 1996). Building on the work of Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbecks (1961), Schein (2004, p.17) described organisational culture as  
‘a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered, or developed by a given 
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation 
to those problems’. 
 
 
 
Schein explained external adaptation as the physical survival of problems found in the 
external environment, and internal integration as social survival within the internal 
environment. However, Schein cautioned that not all groups learn integrated cultures 
through this process, because often groups, organisations and societies exist where beliefs 
and values work at cross-purposes to other beliefs and values, resulting in situations of 
conflict and ambiguity (J. Martin, 2002). In his attempt to contextualise leadership 
challenges in a cultural setting, Schein (2004) indicated that organisational culture 
involves three interconnected levels, arranged according to their visibility: (1) the artifacts 
and creations produced; (2) the underlying sets of values and (3) the basic assumptions. 
Schein’s framework considered the artifacts and creations produced to be the visible 
organisational structure and processes, which he explained as ‘the architecture of the 
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organisation’s physical environment, its language, its technology, and other social symbols’ 
(Schein, 2004, pp.25-26). Thus, he posited that, in analysing culture, ‘it is necessary to 
recognise that artifacts are easy to observe but difficult to decipher’ (Schein, 2004, p.36).  
 
The sets of values are the stated operating principles, that is, how people interact with each 
other and justify what they say or do as a group. This second level is said to contribute to a 
greater level of awareness within the society. Schein considered these first two levels to 
derive from an even deeper, invisible and more abstract third level consisting of a few 
basic assumptions. These assumptions include the relationship between the environment 
and the experiences of the group, the relationships among members of the group, and the 
group orientation towards time and space, which are taken for granted. Schein’s 
framework implies that it is these elements that lay down ways of perceiving, thinking 
about and evaluating the world and, more importantly, oneself and others. According to 
Schein, the ideal organisational culture would reflect the complex interaction between the 
assumptions and theories brought by the group and what the group learns subsequently 
from its own experiences. It is therefore the interconnections of these levels and 
assumptions that form the basis of Schein’s illustration of the cultural framework, as 
presented in Figure 4.1 below: 
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Figure 4-1 Illustration of Schein’s Framework of Culture (Schein, 2004, p.26) 
 
 
 
There are other studies that support the idea that cultural values are related to workplace 
behaviour, attitudes and their consequences for organisations (S.H. Schwartz, 1994; 
Hofstede, 2001). For instance, Hofstede (2001) presented the relationship between culture 
and consequences through external causes, which he referred to as the ‘stabilising cultural 
pattern’, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4-2 Hofstede’s Stabilising Cultural Model (Hofstede, 2001, p.12) 
 
 
Hofstede’s (2001) framework demonstrates that there is a feedback loop between culture 
and its institutional consequences, offering evidence of an element of causation between 
culture and institutions.  Chan and Cheung (2008) indicated that it is this causation that 
affirms the presence of cultural impacts on corporate governance practice. They argued 
that ‘the existence of statutory laws and regulations does not directly imply that the public 
must obey, but, it is their beliefs and value judgements that influence the effectiveness and 
outcome of the actual corporate governance practice’ (ibid. p.229). According to 
Hofstede’s (2001) framework, the emergence and enforcement of cultural patterns is often 
sensitive to the attainment of corporate goals and values. In Figure 4.2 above, Hofstede 
shows how, if changes are to occur, they must come through external influences that 
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include forces of nature, human action or trade, conquest or scientific development. 
Hofstede explained that these changes can occur through shifts in ecological conditions, 
technology, economic or geographic factors, urbanisation or historical events. Indeed, it is 
these ecological factors that affect the physical and social environment. He added that, at 
the centre, it is these societal norms that make up the value systems shared by major 
groups in the population, which have led to the development and patterns of maintenance 
of the institutional structures and ways of functioning that go on in society. These 
consequences affect the family environment, the educational system, and the political 
structure. 
 
According to Hofstede (2001), these institutions, once established, reinforce the societal 
norms that, together with ecological factors, lead to the maintenance of an institution’s 
structure and functioning. This means, when these institutions remain unchanged, the 
persistent influence of the majority value system patiently smoothens out new institutions 
until their structures and ways of functioning are again adopted within the societal norms. 
This implies that one of the most effective ways of changing the mental programmes of 
individuals is to first change their behaviour. Moreover, the ideas absorbed by cultures 
depend on what individuals think, imagine and learn, as well as the collective behaviours 
that shape and sustain the viable patterns of life in ecosystems. As Kunkel (1970, p.76) 
pointed out, the major problem in dealing with the economic development and growth of 
societies is ‘the change of those selected aspects of man’s social environment which are 
relevant to the learning of new behaviour patterns’. 
 
From the consequences of institutional structure and function, Hofstede (2001) identified 
four value dimensions that differentiate between cultures: individualism versus 
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collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and masculinity versus femininity. 
These four dimensions relate to the very fundamental problems that face any community, 
but to which different societies have found different answers, particularly in terms of the 
structural elements of culture that most strongly affect known behaviour in work situations 
and organisations. They are described below: 
 
a) In an individualist culture, people focus on themselves as unique and whole, 
without depending upon any group affiliation (Hofstede, 1980). Such societies 
consist of individuals who are highly independent (Salter and Niswander, 1995), 
responsible only for themselves and their immediate families, and who usually 
prefer loose social ties. In contrast, collectivist values emphasise interpersonal 
relationships and group affiliations. In this case, the self is defined as a part of the 
group, and in such cultures concerns over group welfare, equality and loyalty are 
prominent, as aggregate interests or the common good tend to prevail (Hofstede, 
1991; Very et al., 1997). This type of culture is regarded as a precondition for 
facilitating the effectiveness of leadership (Jung et al., 1995). Moreover, the 
transformational characteristics suggested by Bass and other proponents are linked 
to collectivism, describing a conceptual bridge between these two paradigms (Jung 
et al., 1995). 
 
b)  For uncertainty avoidance dimension, it assesses how people react to the unknown 
and, since the future cannot be perfectly predicted, how it is treated as a continuous 
threat that must be fought (Hofstede, 1980). Cultures that cannot tolerate 
uncertainty will try to control the future by any means, while those that can tolerate 
it will simply wait for it passively (Perera, 1989; Chow et al., 2001).  
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c) Masculine cultures are those with dominant gender role patterns. A value 
orientation with more emphasis on caring for others is described as more feminine 
(Very et al., 1997). Hofstede’s interest in this dimension was in looking at how 
different societies cope in different ways, and the effect the biological differences 
between the sexes are expected to have on the emotional and social roles of gender. 
 
d) The power distance dimension refers to the ‘extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organisations...expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally’ (Hofstede (1991, p.28). Power distance appears in the form 
of a hierarchy, and means that a society’s way of dealing with events is established 
through a system of superiors and subordinates. Here, people strive for power 
equalisation and demand justification for any power inequalities, including ‘power, 
wealth, social status and prestige, physical and mental characteristics as well as 
“privileges” according to laws, rights and rules’ (Hofstede, 1984, p.67).  
 
Although some may argue that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are a product of Western 
culture and thinking, later studies have supported the validity and reliability of the 
dimensions (Hofstede and Bond, 1984). The principles of the dimensions were also 
adopted by the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), using different terms to describe Eastern 
cultural values, namely moral discipline, human-heartedness, integration and Confucian 
work dynamism, which were not identified by Hofstede. In this context, it can be argued 
that corporate governance as a social process may be influenced by the deep societal 
values in a given environment. In other words, institutional leadership and its level of 
success will depend on the congruence between cultural values and leadership processes. 
Summarising both Schein’s and Hofstede’s propositions, Alvesson (2011) stated that 
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culture forms leadership, rather than the other way round, and this is at least the case for 
the large majority of people designated as or emerging as leaders.  
 Significance of the Theoretical Framework to the Study of 4.5
Corporate Governance  
 
 
Corporate governance codes, practices and systems have emanated from diverse cultures 
around the world, and are linked to financing traditions, ownership structures and their 
legal origins. As Calori et al. (1997) indicates France’s core cultural values include 
egalitarianism, hierarchy and a respect for authority; thus, the country primarily depends 
upon internal corporate mechanisms rather than external constraints. In contrast, German 
cultural values emphasise performance orientation, along with practices reflecting such 
characteristics as low compassion, high autonomy and high assertiveness (Brodbeck et al., 
2002). In the Anglo-Saxon states (e.g., the US and the UK), corporate governance systems 
reflect the values of individualism, self-reliance, fair play, accumulating private property, 
and the sanctity of ownership rights, protected and enforced by external agencies and 
regulations (McCarthy and Puffer, 2002). 
 
There are also noticeable differences between the financial and business practices of 
European Union (EU) countries and non-EU Western countries, which can be explained in 
terms of local cultural conditions (Pratt and Behr, 1987). For instance, the Turnbull Report 
(2005) explains that the US auditors of listed companies are appointed by the boards of 
directors, while UK auditors are appointed by and report directly to the shareholders. The 
structures of boards of directors also differ between UK and US corporations (Monks and 
Minow, 2004). Likewise, the use of equity compensation (Brown and Higgins, 2001) and 
executive compensation levels (Coffee, 2005) can vary between the two countries. This 
supports the argument that existing corporate governance practices in Western economies 
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stem from their legal and economic systems (La Porta et al., 2000). However, recent 
studies of legislative and economic reforms have shown that these systems have failed to 
achieve effective governance objectives on their own (Hill, 2004).  
 
According to Gorga (2003), developing financial markets and corporate governance based 
solely on legal rules, and ignoring such aspects as informal norms and the political 
environment of the nation, is bound to fail. This makes intuitive sense, as the environment 
in which a corporation operates can affect its financial reporting and disclosure (G. G. 
Mueller et al., 1991). In fact, a strict application of legal rules and economic codes is not 
in itself sufficient to prevent the failure of corporations (Chanchani and Willet, 2004). In 
African countries, there is evidence that the framework for corporate governance has 
mirrored the legal, economic and cultural structures of the colonial West and their 
multinationals (Baydoun and Willet, 1995; Ayogu, 2001). As such, all of the financial 
information requirements in developing countries (including those in Africa) are 
contaminated by Western economic and legal influence (Baydoun and Willet, 1995). As 
Wanyama et al. (2009) explained, such instruments have been found culturally deficient 
and incapable of addressing several corporate governance issues, especially in the banking 
industry, which is a vehicle for economic growth. This implies that the success or failure 
of any corporation may have as much to do with external factors as internal ones.  
 
If culture is to be contextualised for corporate governance, the fundamental starting point 
is to define the proper level at which culture should be assessed (Lenartowicz and Roth, 
2001), since governance practices differ among different nations and organisations 
(Doidge et al., 2007). Moreover, culture is the ultimate, most frugal, and yet most 
meaningful basic set of axes with which to explain the broad range of attitudes, beliefs, 
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lifestyles and practices among a large population and/or organisation (Vinken et al., 2004), 
and this is what affects financial reporting and disclosure in an environment (G. G. 
Mueller et al., 1991). These reasons further strengthen the argument that leadership styles 
and behaviours are culture-bound.   
 Strategic Framework for Implementation 4.6
 
Culture and leadership evidently have an influence on the decision-making process and 
institutional performance, especially in balancing between economic and social goals and 
between individual and communal goals (Iskande and Chamlou, 2000). Those authors 
argued that a strategy would help to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations and society. In order to achieve this, there is a need to employ an acceptable 
social arrangement between people and institutions. On this note, it is considered that a 
social contract and trust between and within institutions and actors can provide the 
essential mechanism that is required to resolve the institutional and governance impasse.  
The concepts and relevance of social contract theory and trusts are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 Social Contract Theory: Concept, Philosophical Roots and 4.6.1
Relevance 
 
A precise definition of social contract theory is unavailable as the idea varies from theorist 
to theorist. Generally, social contract theory implies ‘using a hypothetical contract to 
determine the rights and duties of people and social institutions’ (Conry, 1995, p.187). The 
contemporary ideas of social contract theory are rightly associated with modern moral and 
political theory, which can be traced back to the political philosophers of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries. The full exposition of social contract theory is credited to 
Hobbes (1651/1996), J. Locke (1690/1980) and Rousseau (1762/1987), whose work has 
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been continued by the generations that have followed
16
. In fact, the traditional concept of 
social contract theory is implicit in the work of these political philosophers and is 
grounded on the following basic logic:  
a) a given human nature determines 
 
b) how people would live in the “state of nature” (that is if there were no social 
institutions), and this in turn determines 
 
c) the terms of an acceptable social arrangement, a contract, among the people or 
between people and a social institution.  
 
 
Both Hobbes’ and Locke’s philosophical ideas argued for the primacy and advantages of 
political liberty, self-interest, individual rights and autonomy over traditional expositions 
of political and economic obligations owed to authorities. Although they differ in a 
number of important respects, together they led to the creation and justification of the idea 
of normative relationships between people and their political and economic institutions. 
Locke’s basic idea of the social contract provides a clearer guide for assessing government 
legitimacy. Moreover, his idea of social contract theory was more amenable than Hobbes’, 
particularly for the Europe of his day, and is believed to have helped ‘to change the 
philosophical and political assumptions of humanity’ (Laslett, 1960, p.16). This is not to 
say that Locke’s theoretical foundation is completely free from the influence of context.  
Nonetheless, it ultimately led to the justification of the emergence of the state and the 
identification of the mutual responsibility of citizens and their state.  
 
                                            
16
The generations of philosophers to the social contract theory debate include Ritchie (1891) and more 
recently Raw (1972) and Gauthier (1986). 
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Generally, the differences in concepts and theories of the social contract came from the 
philosophers’ interpretations of the concept of human nature (T. Donaldson, 1982; 
Gauthier, 1986; Keeley, 1988; Dunfee, 1991; Sullivan, 1986). Here, human nature is 
described as ‘a set of pan human needs, drives, predispositions, tendencies, propensities, 
and actual behaviours’ (Sullivan, (1986, p.535). While early philosophers’ conceptions of 
social contract theory focused on the origin and legitimacy of political institutions, 
subsequent developments have moved the theory towards applications into various spheres 
of human activity (T. Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999)
17
. For instance, A. Smith (1776/1982) 
argued for the economic relationships in the social contract while recognising the 
individualist ideas of Hobbes and Locke. Although Smith’s work focused on institutional 
reform, the aim was to harness individuals’ pursuit of their perceived interests in mutually 
beneficial ways, which was seen as opposing the basic foundation of Hobbes’ social 
contract principles. For Smith (1776/1976, p.1), ‘no matter however selfish man may be, 
there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of 
others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though they derive nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it’.  
 
 
Although most moral, political and organisational imperatives have their roots in some 
concepts of human nature (Ryan, 1974), every organisation can be described in terms of 
goals, objectives, technology, structure, power relationships, economics, legal rules and so 
on (Benson, 1977). Of significance in the philosophical proposition of Hobbes’ social 
contract theory is the prediction of an awful, perennial war of all against all in the absence 
of a social contract. According to him, without any rules at all, the lives of men would be 
                                            
17
 They made the simple assumption that ‘we can understand better the obligation of key institutions, such as 
business or government, by attempting to understand what is entailed in a “contract” between these 
institutions and society’ (Benson, 1977, pp.16-17). 
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‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ (T. Hobbes [1651] 1972, p.186). Indeed, Hobbes’ 
idea was to highlight the benefits that society, community and organisations would expect 
to receive from the state. His ideas also provide an objective basis for morality through 
mutual agreement. For Locke, the absence of a social contract could permit the free-rider 
syndrome that primarily underlies institutional agency problems. Locke’s ideal declared 
that individuals could not be subject to the will of another without giving their consent, 
although he did not clarify how or when their consent was actually granted. 
 
Though the philosophy of the social contract has become entrenched in our organisational 
and societal approaches, Hodapp (1990) cautioned that the theory must be seen to provide 
meaningful consent and agreement. Agreeing with this fundamental requirement, T. 
Donaldson (1982) argued for corporate legitimacy based on the consent of those affected 
by the nature of the business activity. Moreover, he added that the corporation itself exists 
only through the cooperation and commitment of society. With the growing concern over 
the use of “social contracts” in business, Hung and Huang (2010) proposed that social 
contracts should be seen as processes in which a person’s immediate surroundings are 
constantly adapting, revolving and evolving. The immediate surroundings of an individual 
can be termed “micro-social” and the broader, outer parts “macro-social” (T. Donaldson 
and Dunfee, 1994). This is because an individual’s choice of action is first influenced by 
their immediate environment or group norms, followed by the organisational code of 
action, then by societal and cultural pressures, and finally by the core of human nature 
(Hung and Huang, 2010). The attempt to find a form of association that will defend and 
protect, with the whole common force, the person and goods of each associate is the 
fundamental problem to which the social contract provides the solution. Thomson (1986, 
p.96) stated: 
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‘if we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that 
it reduces itself to the following terms: each of us puts his person and all his power 
in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate 
capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole’.  
 
 
 
This argument presupposes that, in place of the individual personality of each contracting 
party, the act of the association creates a moral and collective body that requires the 
promotion of cooperation among the players (Axelrod, 1990). The latter author suggested 
that cooperation could be achieved by ‘transforming the strategic setting itself…by 
enlarging the shadow of the future’ (p.124). This suggestion presumes that mutual 
cooperation can only be realised if the future is sufficiently important relative to the 
present; otherwise, there may not even be a form of cooperation that is stable. Therefore, 
in order to increase cooperation by enlarging the shadow of the future, the durability and 
frequency of interactions between individual parties should be encouraged. Axelrod (1990) 
also indicated that organisations are especially effective at carrying out interactions 
between specific individuals, and this makes it easier for workers to develop stable, 
cooperative relationships. As a construct, cooperation can improve performance, and 
indeed the central organising process, which has important implications for organisations 
(Keller and Loewenstein, 2011). Finally, even though no monolithic version of the social 
contract exists, any operational social contract must specify ‘who are the parties to the 
agreement, how are they situated to one another, what are the intentions, capacities, and 
interest of the individuals involved, what rights and powers do they have, and what is the 
purpose of their agreement’ (S. Freeman, 2007, p.17).    
 Trust: Concepts and Relevance   4.6.2
 
There has been a considerable increase of late in the interest among researchers in the 
concept of trust, and in its application to a variety of important social and organisational 
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issues (Hardin, 2004), especially in the postmodern society where there are continual new 
opportunities and challenges, whether at the interpersonal, organisational or cultural level 
(Williamson, 1993; Lewis and Weigert, 2012). Broadly, trust can be defined in relation to 
(1) individual expectations, (2) interpersonal relationships, (3) economic exchanges, and 
(4) social structures (Zand, 1972; Hosmer, 1995; Chiles and McMakin, 1996). On 
individual expectations, Zand (1972, p.232) defined trust as ‘increasing one’s vulnerability 
to the risk of opportunistic behaviour of one’s transaction partner, whose behaviour is not 
under one’s control in a situation in which the costs of violating the trust are greater than 
the benefits of upholding the trust’. This has been explained as the outcome of 
expectations regarding (1) the persistence and fulfilment of the natural (and existing) 
social order in which the individual finds himself or herself, (2) competent role 
performances from those involved with the individual, and (3) morally correct role 
performances from those associated with the individual (Barber, 1983).  
 
Within interpersonal relationships, trust is ‘a concomitant expectation that the other will 
reciprocate in achieving mutual cooperation’ (Carnevale et al., 1982, p.13) or the 
‘expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written 
statement of another individual or group can be relied upon’ (Rotter, 1967, p.651). This 
concept appears to apply to superior/subordinate relationships and the personal 
characteristics of specific individuals involved in those relationships (Hosmer, 1995). In 
economic exchanges, trust is  
‘the expectation that another individual or group will make a good faith to behave 
in accordance with any commitments, explicit or implicit; be honest in whatever 
negotiations preceded those commitments; and finally not to take excessive 
advantage of others even when the opportunity prevails’ (Bromily and 
Cummings, 1992, p.4)     .  
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In social structures, it is the ‘collective attribute based upon the relationships between 
people within a social system’ (Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p.968). In this context, shared 
social norms, repeated interactions and shared experiences are essential in the 
development of trust. Indeed, it is the honouring of identified moral obligations inherent in 
the social norms that generate trust that ultimately constrain opportunistic behaviours. The 
general view of scholars is that trust can be defined on the basis of four identified 
dimensions, which are founded on notions of vulnerability (Luhmann, 1979; Barber, 1983) 
and expectations or beliefs (Luhmann, 1979). Using these dimensions, Mishra (1996, 
p.265) defined trust as ‘one party’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on 
the belief that the latter party is (a) competent, (b) open, (c) concerned, and (d) reliable’. 
Here, “vulnerability” is a critical condition of trust (Boss, 1978; Mayer et al., 1995; 
Moorman et al., 1992). The latter stated that, ‘without vulnerability, trust is unnecessary 
since outcomes may be inconsequential for the trustor’ (Moorman et al., 1992, p.82). 
Child (2001, p.275) asserted that trust is ‘concerned with the willingness of one person or 
group to relate to another in the belief that the other’s actions will be beneficial rather than 
detrimental, even though this cannot be guaranteed’. He explained that trust is vital for any 
relationship, business or otherwise. In today’s competitive business world of dynamic 
managerial changes, trust is an essential requirement and forms the organisational glue 
(Shaw, 1997) in both political approaches and technical matters (Earle, 2009). More 
importantly, the latter argued, trust is a public good. 
 
Although trust is vital to successful change, it is becoming more elusive in many 
organisations. Moreover, trust itself is based on the assumption that one person can and 
wants to meet the other’s needs, and this depends on the situation, and the attitudes and 
dispositions of those involved in the potentially trusting relationship (Lewis and Weigert, 
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1985). A considerable number of theoretical perspectives of trust have been taken in a 
number of disciplines, including management, and have identified the relevance of trust 
for interpersonal and organisational relationships (Kramer, 1999), leadership and the 
leadership process (Kramer, 2011), and wider economic and social contexts (Putman, 
1993). While these studies promote the emergence of trust, they also clarify that the loss of 
trust can threaten the norms of collaboration and commitment (Hofstede, 1980). Both of 
these aspects suggest that trust is essential in achieving leadership effectiveness and higher 
performance with respect to commitments to the organisation and organisational 
citizenship behaviour, among others (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002).  
 
In the wake of the social excesses and business abuses of the 1980s, a move was made to 
conceptualise these issues within law and economics. This shaped agency theory, 
transaction cost perspectives and theories of collective action in organisational analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). This led to increasing interest in trust and its implications for the 
management of organisations, particularly regarding why it is important in different 
managerial settings, collaborations and alliances and their governance structures (Beccerra 
and Gupta, 1999). Beccerra and Gupta pointed out that trust-embedded theories often 
provide a richer explanation of inter-organisational issues, and this is what Child (2001) 
explored as the fundamental bond in global collaborations, especially in the international 
alliances and networks that exist between firms, stretching across cultural and 
geographical boundaries. Furthermore, McAllister (1995) contended that, within 
organisations, trust helps with the effective implementation of strategy, and leads to 
greater managerial coordination; Lawler (1992) argued that it also produces effective work 
teams. For instance, evidence abounds that trust in groups and organisations is related to 
“bottom-line” effects or actions that affect the net earnings of the corporation (Dirks and 
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Skarlicki, 2004). One of the reasons for this is that trust in leadership harnesses the 
followers’ efforts towards achieving a common goal or strategy. However, Shaw (1997) 
suggested that, in order for any organisation to achieve trust and cooperation, leaders must 
(1) justify that they can meet expectations, (2) act with integrity, and (3) demonstrate a 
concern for meeting expectations. In addition, to achieve any degree of intensity in a trust 
relationship, the basic elements by means of which the trustor evaluates the 
trustworthiness of the trustee must be present (Bews and Uys, 2002). Depending on the 
contextual factors that influence the importance of each facilitator, Bews and Uys (2002) 
suggested that the trustor must evaluate the trustworthiness of the trustee by considering 
the relevant dimensions.   
 
The potential benefits of trust are enormous, particularly if the trusting player is paired 
with a trustworthy counterpart (Frank, 1988). For instance, in a behavioural context, the 
benefit lies in the social action that trust underwrites. Lewis and Weigert (1985, p.971) 
explained that, behaviourally, to trust is ‘to act as if the uncertain future actions of others 
were indeed certain in circumstances wherein the violation of these expectations results in 
negative consequences for those involved’. This suggests that, when others act in ways 
that imply they trust the other parties, this behaviour is reciprocated, and conversely, if 
their actions appear to violate the established trust, they in turn will be mistrusted 
(Luhmann, 1979). This occurs because trust in others’ veracity functions as a foundation 
for relations among human beings, and once it wears away, institutions collapse. In fact, 
evidence suggests that it was the breakdown of trust and trustworthiness that led to the 
collapse of corporations such as Enron, Tyco and Arthur Anderson (Kramer and Cook, 
2004), all of which have been referred to in research on corporate governance failures. 
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Recent changes in the business environment have radically increased the demands that 
businesses have to fulfil, such as the need for ‘the presence of interpersonal and/or inter-
organisational trust’ (Lane, 1998, p.1). Moreover, trust is not only regarded as an 
important coordination mechanism (Braddach and Eccles, 1989) but is increasingly 
viewed as a precondition for superior performance and competitive success (Lane, 1998). 
It is for these reasons that theories of trust share three common assumptions. Firstly, they 
assume ‘a degree of interdependence between trustor and trustee’ (Lane, 1998, p.3). 
According to Luhmann (1979), this only becomes relevant when the completion of one’s 
own activities depends on the prior action or cooperation of another person, ‘otherwise 
there would have been no need for individuals to trust if not for social relationships’ 
(Lewis and Weigert, 1985, p.969). The second assumption is that trust provides a way to 
cope with risk or uncertainty in exchange relationships. Indeed, risk arises in economic 
theory because trusting behaviour exposes the agent to the presumed opportunistic 
behaviour of the other business partner. The third assumption relates to the belief or 
expectation that the vulnerability resulting from the acceptance of risk will not be taken 
advantage of by the other party in the relationship.  
 
Despite these common assumptions, divergent theories have emerged, in part due to the 
underlying models of human nature, in which man may or may not be primarily seen as a 
rational egoist, and where social interaction could either be informed by moral 
considerations or by cultural scripts and the meanings of systems. Other researchers have 
pointed out that the divergence can also be due to the context in which the trust 
relationship is situated, or the object of trust that is considered (Lane, 1998). While 
101 
 
divergence exists for these reasons, Lewis and Weigert (1985, p.967)
18
 claimed that any 
useful theory of trust must see it as ‘an irreducible and multidimensional social reality’ 
that can bridge both the micro and macro levels. In a trust relationship, the intensity is 
dependent upon several “dimensions” (Cloete and Engelbrecht, 2000; Mishra, 1996; 
Robbins, 2001), namely, ‘competency, concern, openness, and reliability’ (Mishra, 1996, 
pp.266-8), which are discussed below: 
 
a) Competence refers to an ‘ability within the technical and managerial levels, to 
wield influence in a particular speciality’ (Bews and Uys, 2002, p.22). In other 
words, it is the technical knowledge and interpersonal skills needed to perform 
certain tasks. In fact, leaders are characterised by the extent to which their 
followers trust them to make competent decisions (S. Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1991). 
For instance, in organisations, managers tend to develop relationships with their 
subordinates or others largely on the basis of trust in their competence (Gabarro, 
1987; Mishra, 1996).  
 
b) Concern refers to the degree of concern the trustee shows towards the trustor 
(Bews and Martins, 2002). It also encapsulates fairness and loyalty (Bews and Uys, 
2002), and exists not only in the hierarchical relations in an organisation but also 
among individuals at the same level in the hierarchy
19
. This is what Mishra (1996, 
p.267) referred to as the ‘balancing of one’s self-interest with others’ interests’. 
Here, followers’ expectations of their leader’s degree of concern for the needs and 
                                            
18
 Lewis and Weigert (1985) explained that, at the micro level, trust is envisaged both between individual 
persons and between organisations. In this case, interpersonal trust between individuals is derived from 
membership of the same social group, while trust between organisations refers to trusting behaviour on the 
part of corporate actors who differ from the sum of individuals constituting the corporate unit (stakeholders). 
 
19
 Some scholars have used “concern” interchangeably with benevolence, for example, Mayer et al. (1995). 
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interests of others largely define their trust in the leadership (Nanus, 1989; Bromily 
and Cummings, 1996).  
 
c) Openness means the flow of information that is needed to get a task or job done, 
or the honesty in a personal relationship between a trustor and a trustee. It is a 
condition of trust (Butler, 1991) and a key aspect of working relationships in 
organisations (Gabarro, 1987). As the former explained, it is not the amount of 
information shared that is important but the level of openness and honesty one sees 
in another.  
 
d) Reliability deals with the consistency of words and actions. According to Ouchi 
(1981, p.101), ‘expectations about consistent or reliable behaviour’ underlie 
trustworthiness. Thus, in an organisation, the observation of reliable, consistent or 
dependable behaviour through the matching of words and actions builds trust. 
 
Mishra (1996) concluded that trust exists only when all four dimensions are present, and 
stated that they are increasingly recognised as critical in addressing organisational crises. 
As Murnighan et al. (2004) stated, even within the legal framework, contracts provide an 
assurance mechanism that can allow a cooperative process to be initiated in order to give 
trust a toehold. Although, in some cases, there could be difficulties in creating and 
maintaining trust between leaders and their constituents even under the best circumstances 
(Hardin, 2004; Kramer and Gavrieli, 2004), such difficulties can be overcome by 
designing more effective governance processes (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998), as well as by 
fostering greater transparency and perceived accountability (Bennis et al., 2008). 
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  Conclusion 4.7
 
This chapter has discussed culture and leadership as an underpinning theoretical 
framework that offers a nurturing alternative form of corporate governance for banks. This 
is in response to the need for the development and refinement of an appropriate corporate 
governance mechanism for banks following continual corporate scandals and the 
insufficiency of the existing code of corporate governance that was developed based on 
economic and legal models. Effective corporate governance might prevent more scandals 
in the future, if it is mutually complied with (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Rhodes and van 
Apeldoom, 1998). Concepts and theories of culture and leadership have been discussed, 
and which form the central contextual streams of this research. Their links to the 
contextualisation of a corporate governance system have been justified. The chapter has 
also outlined the importance of the social contract and trust as relevant approaches to 
producing an effective mechanism or strategic bridge between leadership and followers in 
governance process. The overall aim of the chapter was to enhance our understanding of 
the mechanism at work, and lay further foundations for including these aspects in the 
corporate governance framework for banks. This chapter not only highlights that culture 
and leadership influence corporate governance issues through various dimensions but has 
also begun to allude to the development of a qualitatively based theoretical construct. The 
next chapter focuses on the research design, methodology and paradigmatic approach 
underpinning the research.  
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 Research Methodology Chapter 5.
 
 Introduction 5.1
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the concepts, theories, and practice of corporate governance were 
illustrated, with particular reference to banks. Chapter 4 discussed a potential theoretical 
framework for uncovering the corporate governance phenomenon. This chapter begins 
Part II of this thesis, which deals with the methodology used in this study to address the 
corporate governance issues identified in the banking industry. A research methodology is 
the ‘overall approach to the research process, from the theoretical underpinning to the 
collection and analysis of data’ (Hussey and Hussey, 1997, p.54). The main aim of this 
chapter is to review and explain research designs and paradigms of inquiry within 
qualitative research. This lays a foundation for explaining the rationale behind the choice 
of research paradigm, the approach and the methods. It also leads to a review of different 
research methodologies and an explanation of why grounded theory (GT) was chosen as 
the methodology for the study. The chapter also presents the historical and philosophical 
background of GT, with a view to providing an understanding of its roots, and 
methodological relevance. Next, it demonstrates the relevance of GT to the research area, 
and discusses the main differences between the two main GT approaches (Glaser versus 
Strauss). Finally, the chapter offers a rationale for the adoption of Strauss’ version to guide 
the direction of this research process.  
 Qualitative Research Design 5.2
 
A research design is, ‘a process in terms of plans and procedures for the research that span 
the decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis’ 
(Creswell, 2009, p.3). The process involves conceptualising a problem and writing 
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research questions, and then goes on to data collection, analysis, interpretation and report 
writing (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). Generally, five sequential steps are considered when 
one is selecting a research design (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994): The first is to locate the 
field of inquiry in terms of either using a qualitative research approach, or a quantitative 
approach. The second is the selection of a theoretical research paradigm that is capable of 
informing and guiding the research process. The third relates to linking the identified 
research paradigm to the empirical world through a methodology. The fourth is the 
selection of data collection methods. The fifth is the selection of the technique to be used 
for the analysis. 
 
Although qualitative research ‘means different things to different people’ (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p.11), it relates to the ‘assumptions and the use of interpretive/theoretical 
frameworks that inform the study of research problems addressing the meaning individuals 
or groups ascribe to a social or human problem’ (Creswell, 2013, p.44). Indeed, qualitative 
research has been more broadly defined as 
‘a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research 
consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. 
These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or 
interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them’ (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011, p.3). 
 
 
Although the characteristics of qualitative research have evolved over time, Creswell 
(2013, p.44) argued that all forms of qualitative research involve the following common 
characteristics:  
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 ‘occurring within a given natural setting, complex reasoning through inductive and 
deductive logic, accepts multiple forms of data methods, allows researchers to 
reflect on their background and how it informs their interpretation of the 
information and what they gain from the study. It also involves holistically 
reporting multiple perspectives and the factors involved in a situation, and 
fundamentally the emergent design of the research processes’. 
 
The main point of interest in this thesis is to attempt to uncover the nature of the 
phenomenon underlying corporate governance practice in Nigerian banks. This 
phenomenon is assumed to be related to situations or events that might affect corporate 
governance (Weber, 2003). As Maylor and Blackmon (2005) stated, what influences 
qualitative research design are the topic being studied and the rules for doing the study in 
general. With this in mind, designing the qualitative research for this thesis commences 
with the identification of the paradigm of inquiry, the research approach and the research 
strategy, which lay the foundation for the choice of an appropriate methodological 
approach and its justification. 
 Paradigms of Inquiry in Qualitative Research 5.3
 
The term paradigm originally featured in Kuhn’s (1962) interpretation of the historical 
development and structure of science, which failed, unfortunately, to provide an 
unambiguous definition. At different points in his work, Kuhn described a paradigm as ‘a 
strong network of commitments - conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological’ 
(ibid, p.42), and later he reframed the concept as ‘an entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques…shared by a given scientific community’ (Kuhn, 1996, p.175). For Guba and 
Lincoln (1994, p.105), a paradigm is ‘the basic belief system or world view that guides the 
investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically 
fundamental ways’. It also ‘involves a framework of ideas, procedures and outcomes 
within which a piece of work is structured’ (Howell, 2013, p.223). Indeed, the paradigm of 
inquiry is the philosophical framework that largely determines how a researcher designs 
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and conducts an inquiry in the research process (Howell, 2013). There are many types of 
inquiry paradigms or philosophical assumptions that have been developed and used in 
research projects over time, including positivism, social constructivism, 
advocacy/participatory, critical theory, realism, interpretivism and pragmatism. These 
philosophical assumptions can be applied within the subjectivist (qualitative research 
design) or the objectivist (quantitative research design) approach, or in their combination. 
The choice of assumptions underlies what constitutes “valid” research and the choice of 
appropriate methods.  
 
As Kuhn did for the physical sciences, Lincoln and Guba (2000) introduced a 
paradigmatic revolution in the social sciences, in which they argued that knowledge is 
constructed and not discovered. The authors posited that, within qualitative research, five 
main paradigms of inquiry are commonly used, and can be identified as ‘positivism, post-
positivism, critical theory et al., constructivism, and the participatory/cooperative 
paradigm’ (ibid. p.168)20. They argued that these paradigms can be distinguished on the 
basis of three fundamental questions or philosophical assumptions (ontological, 
epistemological and methodological), which are interconnected as explained below:  
 
a) Ontological Questions 
Ontology relates to the ‘nature of reality and its characteristics’ (Creswell, 2013, p.20), 
and ‘stems from an enlightenment of metaphysical concern with reality or what exists’ 
(Howell, 2013, p.222). The questions asked relate to ‘what is the form and nature of reality 
and, what is there that can be known about it’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.108). 
Ontologically, Howell (2004, p.4) asserted that, according to positivism, ‘an external 
                                            
20
 Lincoln and Guba (2000) added the participatory/cooperative paradigm after accepting criticism of their 
initial four paradigms on ‘Paradigmatic Controversies and Contradictions’ in the first edition of the book in 
1994 by John Heron and Peter Reason (1997).  
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reality existed, which could be discovered and totally understood’. In fact, the approach is 
sometimes labelled “naïve realism”. In other words, reality exists but is apprehendable, 
and this is akin to cause and effect laws. Under post-positivism, the meaning of reality can 
only be understood imperfectly and probabilistically, and the approach is concerned with 
criticising existing reality (Howell, 2013). In the ‘critical theory et al.’ paradigm, the idea 
is that reality is shaped by ‘social, political, cultural, economic, and ethnic and gender 
values crystalised over time’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.105).  
 
As Howell (2013, p.51) explained, critical realism involves ‘a distinction between the 
knowledge of human beings which can change and knowledge that is of things…which is 
discovered’. In constructivism, the ontological assumption is that reality is locally 
constructed and specific in nature, and can relate to individuals or even across cultures, as 
groups/individuals are changeable. Finally, Lincoln and Guba (2000) considered the 
participatory paradigm to involve a reality that is co-created through the mind and the 
cosmos or external world. In other words, it is co-created by the researcher and the 
participants in the research. This, Howell (2013, p.94) stated, ‘is based on 
phenomenological positions as its ontology perceives reality as integrated with human 
existence and interaction between subjective and objective perspectives’. 
 
b) Epistemological Questions 
Guba and Lincoln (1994, p.108) explained that epistemology identifies ‘the relationship 
between the knower or the would-be knower and what can be known’. This means that it 
concerns the understanding between the researcher and those being researched, and relates 
to the nature of knowledge and the justification of how we know what we know (Creswell, 
2013). For the positivist, the researcher is held to be objective and his findings true, while 
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post-positivism assumes that objectivity remains a “regulatory deal”, meaning that 
‘replicated findings are probably true’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.110). In ‘critical theory 
et al.’, it is assumed that the investigator and the investigated are interactively linked, as 
such findings are value-mediated and hence must influence the inquiry (Howell, 2004). 
Constructivism also assumes that findings are ‘created and develop as the investigation 
progresses’ (ibid. p.6). In other words, the results are created through consensus and 
individual construction, including the constructions of the investigator. Finally, the 
participatory paradigm considers the critical subjectivity in participatory transactions with 
those being researched. Here, it is assumed that ‘knowledge can be obtained through 
experiential, propositional and co-creating of findings’ (Lincoln and Guba, 2000, p.168). 
Experiential knowing is explained as ‘the subjective-objective knowing by acquaintance, 
by meeting, by a feeling of participation in the presence of what is there’ (Heron and 
Reason, 1997, p.278). 
 
c) Methodological Questions 
The methodological assumption determines ‘how the inquirers go about finding out what 
can be known’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.108), and is concerned with the entire process 
of the study. Methodologically, positivism can be achieved through the use of quantitative 
methods of hypothesis testing, through scientific experiments and the manipulation of 
confounding conditions (Howell, 2013). Post-positivism is similar to positivism in this 
regard, and provides sets of immutable laws that enable prediction but also include the use 
of qualitative methods in the disproving of hypotheses. ‘Critical theory et al.’ rests on 
inquiry that requires a dialogue between the investigator and the subjects of the inquiry, 
that is, it rests upon seeing how the structures might be changed and comprehending the 
actions required to affecting change. Constructivism is aimed at understanding how 
111 
 
individual construction can be elicited and refined through interactions between 
investigator and respondent, while the participatory paradigm involves a collaborative 
form in which everyone involved is engaged together in socio-political dialogue, both as 
researchers and co-subjects. This is achieved through primacy of practice and language 
grounded in shared experience and situational context (Howell, 2013). 
 
Even though each of these paradigms of inquiry serves as a major point of emphasis 
around which a qualitative research paradigm or paradigms could be considered, as in all 
cases, the answers expected from the defining questions are ‘human constructions’ (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1994, p.108) that do not require proof. As Creswell (2013) and Howell (2013) 
variously conclude, each of the above mentioned paradigms of inquiry identifies specific 
methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives and indicates how these fit 
together when underpinning a situational research project. For instance, while positivism 
and post-positivism hold a deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine 
effects or outcomes, the latter paradigms, which display elements of phenomenology, seek 
to understand the world in which a particular phenomenon is embedded.  
 Constructivist21 Paradigm of Inquiry 5.4
 
Any of the identified paradigms (positivism, post-positivism, interpretivism, critical theory, 
constructivism or participatory) could have been used to uncover the phenomena under 
investigation, but the choice was always going to have important effects on the final 
outcome of the research and its relevance to corporate governance issues, as different 
paradigms relate to different strands of thought (Schwandt, 1998). Recently, the 
constructivist paradigm has gained acceptance in the lexicon of social science 
                                            
21
 The terms constructivism and constructionism are used interchangeably by sociology and psychology 
scholars and making a distinction between them has become problematic (Schwandt, 1998). In this thesis the 
terms are also used interchangeably on the premise that meaning is constructed by the participants in their 
daily interactions. 
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methodologists and philosophers, as opposed to the traditional paradigms in the century 
before. The philosophical view of constructivists holds that what we take to be objective 
knowledge and truth is the result of our perspective (ibid.). They also place priority on the 
phenomena of study and see both data and analysis as created from shared experiences and 
relationships with participants and other sources of data (Charmaz, 2006).  As Schwandt 
(1998, p.236) points out, ‘knowledge and truth are created, not discovered by mind’. 
Given the objectives of the research, and the socially constructed problems and nature of 
the corporate governance phenomenon, the constructivist paradigm of inquiry would seem 
appropriate for achieving the main aims of the research because, it understands reality as 
being locally constructed and based on shared experiences (Howell, 2013). Moreover, 
groups/individuals are changeable, and further, ‘the mind creates reality and claims that 
facts are produced by human consciousness’ (ibid. p.88).  
 
In this instance, the inquirer must elucidate the process of meaning construction, and 
clarify what and how meanings are embodied in the language and actions of the social 
actors being studied (Schwandt, 1998).  Also, human beings’ construction of interpretation 
does not occur in isolation but rather is intertwined with other shared factors, including 
understanding, practices, language and so forth, or ‘a variety of social and cultural factors 
that lead to shared construction’ (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p.12). In other words, in the 
constructivist paradigm knowledge is seen as an individual construct, a social and 
contextual process that takes place over time. It is then argued that constructivists 
emphasise the instrumental, practical function of theory construction and knowing.   
 
Although users of constructionist inquiry may be split into three varieties, namely 
psychological, radical and social (Raskin, 2002; Constantino, 2008), the three approaches 
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centre on human meaning making. They can vary somewhat, however, in their deeper 
application. Firstly, psychological constructivism focuses on issues related to how people 
learn and how they carry out the process. This approach is more relevant to the education 
field. Secondly, radical constructivism emphasises the ability of human beings to use the 
understandings they create to help them navigate life, regardless of whether or not such 
understandings match an external reality (von Glaserfeld, 1995). In fact, this is an extreme 
form of the psychological approach. Thirdly, social constructionism is fundamentally 
related to both the epistemological and the ontological assumptions of constructivism in 
‘describing the bodies of knowledge developed over human history as social constructs 
that do not reflect an objective external world’ (Constantino, 2008, p.118). Hence, social 
constructionism can be thought of as a theoretical orientation, which offers a radical and 
critical alternative inquiry, especially in the social science disciplines and the humanities 
(Burr, 2003). This is premised on the belief that we take a critical stance toward our taken-
for-granted ways of understanding the world, the idea being that everything an individual 
come to know is determined by a variety of factors, such as ideology, language, politics, 
culture and religion.  
   Paradigm of Inquiry for this Research: Social Constructivist  5.5
 
As Letza and Sun (2002), Letza et al. (2004) and Letza et al. (2008) variously pointed out 
the corporate governance phenomenon is a socially constructed; a social process that 
emphasise on the dynamic nature of social reality. Since for the constructivists, knowledge 
is seen as an individual construct, a social and contextual process that takes place over 
time, a social constructivism paradigm of inquiry fits the nature of this study for a number 
of reasons:  Firstly, as Howell (2013, p.89) pointed out, social constructivism is an aspect 
of constructivism, takes the view that ‘individuals develop and give meanings to the 
world’, and utilises open-ended questioning (Creswell, 2009). Secondly, social 
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constructivism gives the researcher an opportunity to discover the ‘subjective meanings of 
experience…these meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the 
complexity of views rather than narrow the meanings into a few ideas’ (Creswell, 2013, 
p.24). Indeed, these subjective meanings are often negotiated socially and historically 
through interaction with others (Creswell, 2013).  
 
According to Blumer (1986, p.12), ‘the meaning of anything and everything has to be 
formed or constructed, learned, or transmitted through a process, and that is necessarily a 
social process’. Thirdly, it also enables the researcher to learn how, and to what extent, the 
studied experience is embedded in large and often hidden positions, networks, situations 
and relationships (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Indeed, social constructivism offers the 
researcher an understanding of the social practices engaged in by people, and their 
interactions with each other. Fourthly, the paradigm places more emphasis on ‘processes 
than structures’ (Burr, 2003, p.9)22, and accepts that interpretation is itself a construction 
of the inquirer, made about the actors under investigation. Finally, based on one of the 
primary gaps discovered in the literature, and within the theoretical framework, the 
intention in this research was to involve individual actors within banks who were well-
placed to direct the researcher on the subjective meanings relating to corporate governance 
issues. It was expected that this would lead to the construction of experiences, gained via 
interactions with the participants. It can be argued that the use of the social 
constructionism paradigm is a calling for the democratisation of the research relationship, 
leading to an acknowledgement that the accounts of the interviewees are equally valid in 
principle.  
 
                                            
22
 This was the basis for the arguments advanced by Letza and Sun (2002) and Letza et al. (2008) for an 
alternative corporate governance mechanism. 
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Moreover, given that the primary aim of this research is to understand the subjective 
meanings and experiences of the actors within the context studied, while maintaining an 
open mind towards the situation under investigation, inquiring through social 
constructivism represents an attempt to achieve objectivity by acknowledging the 
subjectivity of the research (Howell, 1998). Additionally, it is aimed at developing a 
substantive theory about the corporate governance of banks using the culture and 
leadership theoretical framework. However, despite the relevance of social 
constructionism to the nature of this research, Burr (1998) cautioned that this does not 
necessarily mean that we have limitless choice in how we may construe ourselves. It also 
certainly does not mean that we can simply decide to dispense with oppressive and 
limiting constructions just by ‘changing our minds about how we think about people’ (ibid. 
p.13). 
 The Distinction between the Constructivist and Interpretivist 5.6
Paradigms  
 
Even though the constructivist paradigm has been adopted for this study, there are 
similarities and differences between it and the interpretivist paradigm, more so in GT 
approach. In terms of their similarities, Guba and Lincoln (1989) argued that the 
constructivist paradigm is a replacement for the interpretivist; as such, they refer to the 
same paradigm. Moreover, Creswell (2013) stated that they can be combined in 
undertaking a research project, because both paradigms are committed to the study of the 
world from the point of view of the interacting individuals. The constructivists also 
acknowledged that the theories they produce are interpretations (Bryant, 2002). Moreover, 
to prepare an interpretation is ‘itself to construct a reading of these meanings…’ 
(Schwandt, 1998, p.222). In GT, it is accepted that the constructivist’s ‘concepts and 
theories are constructed by researchers out of stories that are constructed by research 
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participants who are trying to explain and make sense out of their experiences/lives’ 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.10). As such, the “essence” of what participants are trying to 
convey or represent is itself ‘a logical interpretation of data, as seen through the eyes of 
one particular analyst’ (ibid. p.47). Indeed, grounded theorists recognise that both 
paradigms subjective meanings emerge from the interpretation of data and its construction.  
Denzin (1998, p.322) also acknowledged that ‘meaning, interpretation, and representation 
are deeply intertwined in one another’. This implies that both paradigms are ontologically 
relativist. 
Although the constructivist and interepretivist paradigms share this general framework for 
human inquiry, other researchers, such as Schwandt (1998, 2000), have differentiated 
between them. For instance, in his 1998 work (p.222), the author argued that they differ in 
their persuasions, especially in the manner in which each answers the following questions: 
‘What is the purpose and aim of human inquiry (as distinct from inquiry into the physical 
world)? How can we know about the world of human action?’ This suggests that each 
persuasive approach can offer a somewhat different conceptualisation of what we are 
about when we inquire into the world of social agents. The author further stated that 
interpretivists ‘wrestle with maintaining the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity’ 
(Schwandt, 1998, p.223). Although constructivists share this concern too, their particular 
foils are the notions of objectivism, empirical realism, objective truth and essentialism 
(Charmaz, 2006). This distinction can be summed up as meaning that the interpretivist is 
epistemologically objectivist while the constructivist is subjectivist. Moreover, within the 
GT methodology, the differences can be in the ways of understanding what emergence 
means in their practice of GT research (Charmaz, 2000). As Charmaz (2006, p.149) 
concludes that we are part of our constructed theory and ‘this theory reflects the vantage 
points inherent in our varied experiences’.  
117 
 
 Research Approach 5.7
 
There are two major research approaches that are used by researchers: inductive and 
deductive. The choice of which to use is tied to the philosophical assumptions of the 
researcher or the research strategy (Saunders et al., 2007). The deductive approach is 
associated with the positivist paradigm, while the inductive is a tool for interpretive 
research (Creswell, 2009). Deduction refers to starting with the general or abstract concept 
and reasoning about how it applies to specific instances (Charmaz, 2006). Thus, it is a 
process of inferring particulars from a general statement and is a matter of logic. The 
approach seeks to exploit the strengths of the scientific method as a vehicle for 
establishing a causal relationship between two variables (Fisher, 2007). Generally, the 
deductive approach proceeds from the general case to the particular, from particular to 
particular or from general to general, and in all contexts it ‘involves the testing of a 
theoretical proposition by the employment of a research strategy specifically designed for 
the purpose of its testing’ (Saunders et al., 2009, p.590). This implies that the researcher is 
independent of the phenomenon under observation. However, the approach has been 
criticised because it does not fit several theoretical models, and because its tendency to 
construct a rigid methodology gives no room for alternative explanations of what is 
occurring. Moreover, the approach does not usually permit alternative explanations for 
behaviour, which is important because studies in business and management are concerned 
primarily with human behaviour, which can be quite complex and unpredictable.  
 
Conversely, the inductive approach has its roots in qualitative research, in which data are 
generated in a non-standard fashion. Here, emphasis is placed on individuals’ 
interpretations and participants’ experiences. In other words, the inductive approach is 
concerned with the relationship between theory and research, with the former generated 
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out of the latter (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Generally, an inductive approach allows a 
researcher to make more informed decisions about the research design and the appropriate 
strategies that could be used for the research, and more importantly it caters for likely 
constraints (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). The approach is more flexible than the deductive 
approach and has the advantage of allowing the researcher to make changes as the 
research progresses, while permitting facts to be discovered and conclusions drawn from 
the analysis of the collected data. Consistent with the requirements of the constructivist 
paradigm, this thesis employs the inductive approach in its analytical process. 
 Research Strategy 5.8
 
Many researchers would consider themselves to belong mainly to either the qualitative or 
the quantitative school, with each traditionally connected to distinctly different paradigms 
(Layder, 1993). Other researchers might switch between the two or combine both 
quantitative and qualitative strategies (Brannen, 1992). Quantitative approaches are 
derived from the positivist and post-positivist research paradigms. They were initially 
developed to study, through means of quantification, natural phenomena in the natural 
world, and can involve several analytical techniques, including cause-and-effect thinking, 
measurement and observation through surveys, experiments, and statistical and numerical 
modelling (Creswell, 2007). The qualitative method – which is used in this study – was 
developed to address some of the shortcomings of the purely quantitative research 
approach. The distinction between qualitative and quantitative rests on the fact that 
‘qualitative implies an emphasis on process and meanings that are not rigorously 
examined or measured (if measured at all) in terms of quality, amount, intensity, 
or frequency. Researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the 
intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied...They seek 
answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given 
meaning. Quantitative approaches, however, emphasise on measurement and 
analysis of causal relationships between variables, not process’ (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000, p.8). 
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Babbie (2004) stated that the qualitative approach is an effective strategy for studying 
subtle nuances in attitudes and behaviour and for examining social processes over time. 
Although personal preference is a legitimate and appropriate way to select a research 
strategy (Guba and Lincoln, 1994), in dealing with human behaviour, attitudes, beliefs, 
values and actions, which are often the underlying causes of issues like corporate 
governance, it is beneficial to subscribe to the qualitative strategy (Schein, 1996; Parry, 
1998). Besides, the theoretical framework of culture and leadership involves deep-set 
phenomena that manifest themselves at various levels and as such cannot and should not 
be measured quantitatively (Schein, 2004). Moreover, the qualitative approach and its 
data are inherently rich in substance and full of possibilities (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). 
Since the literature suggests that the qualitative research strategy places more focus on 
the social phenomena being addressed (Saunders et al., 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2008) 
and concentrates on the words and actions of the people being studied (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998), this shows that the strategy is better connected to the nature of this study’s 
research questions, the objectives that have been identified, the theoretical assumptions 
and the paradigm of inquiry chosen. Thus, it will help the researcher to develop a holistic, 
complex account of the issue being studied (Creswell, 2007). These qualities have 
informed the choice of the qualitative approach for this investigation of the phenomena 
underlying corporate governance in banks.  
 Methodological Review 5.9
 
A research methodology simply guides the researcher in carrying out the research, within 
the constraints of the research questions that have already been identified (Saunders et al., 
2007). According to Creswell (2009), the knowledge, strategies and methods used by the 
researcher determine the methodology and this suggests a causal link between the 
paradigm of inquiry and the methodology adopted for a research project. For instance, the 
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positivist paradigm uses experiments, surveys, and cross-sectional and longitudinal 
methodologies. In contrast, the phenomenological paradigms may use action research, 
ethnography, case studies or grounded theory. Given the adoption of social constructivist 
paradigm of inquiry for this study, the choice of methodologies was limited to the latter 
group. This is also because the choice of any methodology or combination of them 
depends on the objectives and research questions that have been set out (Bryman and Bell, 
2007; Collis and Hussey, 2009). These methodologies are discussed in the following: 
 Ethnographic Research 5.9.1
 
Ethnography means ‘the study of people’ (Howell, 2013, p.120). Methodologically, 
ethnography focuses on the manner in which people interact and collaborate in observable 
and regular ways (Gill and Johnson, 2010). The methodology ‘provides insights about a 
group of people and offers us an opportunity to see and understand their world’ (Boyle, 
1994, p.183) since the researcher immerses himself/herself in a social setting for an 
extended period of time, observing behaviour, listening to what is said in conversations – 
both between the participants and with the fieldworker – and asking questions. However, 
the main disadvantage of the ethnographic methodology is its inclusiveness (Fisher, 2007), 
and its emphasis on full participation during data collection. In such a situation, a 
researcher must cope with being a full-time member of a work group as well as doing the 
research (Collis and Hussey, 2009). Although direct observation would aid our 
understanding and interpretation and construction of the phenomenon under study, it 
would be difficult to accomplish these essential requirements, especially given that the 
context of this study is banking organisations.  
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 Action Research 5.9.2
 
The action research methodology is used for finding an effective way of bringing about a 
conscious change in a partly controlled environment (Collis and Hussey, 2009) and carries 
out the process of inquiry through a cycle of planning, acting, observing and reflecting 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Thus, it relies on the researcher and the client collaborating to 
diagnose a problem and develop a solution (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005). The 
methodology is often used to resolve organisational issues, such as the implications of 
change, by consulting those who are experiencing the issues directly. As Eden and 
Huxham (2005) contended, the findings of action research result from an involvement 
with the members of an organisation over a matter of serious concern to them. One of the 
weaknesses of action research is the belief that the actions or behaviour of a person can 
only be changed by testing them in action (Fisher, 2007). In addition, the method is 
associated with set timelines and is often costly to sustain over the full period of research.   
 Case Studies 5.9.3
 
A case study methodology involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, using multiple sources of evidence 
(Yin, 2003). Yin explained that a case study involves a systematic investigation into a 
single individual event or situation. According to Yin (2003), the main feature of a case 
study is exploring and understanding a phenomenon within a particular context. The 
research does not commence with a set of questions and notions about the limits within 
which the study can take place, or about the use of multiple methods of data collection. 
However, one of the identifiable shortcomings of case studies, as Mile (1979) argued, is 
the degree of energy required at each stage of the process. This puts a lot of stress on the 
researcher during the observation stage. Although Yin (2003) argued that the use of case 
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studies is only limited by a lack of understanding, further studies have revealed that 
research using case studies takes too long and results in massive, unreadable documents, 
or reports only the researchers’ conclusions (Saunders et al., 2007).  
 Grounded Theory 5.9.4
 
GT can be described as ‘a general method of comparative analysis’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967, p.1) that involves the use of a systematic set of procedures to develop an inductively 
derived theory about certain phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 2009). The methodology 
focuses on the development of new theory, which is generated from basic social processes, 
interactions or actions, identified through incidents by people who have experience of the 
phenomena in question (Goulding, 1999; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The overall features 
of the approach include the attempts to develop categories that illuminate the data, to 
saturate these categories in order to demonstrate their importance and to develop these 
categories into a more general analytic framework (Silverman, 2006). It is one of the 
interpretive methods that share the common philosophy of phenomenology (Stern, 1994) 
and also works toward constructing a theory (Charmaz, 2006). The approach has been the 
most widely used qualitative methodology in the social sciences and management in 
recent times (Altheide and Johnson, 1998). 
 
GT is primarily inductive
23
 and pursues the interpretations of those involved in the 
situation that is being researched and the construction of the researcher in relation to the 
data (Charmaz, 2006). In other words, it permits researchers to give accounts of their 
personal experiences and explain how they may have impacted on the study (Creswell, 
2007). Although not exclusively a qualitative method, GT ‘stands out among other 
methodologies in the investigation of problems of “why” and “how” in a systematic way, 
                                            
23
 Howell (1998) stated that it also accommodates deductive processes. 
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that is “grounded” in the data itself as opposed to being deduced logically’ (W. J. Jones, 
2009, p.30). Moreover, the methodology offers great flexibility with regard to data 
collection and analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), and allows the researcher to use 
interviews as the data collection technique. 
 The Methodology Chosen for This Study: Grounded Theory 5.10
 
Even though either an ethnographic or a case study methodology could have worked very 
well for this study, GT provides both a methodology and a mode of analysis. Robson 
(2002, p.165) described ‘GT based research as one of the influential qualitative 
methodologies besides case studies and ethnography’, and it provides the advantage of 
enabling the researcher to delve into an unknown area, such as corporate governance and 
human nature or behaviour (Nwanji, 2005). In a research project such as this one, 
theoretical explanations of behaviour must allow for process, and recognise context and 
change (Goulding, 2000). In the context of the theoretical framework, human behaviour is 
considered not to be totally strategic because, in many cases, ‘people are calculated and 
rational, but when making decisions they turn to established routines of behaviour to attain 
their purposes’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939). 
 
According to Howell (2009, p.225), GT is ‘on the interpretation of a situation in relation to 
the course of action rather than calculation alone’, and such interpretations result in theory 
building. Moreover, the ‘GT perspective is the most widely used qualitative framework in 
social science study’ (Denzin, 1994, p.508). Given the literature’s identified need for an 
alternative method of corporate governance for banks, particularly in Nigeria, GT should 
satisfy the requirements by allowing theory to emerge from the accounts of those involved 
in the corporate governance process. Moreover, ‘only GT provides the emergence of 
theory from the analysis of a…particular situational context’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 
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p.23). Furthermore, in contrast to alternative methodologies, GT allows a wide range of 
data sources to be used, and this helps the researcher to gather various perceptions and 
viewpoints on the problem (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  These advantages has therefore 
encouraged the researcher to take the opportunity to use it in a different field (corporate 
governance), within an entirely different environment (the banking sector in Nigeria).  
 The Philosophical Roots of Grounded Theory 5.10.1
 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) provides a formal 
description of the GT approach to handling and interpreting qualitative data. The approach 
was developed in the early 1960s, during what can be described as a participant 
observation study of hospital staff’s care and management of dying patients in the US. The 
authors characterised the approach as one oriented towards the inductive generation of 
‘theory from data that has been systematically obtained and analysed’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
2009, p.1). The most significant aspect of GT is the intention that it should be used for 
generating theory where little is already known, or to provide a fresh slant on existing 
knowledge using an interpretive mode (Charmaz, 2006; Goulding, 1998; Locke, 2003). 
Effectively, the methodology seeks to challenge the status quo in social science research 
through the generation of theory from the research situation in the field as it is, rather than 
to test “grand theories” in a deductive manner (McGhee et al., 2007). According to 
Charmaz (2006, p.6), the GT approach ‘provided a powerful argument that legitimized 
qualitative research as a credible methodological approach in its own right rather than 
simply as a precursor for developing quantitative instruments’.  
 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) ideas were influenced by the theoretical thoughts of the 
pragmatist tradition and the early symbolic interactionism of Dewey (1922), Mead (1934) 
and Blumer (1969). They argued that scientific truth results from both the act of 
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observation and the emerging consensus within a community of observers as they make 
sense of what they have observed (Suddaby, 2006).  As is widely acknowledged, Glaser 
and Strauss’ (1967) development of GT not only countered the ruling methodological 
assumptions based on the positivist perspective (K. Smith and Biley, 1997) or ‘a priori 
assumptions’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.3); the authors also ‘intended to construct 
abstract theoretical explanations of social processes’ (Charmaz, 2006, p.5). Indeed, their 
intellectual foundation was noted to be revolutionary at the time because it challenged the 
following ideas (ibid. p.6): 
a) ‘beliefs that qualitative methods were impressionistic and unsystematic, 
b) the separation of the data collection and analysis phases of research, 
c) prevailing views of qualitative research as a precursor to more “rigorous” 
quantitative methods, 
d) the arbitrary division between theory and research, and  
e) assumptions that qualitative research could not generate theory’. 
 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), addressing these challenges was necessary, 
because there was 
‘an over-emphasis in current sociology on the verification of theory, and a 
resultant de-emphasis on the prior step of discovering what concepts and 
hypotheses are relevant for the area that one wishes to research…in social research 
generating theory goes hand in hand with verifying it; but many sociologists have 
been diverted from this truism in their zeal to test either existing theories or a 
theory that they have barely started to generate’ (pp.1-2). 
 
 
 
In terms of guiding methodological completion, Glaser and Strauss (1967) led the way by 
providing written outlines for systematic qualitative data analysis with explicit analytic 
procedures and an explicit research strategy. Indeed, the development of GT ‘offered a 
general model for constructing new theory and some foundational research operations’ (D. 
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K. Locke, 1996, p.241). On that note, many scholars later associated GT with different 
paradigmatic stances. For instance, Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 1998) stance related to the 
intrepretivist approach, while those of Glaser (1978, 1992, 2003) and Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994) inclined towards the post-positivist. It should be noted that both Glaser, and Denzin 
and Lincoln, and their proponents relied on the objectivist approach in their methodologies, 
which erases the social context from which the data emerge. Furthermore, in her 
contributions to GT, Charmaz (2006, p.130) demonstrated a constructivist position by 
arguing that ‘theory depends on the researcher’s view; it does not and cannot stand outside 
of it’, since different researchers may come up with similar ideas but differ in how they 
render them theoretically. Although each of these paradigmatic stances of GT has been 
criticised for different reasons (Atkinson et al., 2003; Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998; Stern, 1994; Charmaz, 2000), the essential aspect that remains is GT’s applicability 
across numerous areas, especially in providing ways for researchers to proceed with 
theorising.  
 Grounded Theory as a Methodology 5.10.2
 
GT is based on the social sciences and involves research about and with people (Howell, 
2013), and it mainly focuses on the generation of theory through comparative analysis 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Glaser, (1978, p.2) pointed out that ‘the methodology offers a 
rigorous guide to theory development that, at each stage, is closely integrated with a 
methodology of social research’.  As a qualitative research method that uses a systematic 
set of procedures to develop an inductively derived GT about a phenomenon, it is 
recommended that the process should ‘involve an iterative reciprocal relationship between 
data collection, theory and analysis’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.24). The method also 
consists of systematic, yet flexible, guidelines for collecting and analysing qualitative data 
in order to construct theories that are “grounded” in the data themselves. Methodologically, 
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GT offers a set of general principles and heuristic devices rather than formulas (Atkinson 
et al., 2003).  
 
For research purposes, the GT approach stimulates theoretical sensitivity in a study, assists 
in providing a secondary source of data, stimulates the type of research questions that 
should be asked, leads to direct theoretical sampling within the research, and helps to 
provide valid outcomes (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). These advantages, McGhee et al. 
(2007) argued, help the researcher to provide a justification for the study, to avoid 
conceptual and methodological pitfalls, to discover the extent of previous knowledge, and 
to assess whether GT is an appropriate method that meets the requirements of local 
research ethics. As a testimony, since its introduction GT has been used for qualitative 
studies within the fields of organisational studies, management and other disciplines (D. K. 
Locke, 2003). As Strauss and Corbin (1998) explained, the method aims at understanding 
the nature of human activity in organised settings and supports the construction of theory 
from the qualitative data gathered. More importantly, GT is said to put no limits on the 
range of data that can be used by the researcher. As Glaser and Strauss (2009, p.65) 
contended, 
‘different kinds of data give the analyst different views or vantage points from 
which to understand a category and to develop its properties; these different views 
we have called slices of data ... allow a multi-faceted investigation, in which there 
are no limits to the techniques of data collection, the way they are used, or the 
types of data acquired’ . 
 
 
They also stated that, in developing theory, although ‘the evidence from which a 
conceptual category emerged may not be necessarily accurate beyond a doubt, the concept 
is undoubtedly a relevant theoretical abstraction about what is going on in the area studied’ 
(p.23). Indeed, GT is an attempt to understand reality through social constructions and 
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objectivity, by recognising the subjectivity of the researcher and the researched in terms of 
their interpretive natures (Howell, 2000). It also has the ability to offer ‘a compromise 
between extreme empiricism and complete relativism by articulating a middle ground in 
which systematic data collection can be used to develop theories that address the 
interpretive realities of actors in social settings’ (Suddaby, 2006, p.637). 
 
This further suggests that researchers using GT are expected to clarify their studies’ 
formats by stating the phenomena to be studied, the purpose, the method used, the 
sampling process, the data collection and generation procedures, and the data analysis 
techniques. They should also clarify the empirical grounding of the study (i.e., the 
findings), and the conclusions, implications and recommendations regarding the findings 
(Suddaby, 2006). Although the use of GT in research projects has gained acceptance 
across disciplines, scholars have, over time, come up with different ways of 
conceptualising and operationalising the method. For instance, 
a) Glaser (1978) proposed the conceptualisation and generation of theoretical 
explanations of substantive areas, 
b) Strauss and Corbin (1998) focused on the conceptual description of the study area, 
and 
c) Charmaz’s (2006) GT approach focused more on the themes that occur within the 
data, rather than on concepts and categories.  
 
In this study, considering the various works of literature, the concern is the depth to which 
Glaser and Strauss took GT in their various statements and guidelines, as considered in the 
next section.  
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 Contrasting the GT Approaches of Glaser and Strauss 5.10.3
 
Although Glaser and Strauss successfully collaborated to set out an initial description of 
the aims and methods of GT in their classic work of 1967, which inspired generations of 
qualitative researchers, the two originators eventually took GT in somewhat divergent 
directions (Charmaz, 2000). The differences started when Glaser (1992) decided to select 
an area (an organisation or activity) for study and allow issues to emerge in the course of 
the research process, while Strauss and Corbin (1990, and later 1998) were more specific 
and chose to identify a phenomenon or issue within the given study area (Parker and 
Roffey, 1997). Predictably, their differences forced contemporary researchers to choose 
between the two approaches and to explain their choice (Goulding, 1998). A detailed 
comparison of their approaches demonstrates subtle but distinct differences in perceptions, 
mostly in terms of style and terminology (Goulding, 1998). For example, Glaser (1992, 
p.3) claimed that ‘Strauss’s version is without conscience, bordering on immorality... 
producing simply what qualitative researchers have been doing for 60 years or more: 
forced, full conceptual description’. Glaser (2001) also pointed out that the concept of 
emergence is a central tenet of GT and that, as such, nothing should be forced or 
preconceived. He argued, ‘we do not know what we are looking for when we start…we 
simply cannot say prior to the collection and analysis of data what our study will look like’ 
(ibid., p. 176). 
 
 
For Glaser, ‘theory should only explain the phenomenon under study; while Strauss’s 
approach insists on excessive use of coding matrixes to conceptualise beyond the 
immediate field of study’ (Goulding, 1998, p.52). The GT procedures advanced by these 
two approaches have continued to be of interest to many researchers (Parker and Roffey, 
1997; Goulding, 1998; Howell, 2000; D. K. Locke, 2003; Heath and Cowley, 2004; 
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Charmaz, 2006; Walker and Myrick, 2006). According to Parker and Roffey (1997, p.222), 
their major differences (based on Glaser, 1992, and Strauss and Corbin, 1990) may be 
found in ‘the approach to generating the focal research issues, the degree of formal 
structuring of the approach to coding data, and the degree of formal structuring of the 
approach to generating a theoretical framework’. Based on the various areas of concern in 
the literature about the two approaches (Glaser, 1978, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
1998), their main differences can be summarised in terms of their use of existing literature, 
procedures, data analysis, theory formulation, how the research questions are identified 
and ease of operationalization, as shown in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5-1 Main Differences between Glaser’s and Strauss’ Approach 
 
 
Main Area of 
Concern 
Strauss and Corbin Glaser 
 
Research Question 
 The research question is a 
statement that identifies the 
phenomenon to be studied. 
 Main problem for people 
in the area under study? 
 What category does the 
concern indicate? 
 
 
Use of Existing 
Literature 
 Literature review can 
stimulate theoretical 
sensitivity, can be a source 
of data, stimulate questions, 
direct theoretical sampling, 
and provide supplementary 
validity. 
 No need to review any 
literature before data 
collection. 
 
 
 
Procedures 
 Researchers need help with 
the interpretation process; 
subcategories are linked to 
categories that denote a set 
of relationships. 
 Problems emerge and 
should not be forced by 
the methodology. 
 Categories and properties 
“emerge” through constant 
comparison of incident to 
incident. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Analysis 
 Initial coding: open coding 
as analytic technique. 
 Intermediate phase: axial 
coding, reduction and 
clustering of categories 
(paradigm model). 
 Final development: selective 
coding, detailed 
development of categories, 
selection of core, integration 
of categories. 
 Theory: detailed and dense 
process fully described.  
 Substantive coding: data-
dependent. 
 Follows on continuously 
from previous phase; 
comparison, with focus on 
data, becomes more 
abstract, categories 
refitted, frameworks 
emerge. 
 Theoretical: refitting and 
refinement of categories 
that are integrated around 
an emerging core. 
 Parsimony, scope and 
modifiability. 
Ease of Operation  Easier to operationalise.  Can be difficult to 
operationalise. 
 
Theory Formulation 
 Generates an inductively 
derived theory; undertaking 
continual verification; 
conceptual ordering. 
 Generates concepts and 
their relationships to 
explain/interpret 
variations; produces 
theoretical conceptual 
hypotheses. 
 
 
Source: Parker and Roffey (1997, p.221); Heath and Cowley (2004, p.146); McGhee et al. (2007); Howell, 
(2013, pp.147-150). 
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The main differences show that Strauss’ technique is found to encourage researchers to 
use their own personal and professional experience and acquired knowledge as a positive 
advantage to enhance theoretical sensitivity. As he stated, ‘if you know an area, have some 
experience…you don’t tear it out of your head, you can use it’ (Strauss, 1987, p.84). For 
Glaser (1992, p.38), coding is ‘conceptualising data by constant comparison of incident 
with incident, and incident with concept’. He argued that using the constant comparison 
method gets the analyst to the desired conceptual goal quickly, with ease and joy. Thus, 
‘categories emerge upon comparison and properties emerge upon more comparison’ 
(Glaser, 1992, p.42). For Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.61), however, coding is simply ‘the 
process of analysing data’, which includes the ‘making of comparisons and the asking of 
questions’ (ibid., p.62) as the basis of the coding process. Justifying this, they added that, 
not only does the making of such comparisons and the asking of questions ‘change with 
each type of coding’ (ibid., p.62), but since these processes are not labelled as we go along, 
‘we have to watch closely to see how we should use them’ (ibid., p.63).  
 
Moreover, Glaser used a two-phase coding process (open coding and theoretical coding), 
while Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) used three phases (open, axial and selective 
coding). While Glaser did not support the inclusion of axial coding in the analytic process, 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.97) insisted that the axial coding process puts the fractured 
data back together in new ways ‘by making connections between a category and its 
subcategory’.  Even though both agreed on the role of GT in theory development, Glaser’s 
approach was to ‘generate a conceptual theory that accounts for a pattern of behaviour 
which is relevant and problematic for those involved’ (Glaser, 2003, p.3), while for 
Strauss the emphasis was on ensuring ‘conceptual development and density’ (Strauss, 
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1987, p.5), and he argued that ‘a few concepts loosely strung together cannot satisfy the 
requirements for formulating social theory’ (Strauss, 1987, p.18).  
 
The two parties also differed on the issue of reviewing the literature when using GT. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.49) argued that ‘familiarity with relevant literature can 
enhance sensitivity to subtle nuances in data’. In contrast, Glaser contended that such a 
practice leads to a “derailment” in the form of recognised assumptions about what the data 
are going to present. He argued that the researcher ‘need not review any of the literature in 
the substantive area under study’ (Glaser, 1992, p.31). In her assessment of the two 
approaches, however, Goulding (2000) concluded that the differences are more of a 
methodological consideration than an ontological or epistemological one. Charmaz (2006) 
added that, despite their differences, there are fundamental areas of convergence in their 
approaches as both aim to move qualitative inquiry beyond description into the realm of 
explanatory theoretical frameworks. Moreover, ‘each considers that it is possible to utilise 
verification as part of theory generation (Howell, 2013, p.148). This thesis is carried out in 
line with the Strauss and Corbin version of GT, while the original discovery of the theory 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) serves as a reference point. The reasons behind this choice are 
detailed in the following section. 
 Reasons for Using Strauss and Corbin’s Approach 5.10.4
 
While the researcher recognises that a number of constants and similarities are present in 
both approaches, it is still necessary to justify why the Strauss and Corbin approach was 
chosen here, both to direct readers and invite commentary. Understandably, there are basic 
philosophical differences between Glaser’s and Strauss’ approaches, and these are present 
in the process of theory generation, in terms of the respective emphases on induction, 
deduction and verification, and in the form the theory should take. Strauss’ version 
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essentially aims to clarify, and guide readers on, how the main objective of the research 
can be achieved. It also offers the following other advantages: 
 
 The Strauss and Corbin approach is more structured in terms of coding and 
analytical procedures, and this makes the approach readily understood by 
uninitiated GT researchers or beginners. Convincingly, based on extant theoretical 
reviews, the Strauss and Corbin approach has been used in a wider range of 
disciplines, including management. 
 The approach recognises the use of literature. This is because in reality one cannot 
go into any research without preconceptions, particularly in relation to pre-
existing theory and practice. Moreover, it enables the researcher to be theory 
sensitive. 
 Their approach is located within the constructivist paradigm (D. K. Locke, 2003), 
which coincides with the paradigm of inquiry for this research. 
 The focus is on theory building rather than theory testing. The former is more 
relevant for developing a substantive theory around culture and leadership through 
an inductive approach. 
 Flexibility is emphasised: ‘while we set these procedures and techniques before 
you we do not at all wish to imply rigid adherence to them’ (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990, p.59). Accordingly, ‘the procedures are not mechanical or automatic, nor do 
they constitute an algorithm guaranteed to give results. They are rather to be 
applied flexibly according to circumstances; their order may vary, and alternatives 
are available at every step’ (ibid. p.59). 
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These advantages and the simplistic procedures provided by Strauss and Corbin invite new 
researchers working within a qualitative context, including myself, to adopt their approach. 
Moreover, Denzin (1994, p.513) contended that ‘when one peels back the layers of 
discourse embedded in any of the numerous qualitative guides to interpretation and theory 
construction, the core features of Strauss’ approach are present, even when Strauss and 
associates are not directly named’. Strauss and Corbin’s procedure for how theory can be 
grounded is discussed in the next section.  
  Procedures and Application of Strauss’ Approach 5.11
 
In the GT approach, the analyst makes use of constant comparison, which is the 
simultaneous and concurrent process of coding and analysing the collected data 
(Partington, 2000). The iteration leads to a “process”, whereby changes in the data are 
monitored and made explicit (Howell, 1996). The critical elements of the procedures and 
framework developed by Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) are as follows:  
 Simultaneous and concurrent data collection and analysis 5.11.1
 
Data collection and analysis occur side by side. One of the benefits of the GT approach is 
that it allows the researcher to commence analysis as soon as the data begin to emerge. 
Corbin and Strauss (1990, p.6) advised that ‘data collection and analysis systematically 
and sequentially enables the research process to capture all potentially relevant aspects of 
the study as soon as they are perceived’. In other words, data are simultaneously analysed 
by looking for all possible interpretations from the outset (Goulding, 1998). In order not to 
miss anything that may be salient, it is advisable for the researcher to begin by analysing 
the first set of data for cues. This gives him/her the opportunity to incorporate all 
seemingly relevant issues into the next stage of interviews (Goulding, 1998). As Corbin 
and Strauss (1990, p.6) remarked, 
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‘this process is a major source of the effectiveness of the grounded theory 
approach. The research process itself guides the researcher toward examining all 
of the possibly rewarding avenues to understanding’. 
 
 
Indeed, this is one of the main reasons why the GT method is one of discovery and one 
that grounds a theory in reality (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). It is important to note that, in 
GT, the researcher does not need to wait until all the data have been collected before 
beginning the analysis; rather, the search for meaning through the interrogation of the data 
commences in the early stages of data collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Stern, 1994; 
Corbin and Strauss, 1990). This suggests that the process is not linear but concurrent, and 
iterative, with data collection, analysis and conceptual theorising occurring in parallel and 
from the beginning of the research process (Duhscher and Morgan, 2004). This important 
process is not available in alternative qualitative research methods, in which data are 
collected prior to the commencement of a systematic analysis. 
 Constant comparison method 5.11.2
 
This involves the constant comparison of data so as to develop concepts and categories. In 
other words, as the researcher moves along with analysis, each incident in the data is 
compared with other incidents for similarities and differences. Incidents found to be 
‘conceptually similar are grouped together under a higher-level descriptive concept’ 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.73). This process helps to provide a way of understanding the 
world around us, both through the central event and, as it takes place, through the 
properties and dimensions generated. Constant comparison is designed to ‘aid the 
analyst...in generating a theory that is integrated, consistent, plausible, and close to the 
data’ (Glaser and Strauss, 2009, p.3). This aspect of the process has become a source of 
validity in this type of research (Silverman, 2006).  
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 Coding procedures 5.11.3
 
Coding is ‘the basic process of analysing data by the researcher’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
p.61) and represents the operations by which data are broken down, conceptualised, and 
put back together in new ways. It is the fundamental analytical process used by the 
researcher, through which ‘theories are constructed from data’ (ibid. p.57). Coding is 
simply the process of categorising and sorting data and, as such, it is ‘the pivotal link 
between collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain these data’ 
(Charmaz, 2006, p.46). As mentioned above, there are three types of coding process, ‘open, 
axial and selective’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.9), but ‘the lines between each type of 
coding are artificial’ (ibid. p.59). 
I.  Open Coding 
Open coding is ‘the analytic process through which concepts are identified and their 
properties and dimensions are discovered in data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.101). It is 
the process of breaking down, comparing, conceptualising and categorising data that helps 
the analyst to gain new insights into the data. The process also allows the researcher pay 
attention to categories and properties that emerge, and asks questions and makes 
comparisons of the emerged categories in order to form higher-level abstract categories 
and subcategories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Furthermore, at the open stage, the 
researcher is required to examine the data without any limitations on scope, and without 
the application of any filters, simply accepting the data in order to enable concepts emerge. 
II.  Axial Coding 
Axial coding is the second phase of the coding process and is ‘concerned with relating 
categories to subcategories along the lines of their properties and the dimensions of a 
category’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.124). The axial coding process allows the 
researcher to reassemble data that have been fractured during open coding, so as to give 
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coherence to the emerging analysis. The process looks at how categories crosscut one 
another and link together (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Charmaz, 2006). Thus, it involves the 
appreciation of concepts in terms of their dynamic inter-relationships, while the data that 
were analysed as separate categories during the open coding process are now joined 
together (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). According to Strauss (1987), the axial coding process 
involves 
a) laying out the properties of a category and its dimensions, a task that begins during 
open coding, 
b) identifying the variety of conditions, actions/interactions and consequences 
associated with a phenomenon, 
c) relating a category to its subcategories through statements denoting how they are 
related to each other, and 
d) looking for clues in the data showing how major categories might relate to each 
other. 
 
Creswell (2009) added that the purposes of axial coding are to sort, synthesise and 
organise data and reassemble them in new ways after the open coding, by making 
connections between categories. A further goal is to link subcategories to the main 
categories. In other words, there is a sequential loop from causal conditions to 
phenomenon to context to intervening condition to action/interaction and finally to 
consequences.  
III.  Selective Coding 
Selective coding is ‘the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to 
other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further 
refinement and development’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.116). The core category 
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represents the central phenomenon around which all other categories are integrated. 
Indeed, ‘as the analytic power that explains the whole’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.146), 
the core category may evolve from the list of existing categories, or may be identified by 
the researcher after he/she has studied those categories. The researcher is advised to 
commence identification of the core category by asking questions such as ‘what is the 
main analytic idea presented in this research, what does all the action/interaction seem to 
be about, or how can I explain the variation between and among the categories’ (Corbin 
and Strauss, 1990, p.424). However, to overcome likely difficulties in identifying the core 
category, Strauss and Corbin (1998) also recommended some techniques to facilitate both 
the identification and the integration of concepts. These include ‘writing storylines, 
making use of diagrams, and reviewing and sorting of memos’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 
p.148). This means that, once a network of conceptual relationships exists, it can be 
refined during selective coding. In addition, Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.130) indicated, ‘it 
is very important to identify these patterns and to group the data accordingly, because this 
is what gives the theory specificity’. Finally, when undertaking a research project using 
GT, researchers are required to adhere to the ‘sequences of evolving action/interaction, 
changes which can be traced to changes in structural conditions’ (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998, p.163).   
  Conclusion 5.12
 
In this thesis, a qualitative research design has been chosen in an attempt to fill the gap 
identified in the extant literature regarding effective corporate governance mechanisms for 
banks, particularly in Nigeria. In order to achieve this, this thesis demonstrates how an 
alternative theoretical framework of culture and leadership (as described in the previous 
chapter) could be utilised to explain this complex phenomenon. The emerging nature of 
this research and the nature of the corporate governance phenomenon under investigation 
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influenced the choice of a qualitative research design. This chapter described the main 
paradigms of inquiry within qualitative research: positivist, post-positivist, critical theory 
et al., constructivism, and the participatory paradigm (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). It then 
differentiated between them on the basis of their ontological, epistemological and 
methodological characteristics.  
 
On the basis of these characteristics, the research problem and the complexity of the 
phenomenon being investigated, a social constructivist paradigm was chosen to underpin 
the research inquiry and methodology. This is because social constructivism shares the 
same philosophical assumption as this research, in leaning towards the subjective 
meanings of socially constructed phenomena. In fact, corporate governance issues 
themselves revolve around social processes and, as such, can only be understood through 
the explanation of human activities and actions. However, the chapter further discussed 
the distinctions between constructivist and interpretivist paradigms and their relation to the 
GT approach. In addition, the chapter demonstrated the features of two contrasting 
research approaches, deductive and inductive, and more importantly explained the 
significance of the inductive approach in terms of developing a substantive theory (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998).  
 
In addition, this chapter discussed quantitative and qualitative research strategies and, in 
view of the assumptions of qualitative research design, argued that the qualitative strategy 
best fits the current research. The chapter then reviewed the four main methodologies of 
qualitative research – ethnography, action research, case studies and GT – and found that 
GT provides both the methodology and the mode of analysis required for this research. 
The main reasons for employing GT as the methodology were presented, including its 
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beneficial qualities for generating substantive theory from inductively derived data. A 
historical and philosophical account of GT was also provided, and it was justified as a 
research methodology. The aim of this was to highlight its importance in the investigation 
of the issues surrounding corporate governance practice, especially in the banking sector, 
which is a complex area, particularly in developing countries such as Nigeria. With GT 
chosen, the chapter further exposited the main differences between the two key approaches 
that emerged from the original developers of GT (Glaser and Strauss) and concluded by 
illustrating the reasons for using the Strauss and Corbin approach and the procedures 
involved in that version. Discussions concerning the data collection, theoretical sampling 
and coding will be provided in the next chapter. 
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 Data Collection, Sampling and Coding Chapter 6.
 
 Introduction 6.1
 
This chapter concludes the second part of this thesis, which deals with the methodology 
and the collection and coding of the data. The aim of this chapter is to explain the data 
sampling and site selection processes used in this study, along with the different data 
collection methods used, which include interviews and a focus group discussion. The 
chapter discusses data accessibility and the challenges experienced during the research. 
Finally, the chapter highlights on the substantive theory as the essence of this thesis.  
 Data Sampling and Research Site Selection  6.2
 
The research scope is based on money deposit banks operating in Nigeria during the 
research period
24
. Under the banking regulations and requirements, all banks in Nigeria 
are registered with the CBN, which supervises their operations, and all are quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) for public trading. To achieve the objectives of the study, 
the researcher considered two main strategies from the outset: The first was to approach 
all 24 commercial banks, and the CBN as the sole regulatory body. These banks were 
identified as the main locations in which the phenomena underlying corporate governance 
practice take place. Principally, those involved would be the executive managers 
responsible for corporate governance policy and implementation in the 24 commercial 
banks and the CBN. The aim was to obtain rich data that could account for variations and 
uncover nuances, so as to afford the researcher a “thick” explanation of what is going on. 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.201) indicated that it is necessary ‘to go to places, people or 
                                            
24
 See Appendix A. 
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events that will maximise opportunities to discover variations among concepts and densify 
categories in terms of their properties and dimensions’. 
 
The second strategy was to base the research process on the GT technique of theoretical 
sampling. Glaser and Strauss (2009, p45) described this as ‘the process of data collection 
for generating theory whereby the researcher jointly collects, codes, and analyses data and 
decides what data to collect next and where, in order to develop the theory as it emerges’. 
The use of theoretical sampling within GT helps with the construction of rich categories 
that are related to each other. Categorising is defined here as ‘the analytic step of selecting 
certain codes as having overriding significance or abstracting common themes and 
patterns’ (Charmaz, 2006, p.186). The GT technique of theoretical sampling works 
 ‘on the basis of concepts that appear to have theoretical relevance to the evolving 
theory. Hence, these concepts are found to be relevant because (a) they are 
repeatedly present or noticeably absent in the data when comparing incidents and 
(b) they are conditions that give variation to a major category. The aim is to 
maximise opportunities in comparing events, incidents or happenings so as to 
determine how a category varies in terms of their properties and dimensions’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.202).  
 
 
However, as concepts are identified and the theory starts to develop based on the initial 
data that have been generated, further individuals and places should be incorporated in 
order to strengthen the findings for broader interpretation. It is important to note that 
theoretical sampling is particularly important in the exploration of new or uncharted areas, 
such as the corporate governance of banks. It helps the researcher to create a sample that 
can bring the greatest theoretical returns. In order to achieve this, the present research 
adopted three theoretical sampling processes in the coding stages of GT: open, relational 
and variational, and discriminate sampling. Open sampling is related to open coding in 
that it aims to discover, name and categorise as much as possible. During this stage, the 
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researcher is expected to be relatively open to any sampling opportunities for data 
collection and, more importantly, should not ‘structure data gathering in terms of timing, 
persons or places so as to not foreclose on discovery’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.206). 
Relational and variational sampling is related to axial coding; it is aimed at ‘finding 
incidents that demonstrate the dimensional variation of a concept or its relationships 
within concepts’ (ibid. p.210). In fact, it is a stage in which categories are determined in 
terms of their paradigm elements.   
 
Finally, discriminate sampling is related to selective coding and allows the researcher to 
focus on the validation of the relationships between the categories that relate to the 
identified core categories. The essence is to saturate categories and complete the study 
either by returning to the old sites or by going to new ones to gather the necessary data 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This is what is referred to in GT as validation, and is ‘a crucial 
part of theory building’ (ibid: p.211). In other words, the researcher should continue until 
‘(1) no new or relevant data seem to emerge, (2) the category is developed in terms of its 
properties and dimensions along variations, and (3) the relationships between categories 
are well established and validated’ (ibid: p.212). The purpose of saturation is to achieve 
density and precision in the theory that is developed. In this study, consistent with the 
purpose of theoretical sampling, as the sampling progressed, further sources of data 
emerged and were approached by the researcher. These additional sources were the NDIC, 
the Nigerian SEC, the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria (CIBN) and two major 
shareholders. The aim in including these sources was to add to the theoretical richness of 
the categories generated. 
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  Data Collection Methods  6.3
 
 
Even though there are no rigid guidelines on the preferred approaches to data collection in 
qualitative research, Creswell (2007, p.130) identified five commonly used methods: 
‘observations, interviews, focus groups, documents, and audio-visual materials’. He 
explained that the use of observations can involve non-participants and/or participants, 
while interviews can consist of both closed-ended and open-ended questioning. Focus 
groups generate data through interaction between group participants. Documents can 
include extant literature, organisational documents such as reports, and archival materials, 
while audio-visual materials include the use of electronic facilities, photographs and 
similar tools. Undoubtedly, the backbone of qualitative research is the extensive collection 
of data from multiple sources to enrich interpretations and constructs (Creswell, 2009). 
Consistent with the research design (discussed in Chapter 5) that is aimed at gaining a 
novel understanding of corporate governance in banks, the data collection method used is 
a combination of interviews and focus group discussion. Other data drawn from 
organisational reports and the extant literature complement the main primary data. In 
theory generation, the use of multiple data collection techniques is encouraged as it 
provides multiple perspectives and viewpoints. This allows for cross-checking, which in 
turn yields a stronger substantiation of the constructs (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Table 6.1 
describes the data collection scheme used in this thesis. 
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Table 6-1 Data Collection Scheme 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Interviews 6.3.1
 
Interviews are a method of collecting data in which selected interviewees are asked 
questions through verbal or visual means, to find out what they do, think or feel (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009). In other words, it is a data collection technique that provides 
qualitative researchers access to the meanings people attribute to their experiences and 
     
Interviews (I and II): Interview set I focused on the participants from 
commercial banks, while interview set II obtained data from the CBN and 
other sources that emerged during the course of interview set I (open 
sampling, relational and variational sampling were used). 
 
Focus Group Discussion: The focus group discussions centred on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance practices in banks since the 2006 
reform, with a view to identifying the challenges of resolving the persistent 
failures in the banking industry that are related to national cultural values 
(open sampling). 
 
Interviews (III): This set of interviews related to the discriminate sampling at 
the selective coding stage and was conducted to verify and validate concepts 
and their properties and dimensions that emerged during the open and axial 
coding stages (discriminate sampling). 
 
Other Secondary Sources: Relevant documentary data were obtained from 
the commercial banks, the regulatory agency (CBN) and other relevant 
reports relating to the banks’ corporate governance practices (open 
sampling). 
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social worlds. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991, p.71), ‘the most fundamental of 
all qualitative methods is in-depth interviewing’, and at its heart is the aim ‘of 
understanding the experiences of other people and the meaning they make of those 
experiences’ (Seiman, 1991, p.3). Interviews, especially in their less structured forms, are 
effective for discovering nuances because they are flexible, iterative and allow for 
continuity (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). In GT interview technique ‘plays a central role in the 
data collection’ (Creswell, 2007, p.131). Moreover, this is a method that facilitates access 
to individuals’ attitudes and values – things that are rarely observed (Bryman and Bell, 
2007).   
 
As Kvale (1996, p.32) stated, ‘a qualitative research interview is aimed at obtaining 
nuanced description from the different qualitative aspects of the interviewee’s life world’. 
Also, for Schein (1984), interviews are best used for an interactive and joint exploration 
since an insider’s experience of a phenomenon will be subjectively different from that of 
an outsider. In management research, particularly when delving into corporate governance 
issues, adopting an interview approach allows the researcher, as an outsider, to contrast 
his/her beliefs with those of the participants, and thereby gain a deeper understanding of 
the phenomenon. Moreover, the general belief, in using interviews as a data collection 
method, is that the views of multiple participants can help the researcher to capture the full 
complexity of the phenomena being studied. J. Macey and O’Hara (2003), arguing for a 
broader set of governance mechanisms for banks at different stages of development, 
suggested that a subjective approach was needed, and could only be conducted through 
direct interviews as the interview process affords the researcher first-hand information on 
why certain events have occurred, enabling him/her to answer the research questions.  
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According to Bloch (1996, p.323),  
‘in social research the language of conversation, including that of the interview, 
remains one of the most important tools of social research analysis, a means whereby 
insight is gained into everyday life, as well as the social and cultural dimensions of 
our own and other societies’.   
 
 
Many scholars have further argued that the spoken word is the most powerful source of 
data because of its capacity to present descriptions, explanations and an almost infinite 
variety of information on the phenomenon under study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). 
Referring to the investigation of people’s behaviour and actions and how they perceive the 
world, the literature reveals that people develop, over their lives, a personal framework of 
beliefs and values, guided by their history and environment, with which they selectively 
and subjectively build meaning and significance into events (Geertz, 1993; Hofstede, 
2001; Schein, 2004). As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) indicated, what is expressed in 
interviews normally relates to the interviewee’s perceived misalignment of values, rules or 
normal expectations with the actual course of events. According to Egan (1990, p.19), 
‘there are three main types of expressions by interviewees: experience, behaviour and 
affect’. He explained that experience relates to what they do or refrain from doing, and 
affect is the feelings and emotions that arise from, or are associated with, experience or 
behaviour. In the current research process, these three categories of verbal expressions 
helped the researcher to explore various issues, and also put into context the behaviours 
and actions of the participants.  
 
While the use of interviews gives the qualitative researcher an opportunity to probe deeply 
and uncover new clues, opening up new dimensions of a problem through accurate, 
inclusive accounts (Burges, 1982), the form in which the interview is conducted 
determines the overall outcome of the dialogue (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Form refers 
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to whether the interview is conducted based on structured or unstructured questions (Collis 
and Hussey, 2009). Structured interviews typically involve closed questions with a set of 
predetermined possible answers. In such cases, the answers are easily compared, since 
each interviewee is asked the same questions. These types of questions are often related to 
a quantitative data collection method, which was not used in the present research. In 
contrast, in semi-structured or unstructured interviews, the issues discussed, questions 
raised and matters explored can change from one interview to the next as different aspects 
of the issue are revealed.  
 
Hussey and Hussey (1997, p.157) stated that semi-structured interviews do ‘not mean that 
the same questions should be asked, but that questions should be posed in the same way. 
Indeed what is important is to ensure the respondents understand the question in the same 
way’. According to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991), an unstructured or semi-structured 
interview is appropriate when it is necessary to understand the construct that the 
interviewee uses as a basis for his or her opinions and beliefs about a particular matter or 
situation. Corbin and Morse (2003) stated that, based on their own experience, the densest 
interviews were those that were unstructured. These types of interviews are often 
associated with phenomenological paradigms, and which is the process of discovery that 
gives the interview type its strength.  
 
The data collection for this study was conducted through the use of semi-structured 
interviews. The researcher’s aim was to secure a greater understanding of the phenomenon 
by encouraging free discussion, which semi-structured interviews permit. According to 
Corbin and Morse (2003), unstructured type is not dictated by any predetermined 
questions. This allows the researcher to ask key questions in the same way each time but 
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thereafter probe for further information about any emerging topics (Arthur and Nazroo, 
2003). The interviews in this study were based on corporate governance issues within the 
context of the research objectives. The interviewees nominated by the various CEOs 
formed a broad set of participants from different, relevant business units. They were asked 
to offer accounts of incidents and events they had experienced, based on the semi-
structured interview questions presented. 
 Focus Group Discussion 6.3.2
 
After the semi-structured interview series I (with participants from the banks) and II (from 
the CBN and other stakeholders had been conducted, focus group discussions was 
employed so as to reach a wider set of stakeholders. As a data collection technique, the 
focus group method was developed in the 1920s and has been used in social science 
research ever since (Frey and Fontana, 1993). This has led to an increase in non-directive 
interviewing using open-ended questions in recent times. Indeed, the technique has now 
been applied in researching social problems across several disciplines, particularly in 
exploratory research projects that aim to understand a social context that is unfamiliar or 
new (Frey and Fontana, 1993). A focus group has been described as ‘a carefully planned 
discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, 
non-threatening environment’ (Krueger, 1994, p.6), where participants share and respond 
to comments, ideas and perceptions. At a methodological level, Morgan (1996, p.130) 
viewed focus groups as ‘a research technique that collects data through group interactions 
on a topic determined by the researcher’. Through this process, participants present their 
own views and experiences but they also have the opportunity to hear what other people 
have to say. This can generate varied responses as the discussion progresses, which can 
give the researcher new ideas, confirm data collected from interviews, or clarify events or 
the frame of reference for the subject under study.   
151 
 
Blumer (1969) recommended bringing together several knowledgeable people, familiar 
with the social situation under investigation, into a discussion group. He argued that this 
group would be ‘more valuable many times over than any representative sample’ (ibid: 
p.41).  In other words, the use of a focus group provides another side of reality as it 
encourages interaction among the respondents and allows participants to change their 
opinions and experiences (Krueger, 1998). More importantly, focus groups 
‘present a more natural environment than that of the individual interview because 
participants are influencing and influenced by others – just as they are in real life’ 
(Casey and Krueger, 2000, p.11). 
 
 
 
Morgan (1997) described the focus group as a group interview, and synergistic in the 
sense that members of the group work together and explicitly interact to generate data and 
insights. Thus, the data gathered relate to the feelings and opinions of a group of people 
who are involved in a common situation or the same phenomenon (Collis and Hussey, 
2009).  Indeed, it is this ‘framework and its real consequence for action, that the 
qualitative researcher is interested in learning about’ (S. Jones, 1993, p.49). Focus group 
discussions therefore serve to solidify the researcher’s idea of the reality of a social 
setting. Multiple respondents can be effective in settings where the relationships among 
the respondents are complex and comprise diverse views (Schartzman and Strauss, 1973). 
The technique can be used as the sole method of data collection, or in combination with 
others, for exploratory purposes. Schartzman and Strauss (1973, p.82) argued that this 
‘form of information gathering provides an especially nice situation for revealing 
variations in perspective and attitude and a ready means, through subtle pitting of one 
against the other, for distinguishing between shared and variable perspectives. The 
pitting process hardly needs manipulation since the hosts themselves, by speech and 
gesture, will naturally “correct” each other’s rendering of reality’.  
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The aim of a focus group discussion is somewhat different from that of an in-depth 
interview because of the ability to observe interactions on the topic under discussion. 
According to Stewart and Shamdasani (1990), the technique serves as a medium for 
understanding the group dynamics that affect individuals’ perceptions, information 
processing and decision making. Highlighting the technique’s importance, Litoselliti 
(2003, p.18) provided the following summary of focus groups’ usefulness:  
‘discovering new information; obtaining a number of different perspectives on the 
same topic, in participants’ own words; gaining information on participants’ view, 
attitudes, beliefs, responses, motivations and perceptions on a topic; “why” people 
think or feel the way they do; examining participants’ shared understanding of 
everyday life; brainstorming and generating ideas, with participants discussing 
different angles of a problem, and possibly helping to identify solutions; gaining 
insights into the ways in which individuals are influenced by others in the group; 
exploring controversial issues and their possible solutions’. 
 
 
 
There are many forms that focus groups can take but Finch and Lewis (2003) identified 
four common types used in qualitative research:  
a) A group of 2-12 participants meeting once and, depending on the subject being 
explored, spending 1-2 hours discussing the topic. 
b) Focus groups in the form of workshops. This implies a large group and a longer 
meeting than in the previous type. 
c) Focus groups for consultative purposes (e.g. for social groups). This includes small 
group discussions. This type of focus group may be conducted in different forms 
and includes drawing people together in a series of sessions to deliberate and 
contribute to decision making. 
d) Focus groups based on virtual discussion, such as online focus groups and the use 
of electronic or technological devices such as video-conferencing. 
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Morgan (1997) contended, to give qualitative researchers a strong understanding of the 
social context within which the phenomenon under investigation exists, a broader 
approach involving focus groups is vital. Based on the results of the semi-structured 
interviews, focus group discussion questions were generated, targeting a much wider set of 
stakeholder participants. The participants involved in the focus group discussion included 
four managers from the commercial banks, one member of staff from the NDIC, two from 
accounting and auditing firms, and one from the CBN. The two remaining participants 
were depositors, who were included to represent the interests of the general public. The 
richness of the data obtained from the focus group dialogues provided an opportunity to 
clarify the data gathered from the semi-structured interviews, which eventually contributed 
to the categories that emerged.  
 Documentary Materials 6.3.3
 
Although the primary sources of data were the interviews and focus group discussions, 
documentary data (both the reviewed literature and other sources) were also used to 
identify essential themes. At the fieldwork stage, the initial documents looked into 
consisted of the relevant theoretical literature on corporate governance practices in the 
banking sectors around the world, and specifically in Nigeria. These formed what Dey 
(1993) called ‘accumulated knowledge’ (p.66), and provided what has been termed 
literature sensitivity (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The documents relating to corporate 
governance practice in Nigerian banks included the following: 
a) The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, introduced in 2006. 
b) The Code of Corporate Governance Report for Financial Institutions (SEC, 2003). 
c) NDIC reports (2008, 2010). 
d) CBN reports (2008, 2012). 
e) Documentary press release on corporate governance practice from the CBN and 
NDIC. 
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f) Reports on bank monitoring and standards, produced by international agencies 
(Basel, Corruption Index, and ROSC), and specifically related to Nigeria. 
g) Audited annual reports for five sample banks (2007 to 2012). 
 
Glaser and Strauss (2009, p.69) advised that researchers should ‘use any material bearing 
on his/her area he can discover’, and documentary materials in particular can help to 
stimulate the researcher’s theoretical sensitivity (Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
In this research, there were two main reasons for examining documentary materials that 
were either collected from the banks directly or through their websites. The first was to 
comprehend the ways in which the actors were influenced by or had influenced the 
information contained in the documents. The second was to understand the nature of the 
influence these documents have had on corporate governance practice. It has been argued 
that the use of documents increases the comprehensiveness and validity of any 
investigation (Patton, 2002). As Atkinson and Coffey (2011) and Prior (2011) claimed, 
documentary texts speak in the absence of speakers and, more importantly, remain 
uniform across separate and diverse local settings.   
 
Furthermore, documents are seen as formal means of communication that demonstrate the 
competence, and often the expertise, of their producers (Miller and Alvarado, 2005), 
offering the social facts of the organisation rather than representations of social reality 
(Atkinson and Coffey, 2011). In this research, the selection of documents to use was 
guided by the theoretical review of the literature. Overall, the combination of semi-
structured interviews and focus groups, further complemented by the relevant 
documentary materials, gave the researcher a broader understanding of the phenomenon at 
hand. In fact, this is the advantage provided by the GT approach, which encourages the 
researcher to consider and employ various data types.  
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 Data Accessibility and Challenges 6.4
 
Corporate governance responsibilities rest on both the internal operators (board of 
directors, executive directors and operating managers in various areas) of the commercial 
banks on the one hand, and the external stakeholders (essentially, the regulators, the CBN 
and other monitoring agencies, and the shareholders) on the other. In attempting to 
understand the underlying phenomenon of corporate governance in banks, the researcher 
had to recognise the nature of banks and the likely reluctance of bank officials to 
participate in a research project. To overcome these challenges, the researcher began the 
formal contact process through an introductory letter from his university
25
 to the managing 
directors of all the commercial banks and the governor of the CBN, requesting an 
interview on the subject under investigation. In addition, to build confidence between the 
researcher and the participating banks and regulators, attached to the university letter were 
ten statement questions
26
 intended to demonstrate to the participants what would be the 
nature and scope of the interview questions. This initial questionnaire was intended to 
sensitise the targeted participants to the research area, and was also a way of gaining 
access for the interviews.  
 
While some banks responded by expressing their willingness to participate and proposing 
a date for an interview, other banks did not, and the researcher therefore had to follow 
them up during the initial phase of conducting interviews in Lagos
27
. Furthermore, even 
for those banks that had agreed to participate, it was difficult to pin down some of the staff 
                                            
25
 See Appendix  C. 
 
26
 See Appendix B. 
. 
27
 Lagos is the commercial center of Nigeria and the location of the corporate headquarters of 23 of the 
commercial banks used in this research. Only the CBN and Unity Bank have their corporate headquarters in 
Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria.  
 
156 
 
nominated by the CEOs to take part in the face-to-face interviews. These persons included 
senior managers, company secretaries and chief compliance officers. In fact, bureaucracy 
and security checks made gaining access cumbersome. Envisaging similar experiences 
during the focus group, the researcher employed an independent approach, which entailed 
making contact with already-identified bank employees directly, rather than formally 
involving the managerial levels of the banks
28
. In spite of using this mode of approach, it 
was still difficult initially to convince the bank officials to attend the focus group meeting 
without seeking clearance from their CEO or regional headquarters.  
 
However, through the network connections of the researcher, and with some help from 
other stakeholders, some of their fears were overcome and a few agreed to attend, on the 
condition that confidentiality was assured. The focus group session was scheduled to take 
place in Abuja as the Federal Capital City and which the researcher is more familiar with 
than the busy commercial centre of Lagos. Overall, two banks declined to participate in 
the interviews, while out of the ten people invited to take part in the focus group, only 
seven attended the 90-minute-long discussion. These difficulties may have affected the 
scope of the data and its final construction. Indeed, some of these difficulties experienced 
in this research may account for the lack of desire among researchers to undertake 
qualitative research on corporate governance issues, particularly in the banking sector in 
Nigeria. However, the combination of data sources used may have compensated for these 
shortcomings. The rich data collected from the interviews and the focus group formed the 
basis upon which the corporate governance theory for banks was eventually developed. 
 
                                            
28
 No formal letter was sent in the case of the focus group. 
 
157 
 
 The Substantive Theory   6.5
 
The aim of using GT in this research was to develop a substantive theory, inductively 
derived from the data collected, in this case through interviews, a focus group and 
documentary materials. As Glaser and Strauss explained, ‘a substantive theory generated 
from data must be formulated, in order to see which of the diverse formal theories are, 
perhaps, applicable for furthering additional substantive formulations’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
2009, p.34). Strauss and Corbin (1990, p.174) advised that ‘the theory must evolve from 
the study of a phenomenon located in one particular situational context’. A substantive 
theory therefore requires that four essential criteria are met: fit, comprehension, generality 
and control (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Firstly, fit entails the relevance of the theory to the 
substantive data and the validity of the theory. Secondly, the fit should be comprehensible, 
that is, understood by all involved in the area of study. Thirdly, the data should be 
comprehensive and interpretations conceptually wide. Finally, it should be made clear 
when certain conditions apply to specific situations and phenomena. 
 
These criteria should not, however, be read as hard and fast evaluation rules but should 
serve as guidelines (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). What is important is that a substantive 
theory should be constructed based on the emergence of the central explanatory category 
of the phenomenon, as generated from the data. Although this thesis is concerned with 
developing a substantive theory of corporate governance, such findings can also be linked 
to a formal theory to give the theory more explanatory power across a range of situations 
(Goulding, 2002). Indeed, a substantive theory can be developed properly into a formal 
theory. This can be done by studying other situations, rather than by generalising the 
findings about the particular situation studied to other situations (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
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Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Moreover, theories are never complete but are processes in 
themselves (Howell, 1998). 
 Conclusion 6.6
 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical sampling and site selection used for the data 
collection in this research project. It has also discussed the three main data collection 
methods used – semi-structured interviews, a focus group and secondary sources in the 
form of relevant documentary materials – and how the researcher gained access to the data 
and the challenges encountered in the process. The collection of data forms the basis for 
the development of a substantive theory, as was highlighted in the previous section. It 
should be noted that the data collection and analysis were carried out simultaneously; the 
next chapter deals with aspects of the data analysis in detail. 
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PART III: Data Analysis and Theory Development 
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 Data Analysis for Semi-Structured Interviews I and Chapter 7.
II and Focus Group – Open Coding 
 
 
 
 Introduction 7.1
 
This chapter commences part 3 of the thesis, which deals with the data analysis. The main 
aim of this chapter is to present the open coding based on the data collected from the two 
sets of semi-structured interviews (I and II), and the focus group discussion. These data 
sources are critical to the investigation of corporate governance practice in banks. 
Consistent with Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 1998) GT procedure, the collected data were 
processed using constant comparison. This process helped the researcher to identify 
whether the data supported and continued to support emerging categories. At the same 
time, it helped the researcher to build and substantiate the emerging categories by defining 
their properties and dimensions. The resulting concepts that emerged from both sets of 
interviews and the focus group discussion were then compared and grouped with similar 
phenomena in order to identify open codes that fitted the data or were ‘conceptually 
similar in meaning’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p.9). Concepts here refer to ‘words that 
stand for groups or classes of objects, events, and actions that share some major common 
properties’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.45). Properties, although they can vary in terms of 
their dimensions, are the ‘characteristics or components of an object, event, or action that 
give specificity to and define an object, event, and/or action’ (ibid p.46).  
 
Through this analytic process, we arrived at eight open categories with various properties 
and dimensions. A dimension here refers to the ‘variations within properties that give 
specificity and range to concepts’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.159). The authors also 
referred to categories as ‘higher-level concepts under which analysts group lower-level 
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concepts according to shared properties’ (ibid, p.159). In fact, they represent relevant 
phenomena and enable the researcher to reduce and combine data. As an interpretive 
process, in open coding, ‘data are broken down, examined, compared, conceptualised, and 
categorised analytically’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.61). The meanings of documents 
and reports are also discovered during the open coding analysis (Parker and Roffey, 1997). 
In other words, the process of breaking data down into concepts using constant 
comparison procedures helps the researcher to think about and interpret phenomena that 
emerge in the data (Charmaz, 2006). It also helps the researcher to identify open codes
29
 
from interview transcripts or reflective notes. This chapter commences with a description 
of the interview processes and questions, and this is followed by the analysis and open 
coding of the semi-structured interview sets I and II. Then, the focus group process is 
explained and the eight open codes developed from the interviews and focus group data 
are presented. Finally, the chapter reflects on the analysis of the interviews and focus 
group and the categories that emerged from it, which form the basis for the axial and 
selective coding analyses.  
 Semi-Structured Interview Process and Questions 7.2
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with interviewees nominated by the chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of the participating banks. Consent to participate was given by 
the CEOs of the banks, which allowed for a flexible interview schedule to be drawn up 
and followed over two phases. The first phase involved those banks that had responded 
before the interviews began
30
. Seven of the targeted banks did not respond initially, but 
                                            
29
 Open codes are names or labels given to events, activities, functions, relationships, contexts, influences 
and outcomes (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
30
 The interview schedule grouped the appointment dates for the participating banks in Lagos based on 
location (Victoria Island, Marina and Broad Street). The only two banks located in Abuja (Unity Bank and 
the CBN) followed a different schedule. 
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eventually five of them did agree to participate after a personal follow-up. Thus, the 
second phase included these five, so that only two of the initial sample of banks did not 
participate in the end. In all interviews, the interviewees were asked if they consented to 
the proceedings being audio-taped; 20 out of 23 agreed. Audio-taping the interviews were 
helpful in ensuring that nothing was omitted from the interviewees’ narratives during the 
analysis. As mentioned above, two series of interviews were conducted; interview series I 
(divided into two phases, as just explained) covered the 22 commercial banks, whilst 
interview series II involved participants from the CBN and other sources. The data 
collection and analysis from interview series I helped to inform the questions used for 
interview series II, and both of these guided the questions presented during the focus 
group discussion stage. Figure 7.1 illustrates the flow of the stages of data collection and 
analysis.  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1 Stages of Data Collection and Analysis 
Focus Group 
Bank Managers, CBN, Shareholders, General Public 
Interview Set II 
CBN, NDIC, SEC and CIMA 
Interview Set I 
Covering phases 1 and 2 (Commercial banks) 
Interview Set III (discriminate sampling used at selective coding stage) 
Bank Managers, CBN, CIBN, NDIC, General Public 
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In the two series of interviews (I and II)
31
, key officials involved with corporate 
governance policy, from the commercial banks and the CBN, were interviewed. They 
were nominated by their respective CEOs on the basis of their experience. Indeed, they 
were all seasoned professionals in their fields and provided an enormous amount of rich 
data for the research. In the course of interview set I, the necessity of interviewing 
participants from other sources emerged. The other sources used were the NDIC, the SEC 
and the CIBN
32
. These sources were approached and interviewed informally. A summary 
of the number of participants of each type and their divisions/departments, in interview 
series I and II, is shown in Table 7.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
31
 Interview series III was treated in selective coding stage (Chapter 8) during data verification and 
validation process. 
 
32
 The NDIC is an autonomous regulatory body, independent of the CBN and equipped with statutory power 
to inspect banks. The SEC is primarily responsible for regulating the Nigerian capital market and also 
registering and regulating the securities of public quoted companies, including banks (SEC, 2003). The 
CIBN is a statutory body responsible for determining the standard of knowledge and skills to be obtained by 
persons seeking to become members of the banking profession. The body is also responsible for ensuring the 
furtherance, maintenance and observance of ethical standards and professionalism among practitioners of the 
banking profession in Nigeria (CIBN Act, 2007).  
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Table 7-1 Summary of Participants in Semi-Structured Interview Series I and II 
 
 
SN Semi-Structured Interviews No. of Participants/Departments 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview series I conducted with 
22 participants from the 24 
commercial banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Top managers from legal departments 
 
4 Company secretaries / legal advisers 
 
5 Chief compliance officers 
 
2 Heads of regulatory and compliance 
divisions 
2 Heads of risk management and 
strategy 
2 Top managers from human resources 
department 
 
3 Chief inspectors of banks 
1 Top manager on policy and strategy 
in the office of the CEO 
 
2 
 
Interview series II with CBN and 
other sources 
1 A senior financial policy and 
compliance manager from the CBN and 
1 participant each from the NDIC, SEC 
and CIBN 
 
 
The semi-structured questions were based on the responses received from the ten 
statement questions (see Appendix B) initially sent to the banks, which covered the 
research questions and aimed to explore and understand the nature of the corporate 
governance phenomenon in the Nigerian banking sector. In GT studies, semi-structured 
questions offer flexibility and sufficient freedom to enable the participants to tell their 
stories as they see them (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Here, the researcher only asks 
questions when an interviewee has finished his/her narrative, and the questions asked are 
only about points brought up by the interviewee, on which the researcher needs 
clarification or elaboration. Asking such questions during interviews enables the 
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researcher to ‘become acquainted with data, develop provisional answers, and probe into 
issues better’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.69). These steps ensure that the phenomenon is 
explored in depth and ‘the questions are ones that lead the researcher to answers that can 
serve in developing theoretical formulation’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, pp.76-7).  
 
Although the outcomes of interview series I with the participants from commercial banks 
influenced the questions used in interview series II, both were tailored towards discovering 
as much as possible about the corporate governance phenomenon in banks. In interview 
series I, all interviewees were asked the same questions, in keeping with the principles of 
the comparative method and also to obtain a degree of objectivity, which is central to this 
research. All of the interviews in series I lasted between 40 and 50 minutes, depending on 
the level of interaction and the amount of detail in the answers given by the interviewees. 
The semi-structured questions asked during interview series I was as follows: 
1) Since the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in 2006, 
what changes has your board of directors made to improve the governance practice 
in your organisation? (changes in structure and process of corporate governance) 
 
2) Are your organisation’s governance practices strongly linked to the expectations of 
the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and other regulations? (fit for 
purpose, conflict and perception of governance practice and regulatory 
mechanism) 
 
3) Has the Code of Governance improved the performance and the role of the audit 
committee in your organisation? (audit committee supervision/enforcement and 
effectiveness) 
 
4) How do the existing rules and code of best practice affect the disclosure of 
information or the level of transparency in your organisation? (information 
disclosure and transparency) 
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5) Is your organisation’s corporate governance practice aimed at meeting business 
objectives? (shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests) 
 
6) What, if anything, in your view, influences the attitudes of employees in relation to 
your organisational governance practice? (thoughts on leadership and motivational 
schemes targeting good corporate governance) 
 
7) How do you think your board of directors affects corporate governance best 
practice in your organisation? (enforcement, compliance, emergence of conflicts of 
interests, monitoring) 
 
8) In what areas of the Code of Corporate Governance, or in other rules, would your 
organisation suggest improvements need to be made? (adequacy of Code and other 
regulations, need for review, enforcement and monitoring) 
 
9) In your view, does the achievement of best corporate governance practice in your 
organisation reflect what happens at the national level? Is it a shared value across 
the banks? (individual and societal effects) 
 
10)  How do you feel about the pressure on the banking industry to improve its 
corporate governance practice? (public pressure: why still a problem) 
 
 
 Analysis of interview series I and open coding 7.2.1
 
Analysis involves interpretation (Blumer, 1969), and interpretation ‘implies a researcher’s 
understanding of the events as related by participants’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.48). 
Through the analysis process, the researcher examines the data in order to find out ‘what it 
is and how it works’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.46), and the emerging events and 
incidents that have theoretical significance for the participants are consequently assigned 
‘conceptual labels’ (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p.7). The concepts derived from the data 
represent the overall understanding of the participants’ ‘experiences, spoken words, 
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actions, interactions, problems, and issues expressed’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.51). 
Emphasising the importance of concepts as the foundation for the construction of analysis 
and theory, Blumer (1969, p.26) stated,  
‘Concepts play a central role. They are significant elements in the prior scheme ... 
they are the categories for which data are sought and in which data are grouped; 
they usually become the chief means for establishing relationships between data; 
and they are the anchor points in interpretation of findings’.  
 
 
 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) added that it is these concepts that are transformed into open 
categories, which are a more abstract form of classification. The open coding in this 
research commenced with the transcription and review of the first series of interviews. The 
audio recording and the interview notes from each interview were transcribed verbatim 
into a written format immediately after each interview for easier examination and analysis 
using the line-by-line, sentence-by-sentence approach to uncover meanings, ideas or 
concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This was made possible by the time delay between 
interviews. The process also helped to guide the direction of the next interview, which is 
an essential part of GT application (Glaser and Strauss, 1967); moreover, the process was 
undertaken in its entirety rather than selectively (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This also 
helped to ensure the validity of the research outcome (ibid.). 
 
Along with thoroughly reading the transcribed interviews line-by-line and sentence-by-
sentence, theoretical memos were used in order to increase the theoretical sensitivity of the 
researcher. In GT, conceptual integration and articulation is enhanced through an 
extensive and systematic process of memoing during the data analysis process. Memos are 
‘specialised types of written records of analysis’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.117). They 
are the theoretical notes about the data and conceptual connections between categories that 
are written up during the coding and analysis process, as the emergent ideation of 
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substantive and theoretical categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), which help the 
researcher to obtain analytical insights into the data. Patton (2002, p.436) stated that 
‘recording and tracking analytical insights that occur during data collection are part of 
field work and the beginning of qualitative analysis’, adding that ‘repressing analytical 
insights may mean losing them forever, for there is no guarantee they’ll return’ (p.406).  
 
For this study, several memos were written in order to assist in capturing the conceptual 
and methodological emergence of the theory
33
. Across the participants and the semi-
structured interview questions in interview series I, a series of concepts emerged. The 
planned interview schedule enabled the researcher to carry emerging issues into the next 
interview while keeping to the initial schedule. During the open coding for interview 
series I, the incidents that emerged were compared to other incidents in order to discover 
or develop a code. This was achieved by identifying actions in each segment of the data 
and coding them using simple, short and active words that best described them (Charmaz, 
2006). For example, participants’ responses to Question 1 resulted in the following 
concepts and categories: 
 
QUESTION 1: Since the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in 
2006, what changes has your board of directors made to improve the governance practice 
in your organisation?  
 
Participant response: 
‘Well, our board has responded positively to the introduced Code of Corporate 
Governance by directing all departments to comply with its guidelines, which has 
been compulsory for all banks. So far we have improved in our operations, in areas 
like risk management, restructuring of the board to include independent directors. 
The tenure of the CEO has also been affected in line with the provisions of the Code. 
We also have more staff training programmes compared to what it used to be and 
these have tremendously improved their IT skills, and many areas of our operations’.  
                                            
33
 Appendix D provides a sample of the conceptual memos. 
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The incidents identified here are compliance, compulsory, improvement, risk management, 
the board structure, skills and training. These were then compared to the responses of 
other interviewees to Question 1 and those found to relate to a common theme were 
collected together to give a higher commonality, called a concept. The concepts were 
further grouped into categories. Finally, for Question 1, the categories that emerged were 
capacity development, board structure, improvements, internal control and accountability. 
The derivation of the capacity development category is illustrated in Table 7.2 below: 
 
Table 7-2  Examples of concepts derived from the labelled codes within the capacity 
development category 
 
Labelled codes Concepts 
Evaluation of the board of directors, 
staff assessment, job target policy, 
expert opinion, experienced personnel, 
job rotation 
 
Personnel assessment 
Induction courses, improving 
networking to reduce costs and time, 
ICT skills, training programme, 
introducing job-knowledge policy to 
reduce training costs, professionalism at 
all levels, improving communication 
  
 
 
Training 
 
 
a) Personnel assessment: the bank’s ability to continuously evaluate board members 
and staff who help to improve corporate performance.  
b) Training: the bank’s ability to provide a policy on human capacity building aimed 
at understanding the current challenges in achieving best corporate practice. 
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The development of categories followed an iterative and integrative process between data 
collection and analysis at every stage of the interview process. Through the analysis, the 
researcher discovered that some concepts appeared repeatedly in response to more than 
one question. In addition, the concepts and categories developed from the initial analysis 
of the first phase of interviews were then applied in iteration to see if they fitted (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). At the end of the analysis process for 
interview series I, 35 different categories had emerged with 108 properties and 
dimensions.  
 Semi-structured interview series II – Questions, analysis and 7.2.2
open coding 
 
This series of interviews was conducted with a participant from the CBN, and participants 
from the three new data sources that had emerged (the NDIC, SEC and CIBN). The 
interview with the CBN participant lasted for about 50 minutes, while an average of 40 
minutes was spent with the others. With the CBN the sole regulatory body for banks and 
the provider of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, the timing of the interview 
with its representative, after the completion of the first series of interviews (with the 
commercial banks), enriched the entire research process. The semi-structured questions 
prepared for interview series II were as follows: 
 
1. To what extent has the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks introduced in 
2006 improved the corporate governance practices of banks? (adequacy of the code 
of governance) 
2. To what extent does the board affect the corporate governance of a bank? (board 
leadership and influence in corporate governance) 
3. What impact does the banking culture have on corporate governance for banks? 
(effects of banks’ culture on good governance) 
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4. How do the Code of Corporate Governance and other existing rules impact on 
information disclosure and transparency? (disclosure and transparency) 
5. Are banks’ corporate governance practices aimed at meeting their business 
objectives? 
6. What, in your view, influences the attitudes of employees regarding organisational 
governance practices? 
7. How would you assess the corporate governance performance of the banks with 
respect to compliance and internal control? (effectiveness of internal controls and 
cooperation)  
8. To what extent has the Code of Governance conflicted with the objectives of the 
banks or their management’s strategic interests? (shareholder and stakeholder 
interests)  
9. Given what has been achieved so far, in what areas of the Code of Corporate 
Governance or other rules would you suggest improvements need to be made? 
(reviewing the Code of Corporate Governance) 
10. What are the challenges facing the realisation of best corporate governance 
practice in banks? To what extent do you think the banks can meet the expectations 
of the Code and other rules? (measures to sufficiently restore public confidence) 
 
 
In terms of the analysis of interview series II and the open coding, the process was the 
same as for interview series I, but in terms of the interviews themselves, a different style 
of questioning was used
34
. Interview series II followed a more interactive approach, and 
the researcher went into greater depth about corporate governance practice in banks, and 
sometimes extended the discussion as far as the wider financial industry. Whilst the data 
were effectively being analysed and collected at the same time, it was the subsequent 
reflection, and the decision to fully transcribe the audio-tapes and analyse the data in a 
more systematic and rigorous way, that produced significant improvements and led to a 
better understanding of the theoretical meanings. The concepts that emerged from the 
                                            
34
 After the completion of the data collection and analysis for interview series I, the style of questioning 
adopted for interview series II was aimed at finding out about the shortcomings exposed in interview series I, 
from participants who were best-placed to know about them, without compromising free-flowing interaction.   
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interviews with the CBN and the other three organisations were regrouped to find 
commonalities that were termed higher concepts. Identifying common characteristics that 
link a new concept to a previously coded concept is a recognised part of the GT process 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This process effectively answers the logical question of ‘what 
is going on there’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.114) from the participants’ perspective. For 
example, drawing from the analysis of interview series I, Question 4 of interview series II 
was aimed at understanding the regulatory perspective, and led to the following response 
and analysis: 
 
QUESTION 4: How do the Code of Corporate Governance and other existing rules 
impact on information disclosure and transparency in banks?  
 
Responses:  
‘You see, we have a responsibility as regulators to ensure banks properly account for 
every step of their stewardship and we found this aspect very much lacking in most 
banks. The first step we took was to introduce a Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks. This is also to safeguard the consolidation reform, part of which deals with 
information disclosure’ (CBN Official). 
 
 
When asked for clarification of the impact of the regulatory mechanism, the participant 
added,  
‘Yes,   ‘we also improved the quality of accounting and the auditing of financial and 
non-financial reporting, which banks have to comply with through their financial 
statements. This standard is expected to meet the international standard and ensure 
market credibility’.  
 
 
Other participants commented as follows: 
 ‘I believe even the general public can attest to the fact that some banks have been 
deceiving everyone for a fairly long time, particularly over their financial 
performance through public financial statements’. 
 
‘Of course, you know such financial reports were tailored just to protect the self-
interests of a few bank executives’.  
 
173 
 
In answer to Question 4 alone, the concepts that eventually emerged included 
accountability, deceit, market credibility, internal control, disclosure, the general public, 
and self-interest. These concepts were compared with other concepts that emerged from 
the remaining questions. Utilising the constant comparison procedure to deal with the data 
generated during this interview series resulted in the emergence of 18 different categories 
with 67 properties and dimensions. It must be noted that some of the concepts generated 
from one question were repeated in answer to other questions by different participants. 
 Focus Group Analysis and the Development of Open Codes 7.3
 
 
The focus group session took place three days after the completion of the data collection 
and analysis for interview series I and II. Participants were drawn from the local branches 
of commercial banks, the CBN, shareholders and those identified as representing the 
general public. All were based in Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria, and were included 
on the basis of their experience of corporate governance practice in the banking sector. 
Those selected from the banks were homogeneous in terms of their positions within their 
banks, while the non-banking participants all had an interest in bank corporate governance 
issues. This helped the free flow of ideas and openness in the issues discussed (Krueger, 
1994). The questions put to the group were similar to the interview questions and were 
principally influenced by the issues raised during interview series I and II.  
 
The discussion commenced with a reiteration that anonymity and confidentiality was 
assured to the participants, followed by a brief mention of the purpose of the research. The 
questions were short and specific and covered the following: why banks continue to fail 
despite the Code of Corporate Governance introduced by the CBN; measures taken by 
banks to improve corporate governance practice; the performance of board audit 
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committees; the quality of disclosure of financial and non-financial information; the extent 
to which boards affect corporate governance practice; how public and investor confidence 
could be improved through good governance mechanisms for banks. Significantly, the 
focus group took place at a time when some of the banks were in the process of being 
acquired, while others were entering into partnerships with other banks. This added a 
further concern and enriched the discussions and arguments greatly.  
 
Contributing to the discussion on how the Corporate Governance Code and other 
regulations affect the banks, one participant stated, ‘the provisions of the Code are 
insufficient to cover the problems that occur in banks, particularly now, and it is this 
inadequacy that the banks continue to exploit’. The overall view of the participants was 
that there should be a regulatory review. Another participant commented, ‘what is needed 
now is a reflection on whether the Code has worked well since its introduction and more 
importantly the challenges that have emerged recently in the banking industry’. Speaking 
specifically with regard to his bank, on the topic of compliance with the provisions of the 
Code of Corporate Governance, another participant stated, 
‘For me, compliance with the code rests on the will of the board, its committees and the 
executive management. This is because they possess the power to enforce, demand 
quality information from the management and discipline erring employees. We all 
know how banks operate. No staff will be spared if found to be negligent, let alone to 
be involved in manipulating records or refusing to do their jobs. The problem lies with 
the board and those given the responsibility to supervise the implementation of 
corporate governance’ (Bank Official, Focus Group). 
 
 
 
Another participant added, ‘I also know of the structural changes made within our bank to 
improve control and abuses and am also aware that the training of staff has been on-going 
in all departments. We are not having problems in the bank now compared to what we 
experienced before the reform in 2005’.  Also, in response to a question on the collapse of 
the banks and some of the issues facing banks now, one participant argued, 
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‘Well, we know everyone is concerned about it. Um, the board members in some 
banks were actually central to many of the failures and as such have to take 
responsibility for this. But I don’t think we can solve problems in banks as fast as 
people want it to happen. Some of these problems also exist in many corporations and 
I believe this also influences the way bank officials handle them. Take the example of 
corruption, where the management and board members give themselves loans or give 
their friends loans, and also their involvement with how bank shares have been 
processed and traded in recent times’ (Bank Official, Focus Group). 
 
 
 
On this issue, some participants admitted that the behaviours of some bank officials, even 
since the introduction of the Code in 2006, have caused great concern to the public, and 
this shows that something is fundamentally wrong, not only with the regulations and the 
Code of Corporate Governance, but also with the supervision and enforcement of the 
provisions. Another participant added that the boards and executive management of the 
affected banks were to blame. There was also the general belief that the collapse of bank 
share values in 2009 was due to ineffective governance in the entire financial sector, 
including banks.  On the question of the disclosure of information and audit committee 
performance, a participant from the regulatory body explained, 
‘Structural changes and processes have been introduced through the banks’ Prudential 
Guidelines of 2011 to ensure the standardisation and quality of financial reporting. 
The guidelines also emphasised that board members would be held accountable for 
any corporate failure and were therefore expected to enforce the provisions of the 
Code at all levels while continuing to observe events through their monitoring 
mechanisms’.  
 
 
 
Another point of discussion centred on patterns of bank behaviour in recent times. Some 
participants claimed that a lot of the problems were related to insider abuse, false financial 
information and the problem of accountability. The researcher asked whether such 
behaviours were unique to banks and, if so, how they could be addressed. The participants 
agreed that ‘a lack of transparency and commitment to a good course of action is an issue 
in all organisations, whether financial or non-financial’. As such, it has become a norm 
and part of individual or group behaviour. When the participants were asked what they 
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considered was the best way to improve governance practices in banks, individual 
speakers expressed their views on the duties and responsibilities of banks’ boards of 
directors under various rules and the Code of Governance. One participant stated, ‘there 
has been very little improvement in my bank and that’s why we are having problems 
now’. 
 
Another participant was of the view that ‘with what has been happening in banks since the 
consolidation, it shows that banks need more than regulation because, less than eight years 
after the consolidation and the introduction of the Code, there are still problems in the 
banking sector’. The participants admitted that there are some problems with certain 
provisions of the Code and the other rules that existed before it. Although some 
participants believed that efforts were being made at the bank level and by the regulators 
to improve governance practices, the main views expressed by the focus group regarding 
the achievement of good governance concerned the need to address human factors at the 
board and management levels, and the need for monitoring by regulatory agencies. 
Moreover, while corresponding blame was pointed at the management of commercial 
banks and the regulatory authority, the balanced consensus expressed by the focus group 
was that good corporate governance is concerned with three critical elements: 
transparency, leadership and a show of positive, responsible behaviour. Analysing the 
various responses in the focus group discussion, the open codes that emerged from the 
concepts expressed by the participants were leadership issues, human behaviour, 
transparency, board structure, compliance, regulatory review, a lack of accountability, 
commitment, improvement, and public pressure and monitoring. 
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 Open Categories Developed from the Interviews and the Focus 7.4
Group 
 
 
In conducting the open coding, the data collected and analysed through the two series of 
semi-structured interviews and the focus group session were fundamental. A constant 
comparison of meanings and interpretations was conducted until the final abstraction was 
reached, resulting in eight open categories, namely corporate transformation, 
code/regulation, self-interest, lack of transparency, improving competence, internal 
control mechanism, organisational factors, and enforcement. It is important to note that 
each open category was linked to one or more interview questions and diverse responses 
to one or more of the focus group questions. The following section explains these open 
categories in terms of their properties and dimensions. 
 Corporate transformation 7.4.1
 
The open category of corporate transformation emerged from the following analysis of 
the responses drawn from the interviews and the focus group: 
Interview Questions 
Series I QUESTION 1: Since the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks in 2006, what changes has your board of directors made to improve the governance 
practice in your organisation? 
 
Series I QUESTION 3: Has the Code of Governance improved the performance and the 
role of the audit committee in your organisation?  
 
Series I QUESTION 4: How do the existing rules and code of best practice affect the 
disclosure of information or the level of transparency in your organisation?  
 
Series II QUESTION 2: To what extent does the board affect the corporate governance of 
a bank? 
 
Series II QUESTION 4: How does the Code of Corporate Governance and how do other 
existing rule impact on information disclosure and transparency? 
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Focus group session 
Questions on the Code of Governance and other regulations, and on disclosure and 
transparency 
 
 
The above questions generated concepts whose commonalities led to the development of 
corporate transformation as an initial category. The term transformation is based on the 
responses from the participants when they were reflecting on new measures taken to 
address identified shortcomings with corporate governance. H. R. Miles (1997) stated that 
transformation denotes a wide range of actions and opportunities that are required to drive 
growth and breakthrough results. Its features relate to changes, actions and measures taken 
to improve performance or generate results. In the context of the banks in Nigeria, 
transformation reflects how various participants
35
 referred to the changes made through 
the initiatives of either the regulatory authority or individual banks that affect corporate 
governance practice. The open category of corporate transformation was developed based 
on the conceptual properties of board structure and tenure. The following quotation is an 
example of the key responses from the interviews and the focus group:  
‘Yes, our board has been restructured to reflect the requirements of the new code, and 
this affects all the banks. The tenure of board members has also been reduced. 
Basically, there have been structural changes in the governance process, including 
within some departments and standing committees’ (Company Secretary). 
 
 
 
Confirming this, another participant commented, ‘I think, principally, the Code of 
Governance is intended to address weaknesses identified within the banks, some of 
which include issues of board tenure, introducing independent directors to devolve the 
powers of the board and also to re-awaken the board’s audit committee to be more 
proactive’. When asked for further clarification, the participant asserted that the 
introduction of these measures was intended to reduce abuses and to ensure that the 
                                            
35
 Various participants mean those involved in interview series I and II and the focus group. 
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board’s power to make decisions was properly used. He added, ‘the introduction of new 
and competent hands is done to ensure that there are sufficient checks and balances in 
the governance processes’. 
 
In summary, the interviewees and focus group participants agreed that the measures 
taken to improve banks’ governance practice included the following: corporate 
transformation of the banking sector through the restructuring of boards, including 
appointments of independent directors and qualified personnel, changes in board 
composition, and changes in the tenure of board members and CEOs. During the focus 
group session, one participant argued, ‘although there were complaints about some of 
the personalities appointed as CEOs or independent directors, or about the composition 
of the boards, there was still the need to ensure that the new boards did not fall into the 
same trap as their predecessors’. Elaborating further, she explained that ‘the special 
nature of banking operations has, over the years, made many changes unworkable, 
particularly if a proper relationship is not achieved between the board, the management, 
and other employees, and more importantly with principal stakeholders (shareholders 
and regulators)’. In support of this view, another participant suggested, ‘changes in the 
banks are welcome, given recent events, but such changes or actions will need the full 
cooperation of all players to ensure their success’. The conceptual properties of board 
structure and tenure, through which the corporate transformation open category 
emerged, are discussed below: 
 
I. Board structure 
Board structure refers to the ‘size and composition of a corporate board of directors, 
whose main functions are to hire, compensate, advise, monitor, discipline and, if 
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necessary, fire top management, all with an eye toward maximising shareholder value’ 
(Denis and McConnell, 2003, p.2). Board structure is also considered a significant feature 
of corporate governance, through which the internal control of corporations is, achieved 
(OECD, 1999). Indeed, Radenkovic-Jocic (2006, p.156) took the view that ‘the size and 
structure of the board influences best practice’. As the main property of the corporate 
transformation category, board structure was observed to be a key factor in the changes 
made so far, due to the continual mistakes and oversights that have been made by boards 
of directors in the past in their control and monitoring roles. Several interviewees and 
focus group discussants agreed that these changes were necessary, particularly the 
inclusion of non-executive directors (NEDs)
36
 on boards. Mallin (2007) argued that, ‘non-
executive directors are a mainstay of good governance in terms of control of influence and 
in ensuring effective monitoring’ (p.132). This further supports the conclusion of the 
Cadbury Committee Report (1992, Para. 4.2), which stated, ‘NEDs should be independent 
of management and free from any business or other relationship which could materially 
interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement’. This suggests that NEDs are 
essential, and that failing to include them will affect the realisation of good corporate 
governance. As one CBN official stated, ‘in recent times, the boards of some banks have 
exhibited tendencies to suggest that banks are their personal estates, thereby taking 
decisions that are not consistent with the interests and objectives of the banks’. He 
explained that the provisions of the Code in respect of IDs’ and audit committees’ 
functions are therefore timely. 
 
Various arguments were advanced during the focus group discussion on the roles and 
structure of boards. One participant expressed the view that ‘the recent failures of banks 
                                            
36
 NEDs are interchangeably referred to as independent directors (IDs). 
181 
 
could have been minimised or avoided altogether if their boards had been effective’. 
Indeed, this was evident from the revelations in the aftermath of these failures about 
corrupt CEOs and the huge amounts lost due to the fraudulent granting of loans. One 
participant remarked, 
‘Lack of accountability on the part of the board was the problem, and it is hoped 
that making the boards accountable and responsible will awaken them to their roles’ 
(Bank Official). 
 
 
 
To address the lack of accountability of the boards, it is deemed necessary to devolve their 
powers by restructuring their committees. Another bank representative commented, 
‘Everyone knows the main reason for introducing more committees, such as the risk 
management, audit and credit committees of the banks, is to limit the influence of the 
board on the decisions to be discussed or taken’ (Head of Risk Management). 
 
 
This suggests that the Code of Governance was partly introduced to devolve board powers 
that are seen as inimical to good governance practice. According to the CBN (2006), there 
should be at least four board committees and the board chairman should not be a member 
of any of them or those of any of the bank’s subsidiaries. Previous research too has argued 
that forming committees with specialised roles will enhance a board’s performance in 
terms of productivity and monitoring (Klein, 1998). However, another interviewee 
observed, 
‘The issue of independent directors has not been well articulated. The concept 
presupposes that an independent director is to be someone who has no stake or interest 
in the bank, but there is concern as to who appoints the independent director. Is it the 
shareholders, the management or the regulator?’ (Company Secretary).   
 
 
While these measures were intended to create boards with ‘a balance of power and 
authority so that no individual or coalition of individuals has unfettered powers of decision 
making’ (CBN, 2006, Sec. 4.8), some issues that have arisen regarding the application of 
the Code of Corporate Governance are yet to be sorted out. 
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II. Tenure 
 
Tenure refers to the ‘length of time workers have been in their current job or their current 
employment’ (OECD, 2001, p.93). The tenure of the board members, including the CEO, 
plays a crucial role in good corporate governance.  Canavan et al. (2004) argued that long 
tenure results in a lack of new insights and solutions to the company’s issues. Liu and Sun 
(2010, p.179) added that this is ‘likely to be ineffective’. On this topic, the Code of 
Corporate Governance (CBN, 2006, Sec. 5.3.10) stated, 
‘Non-executive directors should not remain on the board of a bank continuously for 
more than 3 terms of 4 years, i.e. 12 years’. 
 
 
 
One of the participants confirmed that the reconstitution of boards had forced out directors 
whose tenure exceeded 12 years and auditors whose tenure exceeded 10 years. He added, 
‘we believe the time limit put on board members is a good development since some who 
had served for a long time were part of the problem for the banks’. Another participant 
argued, ‘injecting personnel with new blood at the decision-making level may help 
improve our governance practice’. However, others expressed contrasting views about 
limiting tenure. For instance, one stated, 
‘To me, I can’t understand the wisdom in wasting human talent that could be 
competent and hardworking just in the name of making changes, particularly those 
who have been in the industry for a long time. The banks will now start wasting 
funds and time training the new executives just in the name of change’ (Bank 
Official).  
 
 
 
But, one of the participants in the focus group argued, 
‘The step taken by the CBN through the Code of Corporate Governance is the best 
option given the consistent banking failures. These so-called good directors referred to 
have been there and were part of the many decisions that caused the bank failures’ 
(Focus Group Participant). 
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Overall, the consensus among the participants on the changes relating to tenure was that 
they had resolved some of the complaints concerning “sit-tight directors”. At the least, 
they had removed the erroneous belief that some directors were untouchable. Moreover, 
the process was aimed at introducing new blood into boards, moving towards new 
thinking, and encouraging vibrant corporate governance for banks.  
 Enforcement  7.4.2
 
Another category that emerged from the analysis of the responses to the questions listed 
in Section 7.4.1 above was enforcement. Enforcement is concerned with the ability to 
compel observance of or compliance with a law, rule or obligation (Baldwin and Black, 
2007). This involves ‘detecting undesirable or non-compliant behaviours, developing 
tools and strategies for responding to that behaviour, ensuring compliance with those 
tools and strategies, assessing their success or failure and, modifying them accordingly’ 
(ibid., p.25). In this thesis, it is the ability of the banks and the CBN and its agencies to 
enforce compliance with the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance and other 
relevant regulations. The overall consensus of the interviewees and focus group 
participants was that enforcement of the Code of Corporate Governance was essential 
to ensuring best corporate governance practice in the banking system. Some 
participants expressed the idea that what is required is a working relationship based on 
mutual trust among the players in the governance process. One participant stated, 
 ‘There are no doubt laws, and the Code of Corporate Governance plays a vital role 
in promoting corporate governance practice in banks, but its enforcement has been 
the problem and it is the result of that we are seeing happening in banks today’ 
(Focus Group Participant). 
 
 
An interviewee from the CBN admitted the difficulties of enforcing the provisions of the 
Code. According to him, problems were still noticeable in many areas of banking. As he 
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argued, ‘efforts are being made through different strategies to enforce compliance with the 
provisions of the Code and other regulations to ensure the stability of the banks and also 
restore public confidence in the sector’. The category of enforcement emerged from the 
properties of compliance, monitoring and trust, as discussed below:   
 
I. Compliance 
Compliance refers to ‘taking needed actions to conform to relevant laws, regulations or 
policies’ (Hurley and Becca, 2007, p.8). Here, conformity implies obedience with laws, 
regulations, Code of Corporate Governance provisions and prudential statements that form 
the framework for achieving best practice (BCBS, 2012). The participants agreed that 
corporations can achieve good corporate governance when they effectively comply with 
the provisions of the corporate framework. Conversely, any organisation that ignores or 
fails to comply with this framework will see the quality of its corporate governance 
practice affected. With respect to the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, the CBN 
(2006, Sec. 1.7) stated, ‘compliance with the provisions of this code is mandatory’. A 
chief compliance officer made the following comment: 
 ‘We have responded to CBN guidelines through many measures, particularly with 
board membership and tenure and ensuring the existence of other committees. There 
are several new faces now on our board. Everyone is now careful about how he/she 
does things and I think we are on course to complying with the provisions and other 
policy directives sufficiently.’ 
 
 
Another executive manager commented, ‘steps are being taken to ensure compliance with 
the provisions of the Code of Governance’. Clarifying this, she added, 
 
‘Presently the only thing we are yet to comply with fully is on the percentage of 
public sector holdings, and we are working hard toward achieving our compliance 
target. For disclosure, we have a template with the requirement from the CBN, very 
explicit, and I am confident that we shall continue doing our best’. 
 
185 
 
The balanced opinion from the interviews suggests that banks have shown some 
willingness to comply with the provisions of the Code and other regulations. However, in 
the focus group session, some participants were of the view that not enough had been 
achieved as far as compliance with the provisions was concerned. As one participant 
argued, 
‘If a bank, through the established regulatory compliance unit, has complied with the 
existing legal framework, including the bank’s specific rules, how can there be bank 
failures as we are seeing today – years after the Code of Corporate Governance came 
into force? There is something wrong within the system’ (Focus Group Participant). 
 
 
 
In line with their opinions, the ROSC Report (2011, p.17) confirmed that ‘except in the 
case of a few banks, appropriate accounting and disclosure for financial instruments are 
rarely found in the financial statements of the corporate entities’. This information on 
compliance gaps demonstrates that there are still weaknesses in Nigerian banks’ corporate 
financial reporting.  
 
II Lack of monitoring  
A lack of monitoring, as a property of the enforcement category, reflects the participants’ 
concern regarding the failure of various players in the corporate governance process. 
Monitoring is considered important, and as such the Code of Corporate Governance 
requires, not only regular management reporting and the implementation of monitoring 
systems by banks, but also a well-articulated code of conduct for directors, management 
and staff (CBN, 2006). The participants agreed that a lack of monitoring had caused the 
widespread abuses in the banks to remain undetected for a very long time. This was 
reflected in the following comment: 
‘Following the consolidation reform of the banks, everyone knows it is difficult to 
expect the board of directors to monitor itself or the management it controls, since it 
was the boards that the CBN accused of exhibiting weaknesses that affected banking 
performance’ (Bank Official). 
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At the focus group, one participant was of the view that the leadership abuses that led to 
the collapse of some banks in 2009 and 2010 resulted, not only from the inability of the 
boards to monitor their banks’ activities, but also from the failure of the regulatory 
authority to take any responsibility for monitoring the boards. He remarked, 
‘What we often hear is when a bank collapses. We also know that the board, the 
CBN, and the NDIC are all responsible for monitoring banks but what we again do 
not know is whether there is effective structure and process through which 
monitoring can be coordinated and abuses detected early enough’ (Focus Group 
Participant). 
 
 
Although blame was placed on each other by the regulatory authority and the banks 
regarding the monitoring of banks, the consensus among the focus group participants and 
the interviewees was that, in spite of the banking reforms implemented by the CBN in 
2006 and the subsequent changes in the banks, the monitoring of the banks had not been 
effective.  
 
III Trust 
Trust is the ‘willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on 
the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ (Mayer et al., 1995, 
p.712). In other words, it is ‘concerned with the willingness of one person or group to 
relate to another in the belief that the other’s actions will be beneficial rather than 
detrimental, even though this cannot be guaranteed’ (Child, 2001, p.275). This, Child 
explained, is vital for any relationship, business or otherwise.  For instance, one official 
observed that most of the changes favoured outsiders who were not part of internal 
management, and as such there was an attitude of let’s wait and see whether the newly 
appointed would bring a different agenda that might affect the existing relationships and 
cooperation among the ranks in the banks.  
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One interviewee argued, 
‘The nature of banking operations is different to non-banking operations, and any 
changes in the structure that compromise ensuring good relationships and cooperation 
between all players in the governance process, including the regulators and the 
shareholders, may likely create more problems than it can solve’ (Bank Official).  
 
 
 
Another participant observed that ‘much would be achieved in the banking sector if there 
were mutual trust between the regulatory body and the banks’. From the viewpoint of the 
participants, the newly appointed CEOs and other board members would need good 
relationships based on trust even at the board level, in view of the various decisions they 
would need to make over time. This further suggests that building trust at all levels is 
essential. 
 Code/Regulation 7.4.3
 
The open category of code/regulation emerged from the analysis of responses to the 
following questions: 
Series I QUESTION 2: Are your organisation’s governance practices strongly linked to 
the expectations of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and other regulations? 
 
Series II QUESTION 4: How do the Code of Corporate Governance and other existing 
rules impact on information disclosure and transparency? 
 
Series II QUESTION 8: To what extent has the Code of Governance conflicted with the 
objectives of the banks or their management’s strategic interests? 
 
Series II QUESTION 9: Given what has been achieved so far, in what areas of the Code of 
Corporate Governance or other rules would you suggest improvements need to be made? 
 
Focus group question: To what extent have the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks 
and the other regulatory frameworks influenced governance practices in banks? 
 
 
The open category of code/regulation refers to the applicable regulatory frameworks 
governing banking activities in Nigeria, as issued by the CBN. It relates to the 
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participants’ (in the interviews and the focus group) opinions over the adequacy of the 
provisions of the Code and other regulations in terms of producing good corporate 
governance. In response to the recent financial crisis, the BCBS (2010, p.7) recommended 
that regulatory bodies can enhance corporate governance practice in banks by ‘establishing 
rules or codes to guide corporate governance strategies, policies and procedures’. This 
underscores the reasoning that the ‘quality of laws and rules as governance mechanisms 
affects regulatory outcomes’ (Jalilian et al., 2006, p.5), which in turn can be expected to 
have wider economic consequences (K. Alexander, 2006). In terms of the codes that apply 
to banks in Nigeria, apart from (1) the inherited English common law, which derives from 
the colonial past with Britain, (2) statutes enacted by Nigerian legislature, (3) customary 
law and sharia law, and (4) judicial precedents or case laws, the participants made constant 
reference to CAMA 1990, the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria 2006, 
the SEC Code of Corporate Governance 2003 (revised 2009) and other internal and 
external mechanisms
37
 aimed at complementing them. The category of code/regulation 
was made up of two significant properties, harmonisation and review, as discussed in the 
following sections.   
 
I. Harmonisation of regulations 
Harmonisation refers to ‘the process of creating equal conditions’ (Mock, 2002, p.1). This 
relates to the coordination and merging of processes, institutions and systems (ibid.). Here, 
harmonisation of regulation relates to ways of reducing duplication and overlaps in the 
regulatory frameworks for corporate governance. Harmonisation was observed to be the 
main property of code/regulation, with dimensions arising from conflicting policy 
directives, overlapping regulatory frameworks, and the provisions of the Code versus other 
                                            
37
 Internal mechanisms refer to routine guidelines issued by the CBN on banking activities and governance, 
whilst external mechanisms relate to the expectations of international agencies regarding meeting 
international standards and/or ensuring investor confidence. 
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regulations. The participants from the banks agreed that regulations are necessary for the 
safety and soundness of the banks but indicated that different bits of regulations and policy 
directives gave room for corporate abuse by various actors and also prevented corporate 
excellence. Hurley and Becca (2007, p.51) explained that ‘a lack of guidance will make 
companies more risk averse’. One of the interviewees in the current research stated, 
‘We quite well recognise the importance of regulatory measures introduced for 
banks at various times and they are necessary in all respects. For instance, the Code 
of Corporate Governance for Banks introduced by the CBN is intended to 
complement existing rules such as CAMA (1990), BOFIA (1991) and the SECT Act 
(2009). In addition to these provisions, we also receive a series of directives from 
the SEC and the NDIC on corporate governance matters. Due to these 
uncoordinated governing rules, we are often asked to provide the same information 
to different regulatory agencies, which indicates their lack of coordination’ (Bank 
Official). 
 
 
 
 
Clarifying this, the participant said that, while they received directives from the CBN to 
present certain reports in a particular format, the SEC or NDIC often requested the same 
information in a different format. There are also areas of difference between the CBN’s 
Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and the banks’ internal governance guidelines, 
particularly in the area of risk management. On the topic of conflicting directives, a 
participant remarked, ‘there has been inconsistency on the directives relating to the issue 
of locating ATM facilities in non-banking premises or within banking premises. Some 
banks spent huge amounts moving out of banking premises and into other premises’. 
These excerpts indicate that the CBN needs to better articulate its policies towards banks 
and acknowledge the banks’ sensitivity to market competition. Similarly, during the focus 
group session, a participant observed that banks work under a variety of different 
regulatory expectations, and this confusion may account for the difficulties experienced in 
enforcing the governance framework, and realising the intended aim of the Code of 
Corporate Governance.  
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She stated, 
‘While the CBN made compliance with the provisions of the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks mandatory, the revised SEC code (2009) indicates that the code 
is not intended as a rigid set of rules. What are we to do under this situation of 
compulsion and discretion?’ (Bank Representative). 
 
 
The general view suggests that there are wide differences between the provisions of the 
CBN (2006) and the revised SEC Act (2009) and also a lack of coordination among the 
regulatory agencies on certain aspects of the control framework. Bringing them together 
under one strong institutional mechanism could eliminate the multiple compliance 
requirements faced by the banks at present. However, the CBN representatives insist that 
‘banks are expected to follow the provisions of the CBN Code wherever it differs from 
other rules’. According to the participant from the CBN, the Prudential Guidelines 
released in 2011 have addressed some of these areas in some ways. Nonetheless, the CBN 
has recognised the need to provide a mechanism that can guarantee effective policy 
coordination, particularly in the identified areas of overlap.  
 
II. Regulatory review 
Regulatory review refers to the difficulties experienced in the enforcement of and 
compliance with some aspects of the regulatory frameworks. This property emerged from 
dimensions such as developing policy as opposed to law, insufficient guidelines, providing 
a robust system, a lack of continuity, and provisions that are unenforceable due to current 
realities. In fact, the interviewees from various banks indicated that an effective and 
realisable provision that reflected the current situation was the most essential aspect 
needed to improve governance practice in banks. A chief compliance officer commented 
as follows: 
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‘We have seen so far the effects of the new Code of Corporate Governance (CBN, 
2006) along with other regulatory frameworks such as the BOFIA (1991), CAMA 
(1990), and SEC (2003) on banking activities. Although there have been positive 
effects of these regulations, there is still the need to improve some provisions, 
particularly in some critical areas of the major regulations, such as the CBN code, 
CAMA and the SEC’ (Chief Compliance Officer). 
 
 
Commenting on the CBN code of 2006, another bank executive in charge of compliance 
and policy added the following: 
‘We are striving to comply with the requirements of the Code of Governance but 
everyone knows the Code was developed in a rush and did not envisage today’s 
challenges. In our case, we are trying to address the identified gaps through regional 
external control compliance and internal compliance units. But we need to sit with 
the CBN and sort out some issues. For now, we have informed them of these 
difficult areas and I believe my colleagues in other banks may experience the same 
or even more issues’ (Compliance and Financial Policy Manager).  
 
 
CBN officials too have indicated that the banks need to cooperate with the regulators in 
order to achieve effective implementation of the regulations and good corporate 
governance. Similarly, in the focus group session, one participant asked, ‘we talk of 
regulations and abuse of regulations always. Why can’t all parties meet and discuss the 
best guidelines to get the banks out of this mess?’ In support of this, another participant 
commented that, ‘elsewhere, banks are involved in developing policy guidelines, 
providing inputs and comments’, and asked why Nigeria could not ‘establish a similar 
process since there is a history that all could learn from’. To summarise, the 
inconsistencies in the existing regulations, and some difficulties experienced in 
implementing them in view of the market realities, are some of the fundamental factors 
affecting governance and justifying a second look at the various frameworks.  
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 Improving competence 7.4.4
 
The open category improving competence emerged from the analysis of the following 
questions: 
Series I QUESTION 1: Since the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks in 2006, what changes has your board of directors made to improve the governance 
practices in your organisation?  
 
Series I QUESTION 6: What, if anything, in your view, influences the attitudes of 
employees in relation to your organisational governance practice?  
 
Series II QUESTION 7: How would you assess the corporate governance performance of 
the banks with respect to compliance and internal control?  
 
Focus group: Measures taken by banks to improve corporate governance practice. 
 
 
 
Competence is ‘the degree of fit between the ability requirements of a certain task and the 
corresponding abilities possessed’ (Brinckmann, 2007, p.20). In other words, it comprises 
‘the underlying characteristics, such as skills or body of knowledge, an individual 
possesses and uses which leads to successful performance in a life role or job’ (Boyatzis, 
1982, pp.21-22). The competence category emerged from the participants’ explanations of 
the various steps banks have taken to improve the abilities and knowledge of both the 
board members and other employees in response to the increasing challenges to banks’ 
competiveness. The participants recognised competence as a necessity for banking 
organisations. The category can also be explained in terms of a firm’s distinctive 
competence needs, that is, as a reflection of organisational capabilities to coordinate and 
learn (Dosi and Teece, 1998)
38
.   
 
 
                                            
38
 Organisational capability is the ability of an enterprise to organise, manage or govern sets of activities 
(Dosi and Teece, 1998). 
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One participant stated, 
‘Banks’ employees need training in new skills in view of the new challenges in our 
competitive market, and also to enhance our strategic position. Moreover, 
competiveness in the banking sector in terms of product and service requires 
employees to improve their competence by acquiring new knowledge. The same is 
also true for board members who are in charge of policy decisions on behalf of 
banks’ (Bank Official). 
 
 
 
The consensus of the participants, regarding meeting the challenges of the corporate 
governance provisions and the market environment, was that the board members and 
management needed to “brace up” mentally. They also acknowledged that, although there 
has been an improvement in recent times, achieving competence is still a problem for 
banks. One participant commented, ‘some of the appointed board members and even those 
selected onto the committees of the boards may not have appropriate qualifications or 
training in a finance background’. The BCBS (2012, p.15) also requires organisations to 
ensure ‘the availability of competent, independent and experienced professionals’. In the 
opinions of the participants, competence as an open category emerged from the conceptual 
properties of training, job assessment and skills development, as discussed below. 
 
I. Training 
Training is ‘associated with the performance of people in their job based on the identified 
shortfall in their knowledge and or skills to undertake certain roles or tasks’ (Anitha and 
Thenmozhi, 2011, p.785). In the context of this research, it is a planned process used to 
modify attitude, knowledge through a learning experience so as to achieve effective 
performance (Osborne, 1996). Training, as the main property of competence, emerged 
through dimensions relating to additional knowledge and job orientation, both of which 
the participants agreed were vital for good corporate governance. An official from the 
CBN stated, 
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‘We realise that banks need to have the appropriate knowledge, not only for the 
market, but for their relationships with other stakeholders. On our part, we have 
already put in place long and medium-term plans for improving the abilities of our 
employees to cope with challenges in supervision and enforcement within our 
statutory responsibility’ (CBN Official). 
 
 
 
Some participants emphasised that the nature, structure and processes of corporate 
governance in banks needed to be properly understood, first by the executive directors, 
and then down through the management structure. As one participant further explained, 
 ‘Board members need a new orientation towards the present challenges. Prior to 
this reform, it was difficult for some board members to take part in any form of 
training programme, except conferences, most of which they see as a relaxation 
forum. I think enhancing the potential of the decision makers is a good means of 
achieving corporate goals’ (Company Secretary). 
 
 
 
This suggests that, through training programmes, details of corporate governance 
requirements for banks may be taught to the executive management so as to enhance their 
ability to influence good governance practice. The participants also confirmed that there 
had been improvements in the training policies of their banks, particularly in relation to 
corporate governance requirements, compared to in the past. For instance, banks now use 
both internal and external training programmes for their employees, including the 
members of various committees. This has also brought about wider interaction among the 
banks and their representatives. 
 
II. Job assessment 
The term assessment refers to ‘evaluation measures of how well learning or experience has 
been applied to a job or task, or on-job objectives have been achieved, either directly as 
part of the training, or as a consequence of it’ (Osborne, 1996, p.59). In other words, it is a 
routine evaluation of the experience, knowledge or skills needed to ensure performance 
(Anitha and Thenmozhi, 2011). As one of the main properties of the competence category, 
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job assessment was observed through dimensions related to employees’ evaluation and 
monitoring, and work tasks. As the participants variously highlighted, continuous 
evaluation of on-the-job tasks helps to improve performance. As one participant pointed 
out, ‘every member of staff has a key performance indicator (KPI) job description through 
which he is assessed and this is based on the tasks assigned to him or her, and such 
functions are also reviewed monthly’. KPI is a tool used by organisations to evaluate their 
success in particular activities. Recognising the importance of job assessment, regarding 
board performance, the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks (CBN, 2006, Sec. 5.4) 
provides that ‘there should be annual appraisals of board members, independently, and the 
report shall be presented to shareholders at the AGM and a copy forwarded to the CBN’. 
Similarly, assessments are made of the performance and objectivity of the internal audit 
process and of the independent external auditors. These findings demonstrate the role 
assessment plays in staff competence, both within the supervisory teams and among those 
expected to comply, and the effect on the quality of governance practices. 
 
III. Skills development 
A skill refers to the ability to do something well, ‘including both hard skills which are 
technical in nature and soft skills that are people oriented’ (Gallagher, 2010, p.3). The 
interviewees acknowledged that, in the new era of technology and market volatility, the 
skill level in a bank influences its capacity to carry out certain tasks, and consequently its 
competence. This shows that skills development needs to be a core objective of policy 
intervention, particularly in a complex market economy such as Nigeria, and indeed 
elsewhere. A risk management manager interviewed said, ‘our operations today are 
technologically driven, and to effectively communicate within the system, we must 
improve our skills’ He added that both the regulators and the banks needed to do more in 
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the area of skills development. According to him, most of the errors that had occurred in 
the past, at least in some departments, had come from a lack of sufficient skill to monitor 
what was going on there. More general comments were directed towards the significance 
of skills development; it was argued that continuous efforts were needed in this regard, in 
response to the changing working environment.  
 Internal control mechanism 7.4.5
 
The internal control mechanism emerged as an open category in response to the following 
questions: 
Series I QUESTION 6: What, if anything, in your view, influences the attitudes of 
employees in relation to your organisational governance practice? 
 
Series I QUESTION 7: How do you think your board of directors affects corporate 
governance best practice in your organisation? 
 
Series II QUESTION 7: How would you assess the corporate governance performance of 
the banks with respect to compliance and internal control? 
 
Series II QUESTION 10: What are the challenges facing the realisation of best corporate 
governance practice in banks? To what extent do you think the banks can meet the 
expectations of the Code and other rules? 
 
Focus group: Measures taken to improve corporate governance; why banks continue to fail 
despite the introduction of the code; how to improve public and investor confidence 
through good governance in banks. 
 
 
 
Control relates to the internal, organisational, and external mechanisms employed to help 
align the diverse interests of management (including directors) and shareholders so as to 
achieve value maximisation (Walsh and Seward, 1990). Here, internal corporate control 
reflects the participants’ view of tightening loose areas in order to achieve the standards 
expected of similar banks elsewhere. The participants agreed that the essence of corporate 
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governance is centred on control. As such, it is vital for banks to improve their internal 
and external control mechanisms. One participant put it as follows: 
‘Banks need control, particularly internal control. Unfortunately, in Nigeria, and from 
our banking reforms history, the absence of a process of checks and balances on 
decision-making has been the main cause of the abuses experienced’ (Bank Official).  
 
 
 
During the focus group, a participant observed that ‘the continued failure of banks is a 
testimony to the lack of control mechanisms to restrain individuals at the board and 
management levels’. A CBN official agreed and stated, ‘weak internal control was one of 
the identified weaknesses in the banks prior to the reforms in 2004 and the problem is still 
visible in most banks, despite our efforts and the general expectations’. Indeed, it is the 
recognition of control in corporate governance that led the Cadbury Committee Report 
(1992, Para. 1.9) to rightly define corporate governance as ‘how companies are directed 
and controlled’. According to the participants’ responses in this research, the initial 
category of corporate control mechanism emerged from the conceptual properties of 
whistle blowing and risk-taking behaviour, and these are discussed below. 
 
I. Whistle blowing 
Whistle blowing refers to ‘the disclosure by organisation members of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that 
may be able to effect action’ (Near and Miceli, 1985, p.4). Here, it relates to employees 
within an organisation reporting wrongdoing for the purposes of detecting and controlling 
fraud or financial irregularity arising from improper conduct or unethical activities (Bhal 
and Dadhich, 2011). Both the regulator and the participants from the banks agreed that 
organisational members’ perceptions of wrongdoing and why it has occurred may play an 
important role in helping to address such events. Indeed, the adoption of a whistle-blowing 
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strategy may help to restrain managers from wrongdoing and protect corporate value 
(Dasgupta and Kesharwani, 2010). In this case, the mechanism must be aimed at 
correcting wrongdoing that harms the interests of the organisation itself, and those of other 
stakeholders. Whistle blowing emerged as the main property of the corporate control 
category, as the bank executive managers argued that a failure to know when wrongdoing 
is occurring, or originating, and who is involved undermines the efforts towards good 
corporate governance practice. A participant from the CBN stated, 
‘The absence of a mechanism by which employees can raise the alarm has, in the past, 
provided management and executives with opportunities to abuse their offices 
unnoticed. In our response to this gap, the current Code of Corporate Governance 
provides (CBN, 2006, Sec. 6.1.12) that banks shall have a whistle-blowing policy 
made known to employees and other stakeholders’ (Official, CBN). 
 
 
Another interviewee remarked, 
‘Since the introduction of a whistle-blowing policy and the support given by the new 
board, there has been calmness in most areas of our bank. Although it is difficult to 
know whether such reports are being made, it seems that it is operational at least in 
our bank’ (Bank Official). 
 
 
 
This topic provoked a mixed reaction during the focus group discussion, when some 
participants cautioned that putting such a system in place may not be sufficient to 
encourage staff to report wrongdoing. Their reasons were based, not only on the risk of 
doing so, but also on the nature of banking operations and the banking culture, which may 
make it difficult to achieve much through this mechanism, particularly when the 
wrongdoing is to be detected by an employee. For instance, one participant was of the 
view that 
‘the whole issue rests on good leadership behaviour and cordial relationships existing 
among staff. A whistle-blowing system is a voluntary extra-role activity, which may 
not be realised easily in organisations like banks’ (Bank Official). 
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Although all the banks have now put a whistle-blowing mechanism in place as an 
additional internal control, questions were raised by the participants regarding how these 
are operated, and how they would be enforced if the wrongdoing were occurring at the 
board level or with the understanding of employees (corporate insiders). The overall view, 
moreover, was that in organisations like banks such policies carry little weight and may 
not effectively address the central issues of corporate governance.  
 
II. Risk-taking behaviour 
 
Risk taking refers to the tendency to engage in behaviours that pose potential harm or 
danger, or a greater uncertainty of outcome to an individual or organisation (Kim and 
Santomero, 1988). Risk taking was observed to be one of the main properties of the 
internal control mechanism category, with dimensions relating to recklessness in the 
irrational granting of unsecured loans, risk-taking decisions and abuse of office. In both 
the interviews and the focus group, participants expressed the view that the level of risk 
exposure of the banks had accounted for the severity of their collapses. They added that 
responsible risk taking was essential for effective corporate governance in banks. The 
participant from the CBN agreed with this in principle but remarked, 
‘What banks experienced was irresponsible risk taking by the boards and 
management, which was the root cause of the bank failures. It is in response to these 
behaviours that the CBN was compelled to introduce control measures through the 
Code mechanism, with provisions relating to risk management for the banks’ 
(Official, CBN). 
 
 
As Owojiri et al. (2011, p.24) explained, this is particularly true in Nigeria, where ‘non-
payment for loans and advances by directors or managers or companies related to them 
was a major contributor to several liquidated banks’. In fact, there is evidence that some 
banks were (and some are still) granting loans even before the application and/or 
acceptance letter had been received. Corroborating this view, one participant commented, 
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‘The lack of internal control of the level of risk taking is caused by the bank 
ownership structure. For instance, in banks principally run by family owners, such 
risk behaviour is common. In them, boards are only there to ratify decisions, most of 
which are for the sole benefit of the owners’ (Bank Official).  
 
 
This suggests that risk taking in some banks is influenced by the owners, which impacts 
on the quality of governance (John et al., 2008). Another participant stated, ‘the problem is 
all on risk taking issues relating to granting of loans without course for due diligence’. The 
participant blamed a credit culture that was not properly developed, allowing individuals 
in positions   to exploit situations. n recognising the role of risk taking in corporate 
governance practice, CBN (2006, Sec. 7) provided that 
‘all banks are to have a risk management framework, specifying the governance 
architecture, policy, procedures, processes, and this shall not only reflect the bank’s 
risk profile but also clearly describe the roles and accountabilities of the board and 
the board risk management committee’. 
 
 
The Head of Risk Management of a bank commented, 
 
‘To a great extent, the provision on risk management in the Code of Governance 
for Banks is important but I think the levels of control differ from bank to bank, 
depending on the bank’s competitive strength and how their management handles 
the issue’. 
 
 
However, at the focus group session, the participant from the CBN raised a concern 
about the adherence to the provision’s requirements and remarked,  
‘Despite efforts put in place so far, most banks have not changed their behaviour 
regarding governance practice substantially, particularly in the area of risk taking, 
from that of the pre-reform era of 2004. To improve some of these areas, the CBN has 
now further required that the accounting reporting of the banks must reflect only the 
income earned, and this has been communicated to all banks’. 
 
 
 Lack of transparency 7.4.6
 
Lack of transparency emerged as an open category from the analysis of responses to the 
following questions: 
Series I QUESTION 4: How do the existing rules and code of best practice affect the 
disclosure of information or the level of transparency in your organisation? 
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Series II QUESTION 10: What are the challenges facing the realisation of best corporate 
governance practice in banks? To what extent do you think the banks can meet the 
expectations of the Code and other rules? 
 
Focus group questions: quality of disclosure of information; how boards affect corporate 
governance practice in banks; the audit committee. 
 
 
Transparency refers to ‘the widespread availability of relevant, reliable information about 
the periodic performance, financial positions, including governance, value, and risk, of 
publicly traded firms to those outside the firm’ (Bushman et al., 2004, p.210). It also 
means ‘the free flow of information and the disclosure of reasons or motives behind 
decisions’ (Sison, 2000, p.189). Indeed, financial and corporate transparency is a ‘critical 
tool in the disclosure of information of a firm and its corporate governance’ (Bhat et al., 
2006, p.719). In the banking sector, ‘it is an essential criterion of corporate governance 
policies and processes as it facilitates public understanding of the banking system and the 
exercise of market discipline’ (BCBS, 2012, p.63). Similarly, the CBN (2006, Sec. 3.16) 
provides that ‘disclosure and transparency are key attributes of good corporate 
governance, and provide stakeholders with the necessary information to assess whether 
their interests are being taken care of’. Within the Nigerian banking sector, transparency is 
still identified as an unresolved issue. Confirming the lack of transparency in the banking 
sector in Nigeria, the Governor of the CBN remarked, 
‘Some banks even engaged in manipulating their books by colluding with other 
banks to artificially enhance their financial positions and therefore stock prices’ 
(Sanusi, 2010b, p.8).  
 
 
Also, during the focus group discussion a stakeholder admitted, 
‘To be honest, banks have not been transparent in their statutory responsibilities from 
the top down in recent times but I think the problem has to do with the CBN and the 
way banks are led or encouraged through various lapses by the regulatory body’ 
(Focus Group Participant).  
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Lack of transparency, as open category, was observed in terms of its conceptual properties 
of lack of accountability and quality of auditing. 
 
I. Lack of accountability 
Accountability deals with the obligation to give an account of one’s actions to someone 
else, often balanced by a responsibility on the part of that other person to seek such an 
account (C. Scott, 2006). It ‘entails a relationship whereby people are required by others to 
explain and take responsibility for their actions…by giving and demanding reasons for 
conduct’ (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p.447). Lack of accountability emerged from 
dimensions including false information, financial manipulation and a lack of accounting. 
These dimensions affect the quality of transparency in any organisation, and thus 
corporate governance practice (Greiling and Halachmi , 2010). Accountability is an 
essential element of the stakeholder-oriented corporate governance concept, which 
Solomon (2007, p.14) described as 
‘the system of check and balance, both internal and external to companies, which 
ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act 
in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity’. 
 
 
 
The participants in this study variously emphasised the need for improved quality of 
financial and non-financial information, to give their banks internal and external 
credibility. It has indeed been recognised that the loss of public confidence in the banks is 
caused by misleading information in their financial reporting. A CBN official suggested 
that the boards of directors should be held responsible for banks’ lack of accountability, 
since the CBN has made the board specifically accountable under the provisions of the 
Code.  
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However, another participant argued, 
‘It is untenable to achieve 100% accountability in banks, but there has been 
remarkable improvement with the introduction of a template on financial reporting 
by the CBN. You know, this can only be achieved over time. People forget that a 
bank is part and parcel of the economy and its activities depend on so many factors’ 
(Bank Official). 
 
 
This corroborates the findings of Huang (2006, p.27) that 
‘accounting disclosure by Nigerian banks has been historically poor and the 
reliability of financial information rendered by some banks in the system has often 
been questionable, as some banks have been known to falsify returns to the CBN or 
misrepresent their financial statements to their auditors’. 
 
 
 
This further confirms that transparency is generally weak in Nigerian banks. . This also 
explains why the CPI Report (2012) ranked Nigeria the 135
th
 most corrupt country out 
of 178 countries. It further indicates that corruption is prevalent in the entire national 
operating system and, where it exists in an organisation or industry, it will be difficult 
to eliminate (Damania et al., 2004). This further explains why the banking sector is 
unable to overcome its corruption, despite the public outcry and measures introduced 
by the CBN through the Code of Corporate Governance and other regulations.  
 
II. Quality of auditing 
Auditing refers to ‘a collection of judgements about matters or entities presented in 
accordance with the applicable frameworks, such as adequate management disclosure to 
ensure materiality, sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence’ (Burns and Fogarty, 2010, 
p.311). Quality of auditing was observed to be a vital property of the transparency 
category, with dimensions relating to audit checks, audit reporting, quality of auditing and 
the audit committee. The participants agreed that high-quality auditing is of critical 
importance to good corporate governance practice. Quality of auditing is about 
‘complying, not only with audit requirements, but also with ethical requirements to ensure 
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integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and 
professional behaviour’ (BCBS, 2008, p.2). In fact, the absence of these qualities indicates 
a lack of transparency, which has an overall effect on the quality of organisational 
corporate governance. In the banking sector, high-quality auditing ensures the probity of 
the information presented, and also enhances market confidence. One participant in this 
study stated,  
‘From what I know, I think the issue is that we are not honest in our auditing 
process and there is no way its final product can satisfy the qualities of a good 
statement or report. I have thought over and over on this issue and along the lines 
of the process, to try to understand where the problem lies, and my conclusion 
centres on the honesty of our board and management, including those entrusted 
with the auditing’ (Bank Official). 
 
 
 
Some other participants confirmed that there was a lack of high-quality and prudent 
auditing, needed to detect manipulations of material information. However, there were 
mixed views on this point. One view was that the auditing behaviour was driven by market 
competiveness within the sector, and another suggested a deliberate attempt to conceal 
facts relating to the wrongdoing of individuals within the leadership of banks. 
Commenting on auditing and the board audit committee, an official from the CBN said, 
‘We are also concerned about the quality of auditing, because in spite of the improvements 
made to the structure and composition of the audit committee, we realise that technically 
they can act only on what is presented and explained to them by the management of the 
banks’. 
 
 
 
Another participant added, ‘I think the quality of auditing reflects the overall behaviour of 
the banks towards good governance’. The audit committee is the board’s mechanism for 
enhancing accountability around financial reporting and accounting functions (Brennan 
and Solomon, 2008). While some structural changes have been made to Nigerian banks, in 
terms of the professionalism and independence of the board members , they are still 
underperforming. In conclusion, as the interviewees and focus group participants argued, 
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although there have been improvements in some banks recently, further improvements to 
the auditing process will be required if it is to act as a watchdog for banks’ transparency of 
financial reporting and accounting.  
 Self-interest 7.4.7
 
Self-interest emerged as a category from the analysis of responses to the following 
questions: 
Series I QUESTION 9: In your view, does the achievement of best corporate governance 
practice in your organisation reflects what happens at the national level? Is it a shared 
value across the banks?  
 
Series I QUESTION 10: How do you feel about the pressure on the banking industry to 
improve its corporate governance practice? 
 
Series II QUESTION 3: What impact does the banking culture have on corporate 
governance for banks? 
 
Focus group: From responses to several questions relating to corporate governance issues 
in banks.  
 
Self-interest refers to ‘an individual’s attitudinal position in terms of (1) its short to 
medium-term impact on the (2) material well-being of the (3) individual own personal life, 
(or that of his or her immediate family)’ (Sears and Funk, 1991, pp.15-16). The concept 
presupposes that the action of a human is motivated first and foremost by personal self-
interest, in other words, a ‘self-absorption and disregard for the rights and interests of 
others, making money, avarice and greed, materialism, hedonism, the profit motive or 
profit maximization, and more’ (Maitland, 2002, p.4). This implies that, if neither people’s 
attitudes nor the subjective norm changes then we cannot expect a change in human 
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behaviour that will ensure good governance in banks (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). One 
participant in this study expressed the following opinion:  
‘Certainly, the challenge we have concerns the behaviours of leaders and their 
collaborators within the banking system towards their ambitions for self-enrichment. 
This behaviour has great influence on how banks comply with any code or 
regulations. And I think this is similar to what has been happening in other banks and, 
indeed, in wider organisations, be it in the private or public sector’ (Bank Official).  
 
 
The self-interest category emerged from the properties of human attitude and moral 
values, which are explained in the following sections. 
I. Human attitude 
According to Rokeach (1979), attitude is an enduring set of beliefs predisposing one to 
respond in some preferential manner in a given situation. Human attitude came up as one 
of the main properties of self-interest, with the participants generally expressing the view 
that it influences the choices individuals within banks make to act responsibly or not. One 
participant voiced the following idea: 
‘I don’t think changing people at the executive or board levels or rolling out 
regulations are sufficient to significantly change people’s attitudes towards 
materialistic tendencies or on what they set their mind to do. For a short time, yes, but 
you can see what is happening now in the banking sector again’ (Bank Official). 
 
 
 
In general, the participants’ beliefs about the self-interested attitudes of various actors in a 
wider context are associated with the following: (a) unwillingness to act in the most 
appropriate way so as to achieve best practice, (b) complying only when such rules satisfy 
their primary objectives as individuals or a corporate body, and (c) affecting the process of 
good governance through behaviours relating to (a) and (b). Obviously, this leads to 
difficulties in enforcing the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks. 
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II. Moral values 
Moral values are those that distinguish between good and evil (D. E. Scott, 2002, p.33). In 
other words, ‘beliefs about what is good and evil controllable behaviour’ (ibid). This 
means that individuals or societies with low moral values have a high tendency to 
disregard compliance. Moral value was observed to be a property of the self-interest 
category, coming from dimensions such as collusion, low moral standards, the drive for 
wealth and a lack of integrity. The participants were of the opinion that the declining 
moral values in the society and of the individual actors involved in the banking industry in 
particular, explain why banks persistently fail to achieve corporate excellence. Indeed, 
individual values are central to the domain of ‘morality and from which they drive their 
principles’ (Pojman, 1993, p.94). This suggests that moral values are critical determinants 
of management/employee behaviour that leads to effective corporate governance. As one 
participant mentioned, ‘once there is a morality problem in organisations like banks, then 
expect nothing from enforcing any law or code of governance’. Agreeing with the above 
assertion, another participant commented, 
‘The banking environment requires spirited efforts from all players in the corporate 
governance process, and over the years this has been lacking due to reported 
collusion between and within the actors. These behaviours are inconsistent with the 
nature of banking operations. Regrettably, such have been the case even at the 
organisational level’ (Focus Group).  
 
Asked for suggestions on the way forward, the participant was of the view that the 
increasing decline in moral values, whether at the individual or the corporate level, 
explained what is happening not only in the banking sector, but also in the society at large. 
To deal with this, the participant argued for a more holistic approach to the governance 
process, not only producing regulations, but also addressing the human aspects of the 
process. 
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 Organisational factors 7.4.8
Organisational factors emerged as an open category from the analysis of the following 
questions: 
Series I QUESTION 9: In your view, does the achievement of best corporate governance 
practice in your organisation reflects what happens at the national level? Is it a shared 
value across the banks?  
 
Series I QUESTION 10: How do you feel about the pressure on the banking industry to 
improve its corporate governance practice?  
 
Series II QUESTION 3: What impact does the banking culture have on corporate 
governance for banks? 
 
Series II QUESTION 10: What are the challenges facing the realisation of best corporate 
governance practice in banks? To what extent do you think the banks can meet the 
expectations of the Code and other rules?  
 
Focus group: Discussions around critical questions on corporate governance practice in 
banks relating to regulations, the roles of boards of directors, information disclosure, and 
ways to improve public and investor confidence. 
 
 
Organisational factors refer to ‘the context or environment, structure, processes within a 
concrete, observable association of persons engaged in collective activities with common 
objectives’ (Sheaff et al., 2003, pp.8-9). Here, the environment, structure and processes are 
the ‘external and internal dimensions that influence or guide the decision processes and 
actions in an organisation’ (Adams, 2002, p.224). This implies that organisations can 
achieve “high performance” work practices when the external and internal factors serve 
their goals effectively, particularly in terms of increasing their corporate wealth (Patterson 
et al., 2003). Bank executives have identified that achieving corporate wealth requires 
effective contributions from both the internal and external factors. Obviously, differences 
in the corporate governance practices of different banks depend on differences in the 
effective contributions of these factors (Khrawish, 2011). From the analysis in this 
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research, the open category of organisational factors was observed in terms of the 
conceptual properties of a lack of corporate culture, leadership problems and public 
pressure, which the participants believed influence the quality of corporate governance. 
These properties are discussed in the subsections below. 
 
I. Corporate culture 
All licensed banks in Nigeria are supervised and monitored by the CBN and these banks 
are organisations with their own cultures. Corporate culture refers to the ‘values, norms 
and practices of a group of individuals’ (De Long, 1997, p.6), or ‘implicit shared values 
among a group of people – about what is important, what is good and what is right’ 
(Kotter, 1997, p.166). Here, values are what members of the organisation believe are 
worth doing, norms are the expected patterns of behaviour or shared beliefs, and practices 
are methods used to accomplish organisational work, relating to conventions, customs and 
habits (ibid.). Corporate culture in this study is what the participants refer to as the 
orientations of the banks, guiding their day-to-day lives or attitudes towards change. This 
indicates that a bank’s culture is derived from its shared historical structures, processes 
and significance. As the participants collectively expressed, the values, norms and 
practices of board members and other employees determine the quality of corporate 
governance practice in a bank. This also implies that, even with the CBN changes that 
have brought new, competent NEDs onto boards, and regardless of the ‘will and skill’ of 
the NEDs, they can be made considerably less effective if there is a disabling boardroom 
culture (Pye, 2001). 
 
On the issue of lack of acceptable corporate culture, some participants’ comments are 
presented below: 
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‘We agreed that banks in Nigeria lacked a corporate culture aimed towards good 
governance in the past, but there has been progress. What is being experienced could 
be due to our orientation and uniqueness compared to non-banking organisations. 
Despite the problems, things are beginning to change’ (Bank Official).  
 
 
‘Traditional banking problems have not been different from the socio-economic 
problems of Nigeria. While we understand the corporate challenges facing us, we also 
believe that some of the measures taken towards good governance for banks do not 
reflect the current realities of the banking environment’ (Bank Official). 
 
 
‘Compared to other government sectors, the banking sector  culture is different and as 
such certain reform elements needs to be looked into’ (Bank Official: Focus Group).   
 
 
‘You can see recent discussions in the banking industry are all about good 
governance. What the Code of Corporate Governance and the CBN intend to do is to 
change the cultural orientation of banks towards good corporate governance and once 
we get things right, banks’ activities will improve  (CBN Official). 
 
 
‘We are now using the CBN framework except in some areas of difficulty. Our bank 
has been liaising closely with the CBN to sort things out, and everyone in the bank has 
come to understand what we are expected to do and not do. Just understand that issues 
of governance in banks differ from bank to bank’ (Bank Official). 
 
 
The uniqueness of banks and their orientations towards poor governance were described 
by the participants as constraining governance success. Although there have been 
improvements in recent times, this explains why ‘only 40 of the quoted companies, 
including banks, have recognised the Code of Corporate Governance that is in place’ 
(CBN, 2006, Sec. 1.3). It further explains why the CBN Code and other strategies are 
aiming to re-orient the banking culture towards good corporate governance practices.   
 
II. Leadership problem 
Leadership refers to ‘a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to 
achieve a common goal’ (Northouse, 2007, p.3). This suggests that leaders are ‘those who 
significantly influence the thoughts, behaviours and/or feelings of others’ (Gardner, 1995, 
p.6). In an organisational context, leadership is seen as ‘the interpersonal influence 
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exercised in situations and directed, through the communication process, towards the 
attainment of a specified goal or goals’ (Tannenbaum  et al., 1961, p.24). The participants 
agreed that the board of directors and the executive management have vital roles to play in 
determining the quality of banking governance. This supports the view that the board of 
directors is ‘ultimately responsible for the operations and financial soundness of the bank’ 
(BCBS, 2005, p.10), while the executive management as ‘a core group of individuals are 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the bank’ (ibid. p.12). 
 
The CBN (2006) also recognise the important role the board of directors’ play in 
producing high-quality corporate governance, and provides that the board should have full 
and effective oversight over the banks and monitor their executive management teams. As 
one participant put it during the focus group session, ‘it is one thing for the regulators to 
make laws for the banks, and it is another for the board of directors and executive 
management to ensure compliance or enforcement’. Another participant agreed: 
‘Banks have failed due to the behaviour of boards of directors and executive 
management. There were instances when boards insisted on certain ways of doing 
things, contrary to the operational rules. The board’s influence is broad because 
virtually all reports, either from the audit committee or on compliance, are subject to 
the board’s approval’ (CBN Official). 
 
 
 
This explains that it is not only regulations or their strictness that affect good corporate 
governance for banks, but more importantly those responsible for the processes within the 
system. Another bank representative commented, 
‘Although the CBN has its problems related to the supervision of banks, I think we 
need to encourage a level of trust between banks and between the leadership of the 
banks and the regulatory body over policy issues. At the moment, it seems there is a 
power game that also influences the boards of directors on some policy 
implementations’ (Bank Official). 
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The general view is that the leadership problem is occurring on both sides: with the banks 
and the regulatory authority. While the influence of individual leadership directives often 
affects governance, the widespread corporate failures have demonstrated that the 
regulatory supervision of the banks is non-existent. Also, recent changes in the banking 
leadership, made by the CBN without sufficient stakeholder consultations and due process 
in some instances, have further affected the leadership relationships in the banking system. 
It was also observed that, apart from peculiar issues relating to the banking sector, 
leadership actions in the banks are not substantially different from the overall problems of 
corporate governance in the financial industry, and by extension non-financial 
corporations.  
III. Public pressure 
Participants variously indicated that there had been enormous pressure on banks, from the 
regulatory institutions (the CBN, NDIC and SEC), the politicians, shareholders, the media 
and international bodies, to improve their corporate governance practices. While they 
recognised the legitimacy of the issues raised regarding recent bank failures, some 
participants suggested that more time was needed to re-assess the various frameworks in 
order to find a long-term solution. One participant said, ‘banks are now being put through 
a series of assessment tests and are closely watched and perhaps this is adding to the 
confusion’. Overall, multiple dimensions of public pressure were mentioned by the 
interviewees and focus group participants.  Although there was a strong consensus that the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Banks had awakened the employees of banks to the 
need for corporate excellence, there was also the feeling that some fundamental issues 
related to human behaviour still needed to be addressed.  
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One interviewee stated, ‘the media did not help matters at the height of the banking crisis, 
because most of their comments led to more public panic than a process of understanding 
issues at stake’. Some of the continued pressure on the banks is the result of strategic and 
policy pressures adopted by the CBN. Banks are now required to introduce a uniform 
account number structure. This measure was intended to improve the banks’ efficiency by 
reducing the effort required in terms of time and operational costs. In addition, the number 
of account types has been harmonised to three: current, settlement and cash reserve 
requirement accounts. This is consistent with the CBN’s duty as a regulatory body to 
‘ensure high conduct and good management throughout the banking system’ (CBN Act, 
1991 revised 2007, Sec. 42). Generally, there are indications that the CBN and other 
regulatory agencies (the NDIC and SEC) have improved their strategies for banking 
supervision. One interviewee commented, ‘it is this pressure that prompted the regulators 
to make public stories of bank executives facing prosecution due to their involvement in 
financial fraud’. The open categories and their properties discussed in this chapter are 
summarised in Table 7.3 below. 
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Table 7-3  Summary of Open Categories and their Properties 
 
OPEN CODING 
Open Category Properties 
Corporate transformation Board structure, Tenure 
Enforcement Compliance, Monitoring, Trust 
Code/regulation Harmonisation, Regulatory review 
Improving competence Training, Job assessment, Skills 
development 
Internal control mechanism Whistle-blowing, Risk-taking 
Lack of transparency Lack of accounting, Quality of auditing 
Self-interest Human attitude, Moral value 
Organisational factors Corporate culture, Leadership problem, 
Public pressure 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 7.5
 
This chapter has presented the processes, questions and a detailed analysis of the semi-
structured interview series I and II and the focus group discussion. The questions asked in 
interview series II were formulated in the light of the results of interview series I, while 
the questions presented to the focus group were based on the outcomes of interview series 
II. Following Strauss and Corbin’s GT approach, data collection and analysis proceeded 
simultaneously. The interview transcripts and field notes were read thoroughly, over and 
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over, and then an in-depth analysis was conducted so as to discover concepts and 
subsequently open categories divided into properties and dimensions. This chapter has 
shown how the concepts that emerged from the questions asked in interview series I 
assisted in increasing the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher. This further enhanced 
the theoretical significance of the concepts that emerged in the second phase of interviews. 
Consistent with GT procedures, the results of the question-by-question analysis of both 
interview series were constantly compared with the questions and answers discussed by 
the focus group to find theoretically significant concepts. These concepts were found to 
come up in the answers to more than one question and in all data collection stages. Finally, 
the chapter has presented the eight open categories developed through this process, along 
with their properties/dimensions. These categories are corporate transformation, 
code/regulation, enforcement, transparency, improved competence, internal control 
mechanism, self-interest and organisational factors. These open categories formed the 
basis of the axial and selective coding processes that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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 Axial and Selective Coding Chapter 8.
 
 
 Introduction 8.1
 
This chapter was developed based on the first phase of analysis through open coding that 
was presented in Chapter 7. This chapter deals with two stages of the coding process, 
namely axial and selective coding, which are the second and final stages of the GT 
analytic process used in this research. The axial coding led to the emergence of six main 
categories, based on the categories that emerged through the open coding
39
 and the 
application of the paradigm model. Principally, axial coding is ‘reassembling data that 
were fractured during open coding’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.124). At this stage, open 
categories are linked together to ‘form more precise and complete explanations about 
phenomena’ (ibid.). This process illustrates how the initial categories are rearranged and 
linked to form a rational system (Howell, 2000). Since a category stands for a 
phenomenon, issue, event or happening defined by the respondents, axial coding helps 
with identifying those phenomena that have the ability to explain ‘what is going on’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.125).  
 
The axial coding process helps the researcher to answer why, how, where and when 
questions about the identified phenomena. In other words, it aims to ‘link categories with 
sub-categories, and asks how they are related’ (Charmaz, 2006, p.61). Strauss (1987, p.64) 
referred to the axial process as building up ‘a dense texture of the relationships around the 
“axis” of a category’. In GT, axial coding is achieved by applying a coding paradigm that 
specifies a phenomenon in terms of ‘the conditions that create the circumstances; the 
context in which the phenomenon is embedded; the action/interaction strategies by which 
                                            
39
 See details of open coding in Chapter 7. 
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a group or individual responded; and the consequences of those strategies’ (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p.128). The process also allows the researcher to delineate and extricate 
relationships upon which the axis of the category is focused (Strauss, 1987).  
 
In open coding, categories are generated in terms of their properties and dimensions; in 
axial coding, these categories are systematically developed in terms of their relationships. 
Although, the axial coding analysis provides higher-level codes when compared to the 
open codes, here, the distinction between open coding as presented in the last chapter and 
the axial coding presented in this chapter is ‘artificial and is made only for explanatory 
purposes’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.198). This is because the process of relating 
concepts was carried out in both types of coding and these two coding processes were not 
sequential but interrelated. The selective coding stage utilises the outcomes from the open 
and axial coding to ‘identify the core category and develop it in relation to subcategories’ 
(Howell, 2000, p.184). This section of the chapter identifies the core categories through 
the data that were generated through semi-structured interview series III and the analysis 
of those data. The aim is to validate and verify the credibility of the data through their 
relationships with the core categories and the subcategories. In fact, these linkages are 
demonstrated diagrammatically with the aid of a modified paradigm model. 
 An Application of the Paradigm Model 8.2
 
As mentioned in the previous section, axial coding reassembles data that have been 
fractured through open coding. Thus, the eight open categories developed during the open 
coding procedure (described in Chapter 7) were combined into six main categories in the 
axial coding, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. Each of these main categories of the axial coding 
and their corresponding open categories represents a component of the paradigm model. 
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 Open Categories      Main Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Enforcement       From sub-C to category            Enforcement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1  How the Open Categories Were Changed into Main Categories 
 
 
Figure 8-1 demonstrates how the nine open categories were linked and subsumed into the 
main categories of the axial coding. These linkages were the results of questions asked to 
identify the types of relationships involved (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). For instance, the 
main category of corporate control strategies subsumed the corporate transformation 
open category that emerged from board structure and tenure, and the internal control 
mechanism, which emerged from the strategies related to risk taking and whistle blowing. 
Indeed, both open categories relate to the strategic measures intended to improve internal 
control within the banking sector. Similarly, the self-interest and lack of transparency 
open categories were subsumed into the human action main category during the axial 
Corporate Control 
Strategies 
1. Self-Interest 
2. Lack of Transparency 
Changed into 
1. Corp. Transf. 
2. Internal Control 
MStrategy 
Code/Regulation From sub-C to category Code/Regulation 
Changed into 
 
   Human Action 
Changed into Lack of Leadership Organisational Factors 
 
 
Improving Competence From sub-C to category Competency 
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process. This followed from asking the question about what type of relationship there was 
between them. Both open categories were linked to human action. It is these relationships 
that are further related and explained through the elements of the paradigm model. 
  
As Corbin and Strauss (2008, p.89) explained, a paradigm is ‘a perspective, a set of 
questions that can be applied to data to help the analyst draw out the contextual factors and 
identify relationships between context and process’. In other words, it is a conceptual 
analytical device for organising data and integrating structure with process (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998)
40
. Although the actual conceptual names given to categories do not 
necessarily point to whether a category denotes a condition, an action/interaction or a 
consequence, the focus here is more on the complex interweaving of events or conditions 
leading up to a problem or event, to which persons respond through action/interaction with 
some sort of consequences (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  
 
The essence of the paradigm model is about linking and developing categories through 
‘asking questions and the making of comparisons…the nature of the questions we are 
asking is really denoting a type of relationship’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.107). In this 
case, the questions asked are in ‘terms of the conceptual labels themselves, and how one 
category might be related to another’ (ibid. p.108). Thus, reflecting how the open 
categories are linked and subsumed into the main categories during the axial coding 
procedure, the questions asked in order to link the categories together through the 
utilisation of the paradigm model are discussed below. 
                                            
40
 The process consists of ‘sequences of action/interaction taken in response to situations or problems, with 
the purpose of handling the problem’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.96), and represents the 
actions/interactions and consequences of the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Structure is the 
conditional context in which a category or the phenomenon is situated (ibid. p.123). In other words, structure 
sets the scene, describing the context in which the phenomenon exists (ibid.). 
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 The phenomenon 8.2.1
 
A phenomenon is the ‘repeated patterns of happenings, events, or actions/interaction that 
represent what people do or say in response to the problems and situations in which they 
find themselves’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.130), and relates to answering the question 
‘what is going on here?’ (ibid). To be precise, we identify the phenomenon by asking 
questions such as ‘what is the data referring to? Or what is the action/interaction all 
about?’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.100). Based on the analysis of the interviews and 
focus group discussions during the open coding phase, it is what the participants generally 
refer to as human action that provides the answers to these questions. The main category 
of human action refers to the interplay of motives and actions affecting corporate 
governance practice in banks through structures and processes.  
 
Some of the participants captured the self-interested aspect of human action when they 
spoke of ‘insider abuse, pursuit of personal interests and greed, self-directed policies and 
collusion as motives for the continued resistance to attaining the desired corporate 
governance within banks’. Self-interest was variously expressed by the participants as a 
major factor affecting the realisation of good corporate practice. Similarly, the participants 
viewed the lack of transparency exhibited by the leadership of the banks, through 
manipulations and false reporting of their accounting positions, as constraining factors on 
corporate governance practice. As was discussed earlier, in the open coding section, there 
are two key elements of the lack of transparency: (1) lack of accountability, which 
involves the inability to disclose true and reliable financial and non-financial information 
about the corporation, and (2) dishonest auditing, which should serve as a watchdog for 
the attainment of good corporate governance in banks. Except in a few cases, the majority 
of the banks have been affected by a lack of accountability and compromises made in the 
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auditing process, and both actions have consequently affected the quality of the financial 
statements of those banks. These behaviours have led to a loss of investor and public 
confidence in these banks, which has prompted the CBN to take some strategic measures 
to ensure the banks’ safety and soundness.  
 Causal conditions 8.2.2
 
Causal conditions refer to ‘events, incidents or happenings that influence the phenomenon’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.131) or events or happenings that lead to the occurrence of 
the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Thus, causal conditions are identified by 
asking questions such as the following: 
 
What are the incidents, events or happenings that lead to the occurrence of the 
phenomenon?  
 
Here, the main categories of a lack of leadership and competence answer the question. The 
lack of leadership that influences corporate practice in the banking sector is derived from 
the organisational factors while competence stands for the idea of improving competence 
that emerged during the open categorisation process. Competence here refers to the skills 
and knowledge required of the board of directors regarding banking activities, and the 
ability of the regulatory/supervisory authority to detect early enough any emerging 
problems that may affect corporate governance in the industry. The lack of competence 
was initially identified by the CBN in various reports aimed at limiting the negative 
actions that have caused the collapse of the banks. The participants also expressed the 
view that the lack of relevant competence within the leadership hierarchy had affected 
leaders’ judgement, decision making and ability to appreciate good corporate governance 
practice as opposed to unacceptable motives.  
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Through the CBN’s Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, board members and other 
committee members are now required to possess certain qualifications and a certain level 
of professionalism. Banks are also encouraged to provide continual training to employees 
to improve their skills so that they can cope with the dynamic challenges of corporate 
governance. The banks have begun to establish job assessment procedures for employees, 
and skills development training for board members and other committee members. One 
participant stated, ‘these competence schemes have improved staff motivation towards the 
realisation of effective corporate governance performance’.  
 
Organisational factors include the lack of internal corporate culture and public pressure, 
both of which influence banks’ corporate governance activities. The participants indicated 
that, over time, the behaviours of bank executives regarding corporate governance practice 
had become the new cultural orientation within the banking sector. They expressed the 
view that information asymmetry in banks had given way to certain managerial 
manoeuvres and unacceptable behaviours that were not consistent with best corporate 
governance principles. Meanwhile, one interviewee stated that the special nature of banks 
and their contribution to the national economy had led to constant pressure on the industry 
from the CBN through various guidelines. There has also been increased pressure from 
two sets of stakeholders – depositors and shareholders – for improved governance to 
safeguard their deposits and ensure returns respectively. Market challenges have also 
continued to exert pressure on banks to improve. Further pressure has come from 
international bodies that have offered advice and working guidelines, such as Basel I and 
Basel II, on achieving good corporate governance. The press, professional bodies and 
labour unions have also heightened the tempo of compliance with the regulatory 
frameworks for banks in recent times.  
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However, some participants admitted that the above organisational factors had influenced 
what the banks had achieved so far in terms of meeting corporate governance best practice 
requirements. Banks with weak corporate governance had been delisted by depositors and 
other stakeholders and this action had led some banks to take steps to improve their 
corporate culture with a view to achieving best practices.  
 Context 8.2.3
 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.132) argued that context was ‘specific sets of conditions that 
intersected dimensionally at a time and place to create a set of circumstances or problems 
to which persons respond through actions/interaction’. Such sets of conditions within 
which the phenomenon takes place can be identified by asking the following question: 
 
What are the set of conditions under which banks’ strategies and responses towards 
effective corporate governance are made?  
 
Broadly, context is ‘a category that includes all situational factors inside and outside the 
organisation’ (Pillai and Meindi, 1998, p.644) or the ‘surroundings associated with the 
phenomenon’ (Capelli and Sherer, 1991, p.56). These surroundings play a significant role 
in influencing the pace and effectiveness of organisational change. Enforcement, as a 
constraining condition of the code/regulations, manifested itself soon after the code was 
introduced. One of the executive managers interviewed indicated that no adequate 
enforcement blueprint had been followed by the CBN. The regulators were found to have 
been ineffective in terms of enforcement and supervision in many areas of banking 
activities. At the focus group session, a participant commented, ‘the CBN really has had 
issues with the enforcement of the Code for some time due to their internal constraints’. 
The CBN representative explained that, despite the existence of the code of governance, ‘a 
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culture of tolerance and acceptance of the status quo’ of ineffective corporate practice was 
still prevalent in the banking sector. This confirms that the regulatory body has failed to 
sufficiently enforce the Code of Governance for Banks, as already identified by Sanusi 
(2010b).  According to the CBN (2012, p.4), this problem was evident in the ‘critical gaps 
in the regulatory framework, uneven supervision and enforcement’. Here, enforcement 
emerged as an issue during the open coding process, through key properties such of a lack 
of compliance, monitoring and trust. 
 
Lack of compliance with the regulatory provisions has been identified as one of the major 
reasons for the poor governance practices in banks. The interviewees and focus group 
participants were of the opinion that the boards of some banks consider themselves above 
the rules governing business conduct. This attitude had led to corporate malpractice, 
resulting in weak business performance. Apart from the efforts employed by concerned 
individual stakeholders and particularly the CBN to develop mechanisms to enforce 
compliance, there have been renewed calls from international agencies such as the BCBS 
for banks to improve their compliance, not only in Nigeria but also in other developing 
countries around the world (BCBS, 1997).  
 
The monitoring aspect of enforcement deals with the inability of the boards of directors, 
the auditing committees, and the regulatory authority to monitor the banks’ activities in 
line with the expectations of the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks and other regulations. Related to enforcement is the breakdown of mutual trust 
between key stakeholders in the governance process.  
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 Intervening conditions 8.2.4
 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.131) considered intervening conditions to be ‘those acts that 
mitigate or otherwise alter the impact of causal conditions on the phenomenon’. These 
conditions form the broader structural context pertaining to a phenomenon (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, p.103), and include ‘time, space, culture, economic status…’. These 
conditions can ‘significantly facilitate or constrain the strategies taken within a specific 
context’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.96). The intervening conditions are identified by 
asking questions such as the following: 
 
What are the conditions that mitigate or alter the impact of causal conditions on 
human actions in regards to corporate governance practices within the banking 
sector in Nigeria?  
 
 
The condition that alters or mitigates the impact of human action and a lack of leadership 
is code/regulation. At the open coding stage, the code/regulation category emerged with 
the properties of harmonisation and regulatory review. At the national level, the 
intervening conditions include measures taken by the CBN, including the introduction of 
the Code of Corporate Governance and other measures to ensure banks’ soundness. The 
code was expected to complement other existing rules (CAMA, 1990; BOFIA, 1991) and 
other policy directives. This has helped to reinvigorate corporate governance practice in 
the banking industry through reinforcement of the banks’ consolidation reform. At an 
international level, advisory measures have been offered to help banks improve their 
compliance (OECD, 1999; BCBS, 2005). Harmonisation, as an element of the intervening 
conditions, relates to the difficulties experienced by the banks in complying with the 
various overlapping regulations (CBN, 2006; CAMA, 1990; SEC, 2003, revised in 2009), 
which many banks claim were either hurriedly introduced or contradict each other.  
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These loopholes have created room for actors within the banking system to take advantage 
and manipulate the rules in a way that best favours them. Affirming the general view of 
the participants, it has been found that around 373 circulars were issued by the CBN 
between January 2008 and February 2010 on governance-related issues
41
, overlapping in 
content and purpose, and making compliance even more difficult. Moreover, there has also 
been a lack of coordination between the bank regulatory bodies. For instance, the overlaps 
prevented the CBN from providing input to the SEC for the planning of its examinations 
of bank activities, creating room for abuse by the executive management teams of some 
banks. Some participants claimed that there were varying understandings of the existing 
Code of Corporate Governance due to sundry policy directives. They added that this had 
offered some banks further opportunities to play around with the expectations of the CBN, 
harming corporate performance. 
 
In addition, the findings of this study reveal that, in spite of widespread knowledge of 
bank malpractice and the propensity for regulatory arbitrage, the coordinating body for 
financial regulations has failed to evaluate such events for the last two years due to their 
lack of commitment. This has allowed some banks to use excess capital generated through 
other non-lending activities such as stock market investments. However, recent measures 
by the CBN and the intervention of international bodies, aimed at ensuring bank 
compliance, have rekindled public confidence in the banks’ ability to recover. Although 
the prudential guideline on corporate governance (CBN, 2010) has improved some of the 
Code’s weaknesses, it still falls short of comprehensively addressing the fundamental 
corporate governance issues in the banking sector. Thus, there is still a need for a review 
of some of the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance and other existing laws to 
                                            
41
 See Sanusi (2010b). 
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ensure the effectiveness of banks’ governance practice. The executive managers 
interviewed in this study contended that the provisions of the codes were not 
comprehensive enough to safeguard best practice. For instance, one participant argued that 
one of the reasons for the problems was the lack of a legal and regulatory framework 
governing the margin lending activity of the CBN. Also, the need to ensure the 
competitiveness of the banks, and market volatility, mean that the governance principles 
must evolve alongside the changing market environment. One of the main shortcomings of 
the CBN’s (2006) Code of Governance is that it does not reflect the dynamics in the 
market. Overall, the ineffectiveness of enforcement, the lack of regulatory review and the 
inability to harmonise applicable regulatory provisions have allowed the problematic 
behaviour in the banking sector to persist.  
 Action/interaction strategies 8.2.5
 
These strategies refer to ‘deliberate acts that are taken to resolve a problem and in so doing 
shape the phenomenon in some way’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.133) or to strategies 
devised to ‘manage, handle, carry out, and respond to the phenomenon…under a specific 
set of perceived conditions’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.104). Identifying 
action/interaction strategies requires us to ask questions such as the following: 
 
What are the action/interaction strategies adopted by the banking sector in relation 
to corporate governance issues and within the causal, intervening and contextual 
conditions? 
 
 
The main category of corporate control strategies helps to answer this question by 
indicating what might be the action/interaction strategies of the various banks as well as 
the CBN in response to the phenomenon of human action under the conditions discussed 
in the previous sections. The main category of corporate control strategies subsumes two 
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open categories: corporate transformation and the internal control mechanism, as shown 
in Figure 8.1. In this instance, banks’ action/interaction strategies fall within the interplay 
between the causal conditions (organisational factors and improving competence), the 
contextual conditions (enforcement) and the intervening conditions (code/regulations). 
These three conditions are the product of the structure in which the phenomenon is 
entrenched. The interplay of these conditions with the action/interaction is illustrated in 
Figure 8.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-2 The interplay of actions/interactions with the three conditions 
 
 
Causal Conditions 
Lack of Leadership/ 
Competency  
Intervening Conditions  
Code/Regulations 
Contextual Conditions 
Enforcement 
Action/Interaction 
Corporate Control Strategies 
 
Consequences 
Creation of an awareness of the benefits of corporate governance, 
improved capacity development; improved board structure; 
improved public confidence. The generation of difficulties 
overcoming the review and harmonisation of the regulatory 
framework; a lack of leadership needed to ensure a good 
governance culture through an enduring, alternative strategic 
approach. 
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This interplay (Figure 8.2) demonstrates the significance of action/interaction as an 
intermediary process that occurs over time and space, changing or sometimes remaining 
the same in response to the situation or context (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). For instance, 
on the topic of corporate transformation (board structure, tenure), the participants agreed 
that the nature of board composition and the sit-tight attitude of some board members over 
time had affected the enforcement of the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance 
and other rules. This situation had allowed decisions to be made favouring individuals and 
groups as opposed to corporate goals. In addition, a lack of transparency shown by the 
banks was also said to affect the banks’ governance practice. There was also a general 
consensus among the participants that the previous ownership structure of the banks was 
one of the principal reasons for the CBN’s intervention through a series of control 
measures. Indeed, family ownership is considered an important factor when assessing a 
firm’s soundness (Zeitun and Tian, 2007). Similarly, the CBN’s efforts towards board re-
composition and restructuring were intended to improve the efficiency of the banks. The 
CBN has also included provisions relating to bank size, composition and the separation of 
power in the revised Code of Corporate Governance for Banks (CBN, 2010). For instance, 
it has provided that an equity holding of above 5% by any investor shall be subject to the 
CBN’s prior approval. In addition, the code limits the tenure of the CEO to a maximum of 
two terms of five years. The participants contended that these measures have minimised 
the tendency for abuse, and improved the internal control of the decision-making 
processes in most banks.  
 
Control strategies have also been used in an attempt to improve the internal corporate 
control of the banks. These strategies include the establishment of internal whistle-
blowing mechanisms to encourage employees to report wrongdoing in their organisations. 
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Since human action is carried out in conjunction with others, it is believed that involving 
employees can help to discourage wrongdoing. Once unacceptable behaviour is noticed, 
staff can either report it by email, or through their employees’ union or a management 
committee. Finally, the actions/interaction strategies taken by banks and the CBN were 
intended to address the various risk-taking abuses and other related behaviours motivated 
by greed and self-interest. Indeed, this is seen as the beginning of the process of 
developing good corporate governance in the banking sector in Nigeria.  
 Consequences 8.2.6
 
Consequences, as a subcategory, refer to the ‘outcomes or results of action and interaction’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.97). They are also the result of a lack of action/interaction in 
response to an issue or problem (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). They can be identified by 
asking the following question: 
 
What are the consequences of the action/interaction strategies adopted by the banks 
and the CBN to curtail the self-interest and lack of transparency of actors in the 
banking sector in Nigeria? 
 
Here, the banks’ adoption of certain strategies is found to have resulted in their achieving 
the corporate governance and legitimacy expected of them. These strategies have also 
helped to restore public confidence in the sector, and assured the safeguarding of 
investors’ returns and the banks’ contribution to the national economy. On the other hand, 
the banks’ refusal to comply with some regulatory provisions and other controlling 
strategies has equally led to the recent corporate failures of some banks. The strategies 
introduced have also widened awareness of the benefits of good corporate governance 
practice, skills development and training. For example, at the start of the post-
consolidation reforms, improvements were seen in the aggregate financial performance of 
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the 24 deposit banks in 2007 compared to that prior to the introduction of these control 
measures in 2005/6 (NDIC Report, 2008).  
 
However, when the participants reflected on the outcome of the action/interaction or non-
action by the banks and the regulatory agencies, certain challenges to the attainment of 
corporate governance in banks were identified. These included the following: consistent 
behavioural actions of actors towards non-compliance, the inadequacies of the provisions 
of the Code to address issues arising within the internal operating system and with the 
market competiveness of banks, insufficient trust within banks and between the banks and 
the regulatory authority due to the imposition of certain directives, namely, the unilateral 
appointments of some board members, and the restrictions placed on certain banking 
activities and other micro-issues that had been discovered. This means that further 
initiatives need to be taken in order for the banks to achieve best practice.  
 
In summary, the axial coding analysis was used to restructure the categories developed in 
the open coding process and so demonstrate how each part of the data related to the other 
parts. This was done so as to present a better understanding of the phenomenon under 
study. In addition, the coding paradigm was used to integrate structure (the conditional 
context of the phenomenon) with process (the sequences of action/interaction over time). 
This was done in order to examine the relationships between the categories within the 
paradigm components. In GT, the process is used to achieve ‘the linking of sequences of 
action/interaction as they pertain to the management of, control over or response to, a 
phenomenon’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.143). Figure 8.3 presents a summary of the 
relationship between the axial coding and the paradigm model. 
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Figure 8-3 Axial Coding Paradigm Model 
 
 Selective Coding  8.3
 
This is the final stage of the analysis and the main stage of theorising, achieved through 
the connecting of the axial categories to the other categories. It is ‘the process of selecting 
the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, and validating those 
relationships’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.116).  A core category ‘pulls together all the 
strands in order to offer an explanation of the behaviour under study’ (Goulding, 2002, 
p.88). While the early stages, namely the open and axial coding processes, are more 
concerned with discovering what is relevant to the phenomenon under study, ‘it is not until 
the major categories are finally integrated to form a larger theoretical scheme that the 
research findings take the form of theory’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.143). In other 
Context 
Enforcement 
Conditions 
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leadership/ 
competence 
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Human Actions 
[Self-interest and 
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Action/Inter
action 
Strategies: 
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Consequences 
 Reinvigorated 
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 Achieved 
measure of 
success; 
 Understanding 
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facing, CG  Intervening 
Conditions 
Code/regulations 
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words, the selective coding process focuses on ‘integrating and refining categories at a 
higher level of abstraction’ (ibid.). The selective coding in this research began when the 
open categories were subsumed into the six main axial coding categories (as in Figure 
8.1). It is these categories that the researcher interpreted as affecting corporate governance 
practice in Nigerian banks in the earlier section of this chapter. The verification and 
validation of the data and the identification of potential core variables as will be 
considered in the following sections.  
 Verification and validation of the data 8.3.1
 
This is an essential part of proving the credibility of any research process, and it ‘can offer 
“plausible” explanation about it’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.300). In other words, the 
findings of the research can be trustworthy and believable. In GT, theory emerges from the 
data but, by the time of integration, it represents an abstract rendition of that raw data, and 
as such it is important to validate the data that is part of the selective coding process. The 
validation of the data is done ‘to determine how well that abstraction fits with the raw data 
and also to determine whether anything salient was omitted from the theoretical scheme’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.159). Through this procedure, the researcher can account for 
variations both within and between categories. There are two analytical procedures 
involved: continually making comparisons and asking questions (Howell, 2003). In all 
cases, the questions asked continually by the researcher as the analysis progresses relate to 
‘what is the main analytical idea of the research?’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.100), and 
this is done so as to identify what is happening in the data. Other questions relate to ‘what 
patterns are occurring in the data?’ That is, ‘what does all the action/interaction seem to be 
about?’ (ibid).   
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I. Validation process for this research 
The validation of the data used in this research is intended to add density based on 
evidence to the analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggested that this was necessary in 
order to ensure that the analysis was valid and that the next stage in the process could 
justifiably be undertaken. In this research, the validation started with a review of the 
interview data, including the transcripts and the memos made at the open coding stage and 
during the axial coding. After looking back at the properties and dimensions of the main 
categories, the need for a validation of the data arose, informing further questions that 
needed to be asked so as to clarify certain meanings and interpretations of the data. To 
achieve this, the researcher developed another round of interview questions (interview 
series III), building on the previous fieldwork results. As Charmaz (2006) said, in the 
initial fieldwork, both open and axial categories are suggestive, but not yet definitive, 
regarding the happenings. It is also important that, even though the properties and 
dimension of human action, as a phenomenon identified during the previous coding stages 
(open and axial), were kept in mind, relationships had to be established through this GT 
procedure between the core category and the subcategories, and these needed to be 
confirmed through the validation process, which is the essence of the selective coding 
stage.  
 
The researcher’s aim was to obtain additional data to help explicate the categories and 
further reflect qualities of the respondents’ experiences that would provide a useful 
analytical understanding of their views. The first step taken here was to identify the critical 
sites, persons and other sources that could maximise opportunities for comparative 
analysis, which Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.211) referred to as ‘engaged discriminate 
sampling’. In other words, this is a type of theoretical sampling associated with selective 
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coding that seeks and collects pertinent data to elaborate and refine categories so as to 
allow a theory to emerge. It should also be noted that, in the GT approach, validation does 
not imply testing hypotheses in a quantitative way, but refers ‘more to a checking out of 
interpretations with participants and against data as the research moves along’ (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, p.48). Based on the theoretical sampling from the original interview series I 
and II and the focus group discussion, ten participants were strategically identified and 
contacted informally. At this stage, gaining their agreement to participate was not difficult 
since a relationship had already been established during the initial series of interviews and 
the focus group sessions. The selection of interviewees was based on the familiarity of the 
participants with the subject under consideration, the unwillingness to enter into a fresh 
process of formal communication and approval, their professional experience in banking, 
and observations of events and happenings around the sector. The breakdown of the ten 
participants and their organisations is given in Table 8.1 below. 
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Table 8-1 Participants in Interview Series III 
 
SN. Organisation Participants 
      1  Bank: 
 Mega-banks 
 
 
 Medium-sized banks 
 
Two top managers (one chief 
compliance officer and one 
company secretary). 
 
Two top managers (one from the 
legal department and one from 
Policy and Strategy) 
2  
Professional body 
 (CIBM) 
 
One member of top management 
3 Regulatory bodies 
(CBN and NDIC) 
Two top managers dealing with 
the banks’ corporate governance 
policy and compliance 
4  
The general public 
 
Three, comprising two 
shareholders and a depositor 
(stakeholder) 
 
 
 
 
The testing of the validity of the data began with the researcher re-reading the previous 
interview transcripts and the outcomes from the focus group in order to validate the 
statement questions, and asking ‘what is the data referring to?’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, 
p.100) and ‘what is the action/interaction all about’ (ibid.). These questions played a 
significant part in the development of the six statements used in semi-structured interview 
series III, which reflected the main categories of the axial coding.  
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II. Developed interview statements and analysis (series III) 
 
The six interview statements developed from the initial data in order to verify the 
relationships between the core categories and the subcategories were as follows: 
1. Human action has been a major factor affecting the realisation of corporate 
governance in banks. 
 
2. The banks’ and the CBN’s corporate transformation and control strategies have 
improved the banks’ most recent corporate governance practice. 
 
3. Boards of directors and management have a significant impact on effective 
corporate governance practice in banks. 
 
4. The influence of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and other regulatory 
frameworks is not adequate to address the corporate governance issues in banks. 
 
5. Banks respond to the effective corporate governance requirements resulting from 
the CBN’s directives and other regulatory measures either by compliance or 
inadequate compliance. 
 
6. The impact of the Code of Corporate Governance and other frameworks differs 
from bank to bank, depending on their leadership behaviours. 
 
 
Even though the statements were in a structured form due to their discriminate nature, we 
followed the semi-structured style of interview that involves discussion and the raising of 
issues requiring clarification during the individual dialogues, as in the previous interview 
series I and II. The use of the semi-structured style was useful in the verification of the 
properties and dimensions discovered earlier. In addition, the analysis of the responses 
was necessary in order to further clarify and strengthen the impact of the six main 
categories of the axial coding. For instance, the researcher focused on the participants’ 
238 
 
understanding of the properties and dimensions that explained the phenomenon of human 
action, and how such human action broadly influences individuals and organisations 
regarding good corporate governance practice. 
 
For sample, the interviewees’ responses to statement 1 of the interview series III are 
shown below:  
Interview Statement: 
Human action has been a major factor affecting the realisation of corporate governance in 
banks. 
Responses obtained: 
‘I agree fully because over time banks had been experiencing certain managerial 
abuses across some ranks. But with the measures in place now, things are getting 
better’ (Chief Compliance Officer).  
 
‘Most of the issues raised in the various rules by the CBN were aimed at curtailing 
human excesses and restoring sanity. The Code of Governance is good for the banks, 
as is some of the pressure we receive from the CBN and other agencies, local and 
international’ (Bank Official). 
 
‘Yes, I think our moral attitude in banks is very low and, under this situation, 
anything can happen. This is not good for a financial institution like banks, and that is 
why the CBN is so concerned’ (CBN Official). 
 
Comments from other participants: 
 
‘It is true that there have been questions on the quality of our financial statements, and 
this is something we have in common with some banks.’ 
 
‘Like I said earlier, the audit performances were weak and as such everything went on 
unnoticed. We were also surprised when we heard of the depth of all kinds of fraud. 
This has been the problem with our leaders over time’. 
 
‘Yes, but the measures that have been taken are helping to address some of the issues. 
We are hoping for improvement in some fundamental areas, and the sustainment of 
those [things already achieved]’. 
 
‘Previous failures in banks were always due to the abuses of the leadership regarding 
the rules they were expected to protect. Now the financial crisis in banks is leading us 
to a new chapter of orientation. Let’s hope we learn a lesson from that, and the issues 
are addressed strategically’. 
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In the initial stages of this research, the subcategories of self-interest and lack of 
transparency emerged from various properties and dimensions related to human actions as 
they combine to influence corporate governance practice. This final stage consists of 
refining the abstract nature of the properties identified previously. The analysis of the 
above remarks and other responses to the six questions highlight the questions’ 
contributions to the verification and validation process, and indeed to the credibility of the 
findings. As Strauss and Corbin (1994) pointed out, checking or verification is simply part 
of the inductive process; hence, they help in articulating our basic cognitive processes.   
 Identification of core categories and storyline 8.3.2
 
The identification of the core categories in terms of their properties and dimension, as well 
as their relation to the subcategories, is the main purpose of selective coding (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). Building upon the open and axial coding, the selective coding process 
helps the researcher to integrate the categories so as to build a theory around the core 
categories. In a broader sense, a core category can consist of all the products of the 
analysis condensed into a few words that explain what the ‘research is all about’ (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998, p.146) and ‘account for considerable variation within categories where 
it exists’ (ibid.). The results of the third set of semi-structured interviews offered this study 
significant clarification of the properties and dimensions of human action that have 
influenced corporate governance in the Nigerian banking sector. First, based on the 
participants’ responses, regarding the properties and dimensions of the subcategories of 
self-interest and lack of transparency that were subsumed into human action, these 
interviews indicated the broader meaning and interpretation of the effects of human action, 
which can be summarised as follows: 
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a) The participants confirmed that personal greed and internal abuse of corporate 
rules by self-interested officials have been influencing factors behind the non-
realisation of good corporate governance practice in banks. Indeed, the various 
reforms of the banks were intended to curtail the effects of self-interested 
behaviours and the lack of transparency that have been inimical to their corporate 
performance.    
b) The responses also showed that self-interested behaviours have influenced 
corporate actors’ decisions on which of the provisions of the Code of Corporate 
Governance and other rules to comply with and which to ignore, depending on 
whether they favour them. This explains why compliance with the existing 
frameworks, or enforcing compliance, is still a challenge that needs to be 
addressed.   
c) The interviewees also agreed that the lack of transparency, comprising a lack of 
accountability and dishonest auditing, is not substantially different from motives of 
self-interest. 
d) They further confirmed that certain measures have been put in place by the CBN as 
a consequence of the widespread self-interested behaviour and lack of 
transparency.  
 
Second, the responses relating to the lack of leadership main category can be summarised 
as follows: 
a) The participants further confirmed that leadership’s inability to develop a corporate 
governance culture in banks was the main issue affecting corporate governance 
practice in banks. This inability can be linked to the leaders protecting their own 
personal interests. 
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b) The failure of the leadership has led to a disregard for the code of conduct and of 
professionalism in banking operations, which have in turn affected the banks’ 
corporate governance practices. 
c) The responses confirmed that leadership at various levels is critical in determining 
the corporate governance culture in the banking sector and, as such, control 
strategies can only succeed through leadership. This implies that there should be 
continued pressure from the CBN, international agencies, shareholders and 
depositors, and other stakeholders. 
d) Overall, blame was placed on the leadership of both the banks and the regulatory 
authorities, regarding how they had managed the corporate governance process 
over time. This means that commitment to a new approach is required if banks are 
to realise the reform objectives. Also, the current market competitiveness requires 
a higher level of competence, uprightness and professionalism from the leadership 
if banks are to achieve the desired corporate excellence.    
 
Following this confirmation by the participants in the third interview series, the researcher 
asked the following two additional questions: ‘What about this area of study seems most 
striking? What do I think is the main problem?’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.119). This is 
where Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.120) recommend ‘the researcher to think beyond 
description and move to a conceptualisation that encompasses all the categories identified 
and how they are related to each other’. Here, the researcher aimed to reflect on what 
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.146) meant when they stated that it was essential to think of 
the phenomenon and ask ‘what are the salient issues or problems of the participants?’ In 
this instance, it is clear that the action/interaction strategies adopted by the banks and the 
CBN show that the combination of two categories, human action and a lack of leadership, 
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is the main force affecting the corporate governance of the banks. These two categories 
therefore provide the conceptual idea under which all the other categories and their 
properties can be subsumed. As Strauss (1987, p.36) explained, the criteria for choosing a 
central core category are as follows: 
‘(a), it must be central, that is, related to as many other categories and their properties 
as possible, (b), must appear frequently in the data, (c), it relates easily to other 
categories, (d), must have clear implications for a more general theory in the 
substantive study, (e), the concept must be refined analytically, and (f), it must allow 
for building in the maximum variation to the analysis’.  
 
 
 Integrating the core categories into subcategories 8.3.3
 
As a result of the selective coding process, the core categories identified in this study 
represent the central phenomena or theoretical ideas around which all the other categories 
that have been developed are integrated. In integrating these other categories, the selective 
analysis serves to formulate the broader “story” of the core categories, and the prevailing 
framework of a possible set of conceptual relationships to be further validated and to serve 
as building blocks for a future theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This relationship is 
synthesised with the help of the paradigm (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) based on the 
participants’ responses to the six interview statements (as in Section 8.3.2 above) and the 
interpretation of the subsequent analysis. The next subsections therefore discuss this 
paradigm in relation to the central phenomena of this study, the interaction strategies, 
conditions and consequences of the actors’ responses. This is followed with a GT for the 
study – a model of human action and lack of leadership.  
 
I. The core phenomena: Human action and lack of leadership 
The core phenomena have been widened as a consequence of the emphases given by the 
participants in interview series III regarding behaviours related to human action and lack 
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of leadership. Human action consists of two phases of action. Firstly, the self-interested 
behaviours of individuals and organisations have led to the corporate failures of banks. 
These behaviours have had an impact on the investment returns of shareholders, the risk to 
depositors’ funds and indeed to the national economy. Secondly, there is the lack of 
transparency relating to non-accounting and the lack of high-quality and trustworthy 
auditing based on a commitment to good corporate governance practice. This has also 
influenced the quality of financial reporting and the disclosures of various banks over 
time. On the other hand, the lack of leadership to steer an effective corporate culture of 
compliance and enforcement has also affected the realisation of good corporate 
governance within the banking system. Moreover, there are indications that this human 
action occurred because of the leadership, and that such behaviours along with the lack of 
competence of some banks’ leadership influence most of the decision making and 
practices.      
 
II. Action/interaction strategies: Corporate control strategies 
 
These are responses/strategies of ‘individuals or groups to situations, problems, 
happenings and events’ (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.89). There are two action/interaction 
strategies that have been adopted to address the core phenomena. First, some internal 
strategies have been adopted by various banks in response to the calls for good corporate 
governance. These strategies vary from bank to bank. Second, a set of strategies has been 
initiated by the CBN to address some of the identified weaknesses in the banks that affect 
corporate governance practices. These include explicit and implicit requirements of the 
Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, and other complementary policy directives. For 
example, the provisions specify board restructuring, a reduction in the tenures of CEOs, a 
whistle-blowing mechanism, and measures to improve the risk-taking behaviours of 
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banks. Some measures related to financial reporting standards have also been taken. 
Compliance with the Code’s provisions is compulsory.   
 
III. Conditions 
The conditions are the causal, context and intervening components of the paradigm model. 
The causal condition refers to the events or characteristics that cause the core category to 
take place (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In this study, competence is the causal condition. 
However, from the analysis, the influence of the causal condition varies from bank to 
bank. By context, we mean a certain set of properties associated with the central 
phenomenon that provides the basis within which certain actions relate to the core 
category (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Here, the enforcement category describes the 
structural context that determines the occurrences of the phenomena. In this instance, an 
inability to monitor or enforce compliance and a virtual absence of trust among the players 
has enhanced the continued occurrence of the identified phenomena. Finally, the 
intervening conditions, which are the broader structural aspects that alter/mitigate the 
effects of the causal conditions on the phenomena of human action and lack of leadership, 
are created by the Code/regulation. The Code was an initiative undertaken by the CBN to 
mitigate the overall effects of the identified phenomena. It deals with broader structural 
aspects that were expected to alter/mitigate the impact of the causal conditions on the 
phenomena of human action and a lack of leadership. 
 
IV. Consequences 
These are the outcomes of the action/interaction strategies. The interplay of the banks’ 
strategies and the CBN’s strategies for internal control measures in relation to structure 
and process leads to gradual improvements in the governance activities of the banks. For 
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instance, the strategies improve the understanding of the benefits of good governance 
among wider stakeholders, including the impact on the growth of the national economy. 
However, it has also exposed the limits and constraints of the Code of Corporate 
Governance that impede its enforcement in the banking sector. This further shows that any 
evolving governance mechanism for banks must fundamentally address some of these 
constraints.  
 
Finally, based on the overall consensus of the participants regarding the six interview 
statements (series III), the paradigm model in the selective coding stage can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
a) Effective corporate governance for banks is recognised as essential and will impact 
on wider stakeholders, by affecting shareholder value and increasing the growth in 
the national economy. The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, introduced to 
address certain weaknesses identified in the banking sector before the 
consolidation reform in 2004, is seen as a first step towards developing a corporate 
governance framework for banks in Nigeria. 
b) The effects of the Code of Corporate Governance vary across banks in relation to 
human action and the lack of leadership.  
c) The banks’ and the CBN’s responses to the emerging corporate governance issues 
have been to comply with and enforce internal control strategies and the provisions 
of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks and other policy directives. 
d) The outcomes of the various strategies adopted to curtail the effects of the 
identified phenomena can be divided into three main areas: (1) An understanding 
has been created of the benefits of good corporate governance for the overall 
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objectives of the banking sector. (2) The limits and constraints of the Code and 
other regulatory provisions for the governance process in the banking sector have 
been identified. (3) It is indicated that a corporate governance practice in banks can 
be achieved only if a broader approach is considered.    
 
The paradigm model that analytically defines the relationship between the core categories 
and the subcategories as an explicatory framework of alternative corporate governance can 
also be presented diagrammatically, as shown in Figure 8.4 below. In fact, creating 
diagrams is one of the techniques that help in demonstrating the ‘final integration of the 
core categories and with subcategories and their dimensions and properties’ (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008, p.274). Indeed, this is the end result of the selective coding step from which 
the theoretical explanation was constructed. While we acknowledge that the formation of 
theory is far from complete or exclusive as the end result of the research is not a universal 
theoretical explanation of corporate governance for banks, the developed substantive 
theory however only seeks to explain a specific phenomenon that takes place within a 
specific context and among specific actors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 A Model Integrating the Core Categories with the Subcategories 
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From the model presented in Figure 8.4 above, one can observe that the central forces of 
the corporate governance of banks are the human action that occurs through acts of self-
interest and the lack of transparency on the one hand, and the inability of the leadership to 
develop a corporate culture able to steer enforcement and compliance with the various 
control strategies and provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance published for 
banks in 2006. The down and up-pointing arrows from the box containing enforcement, 
control strategies and code/regulation suggest the overall expectations of the consolidation 
reform and the reforms that are to follow. In contrast, however, the findings revealed 
constraining factors related to the broader elements of the core categories of human action 
Effects of Corporate Governance of Banks 
Human Action and Lack 
of Leadership 
Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria 
Self-interest 
Lack of 
Transparency 
Organisation
al factors  
Competence 
248 
 
- self-interest and transparency as indicated on the left hand side - and lack of leadership in 
relation to organisational factors and competence, as shown on the right hand side. The 
conclusion is that good corporate governance for banks in Nigeria can best be achieved by 
addressing these constraining factors. 
 Conclusion 8.4
 
This chapter has demonstrated the application of axial and selective coding within GT. 
Regarding axial coding, the chapter has shown how the eight initial categories identified 
during the open coding phase were reassembled into six main categories during the axial 
coding phase. The chapter has also shown how the categories were arranged and linked to 
form a coherent system (Howell, 2000). These main categories have been linked and their 
meanings explained through the use of a coding paradigm (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In 
the selective coding phase, the researcher identified the core categories after verifying and 
validating the initial data through the application of discriminate sampling using six semi-
structured interview statements. The aim of presenting the statements to the participants 
was to verify the relationships and develop the core categories in terms of their properties 
and dimensions. However, the results from the analysis of the responses suggested the 
need for a modification of the initial paradigm following the emergence of the two core 
categories – lack of leadership and human action. These two core categories were then 
integrated with the subcategories diagrammatically to explain their interplay in influencing 
corporate governance practice in banks. This chapter lays the foundation for the 
substantive theory that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
249 
 
 The Substantive Grounded Theory Chapter 9.
 
‘A theory need not give us answers, but it should, perhaps question  
the questions until they bleed a little’ (Ansoff, 1979, p.8) 
 
 
 
 Introduction 9.1
 
Theory is not about the ‘discovery of immutable laws but the discovery of approximations 
to the truth’ (Howell, 2004, p.5). Moreover, it is concerned with ‘building substantive 
understanding, normativism and ideational simplification’ (Howell, 2013, p.24). This 
chapter presents the substantive theory of corporate governance for banks developed based 
on the opinions of the participants in this study, obtained through the process of data 
collection and the application of GT analytical procedures. The theory follows from the 
open, axial and selective coding analysis presented in Chapters 7 and 8, which eventually 
resulted in the core categories of human action and a lack of leadership and their 
relationship to the subcategories of code/regulation, enforcement, competency and 
corporate control strategies in the selective coding stage, as presented in Figure 8.3. A 
substantive theory is considered to be a process or ‘a way of accounting for, and 
explaining change’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.148).  
 
This chapter also discusses the relevance of culture and leadership to corporate 
governance research and reviews corporate governance utilising culture and leadership 
theories. This is followed by a discussion on the limitations of the literature linking them. 
Furthermore, this chapter explores the substantive theory within the culture and leadership 
framework, and highlights the relationship between the developed substantive theory and 
formal theories.  Although, formalising the substantive is not the aim of this thesis, it is 
simply an attempt to make GT a multi-area through constant comparison (Strauss, 1987; 
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Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This is also illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 9.1. In 
addition, this chapter explains the significance of a social contract theory approach with 
the constructs of cooperation and trust to address the fundamental findings in the 
substantive theory. Finally, a reflection on the chapter forms the basis for the concluding 
part of the thesis.  
 The Substantive Theory  9.2
 
 
The substantive theory developed in this study is based on the opinions expressed by the 
participants in this research (from the banking sector and other stakeholders) on banking 
regulation, monitoring, policy and implementation. The main objective of this study was 
to uncover the underlying reasons for corporate governance failure in banks in Nigeria and 
develop a substantive GT of corporate governance for banks. The basis of the substantive 
theory relates to the identification of what banking corporate governance in Nigeria 
entails, what phenomena are present, how they are related to each other, and what effects 
they have on corporate governance practice. This main objective was achieved through the 
analysis of data that were systematically collected through a series of interviews and a 
focus group discussion. In addition, documentary materials were used to complement the 
opinions generated and help capture the complexities of the topic. A further aim was to 
determine the reasons for the occurrence of the phenomena, the contextual conditions 
embedded in the responses of the parties involved in the governance processes of banks, 
and the consequences of their actions/interactions.  
 
Through an inductive process, and indeed deduction, and the verification and refinement 
of the data, human action and a lack of leadership emerged as the core categories. In a GT 
study, the substantive theory revolves around the identification of the ‘core category’ 
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(Glaser and Strauss 1967, p.40), which relates to the various sub-core categories. The 
developed substantive theory of corporate governance therefore recognises human action 
and the lack of leadership as forces that have, in many ways, shaped and refined the 
activities and achievements of corporate governance, varying according to the perspectives 
and understanding of the participants. The interplay of these forces provides a description 
of the causation, consequences and associated processes for the banks and other 
stakeholders in corporate governance. The highlights of the substantive GT are as follows: 
 
(a) The substantive theory was developed around human action and a lack of 
leadership in relation to their subcategories, as determinants of corporate 
governance in banks. 
 
(b) The theory maintains that human actions are a concern in the corporate governance 
practices of banks. Human action is defined here to mean actions and motives 
related to self-interest and a lack of transparency. Self-interest emerged as having 
two meanings in this context: First, there is the individual self-interest that emerges 
from individual greed, collusion, irrational human behaviour, unwillingness to act 
for the corporate good, fraud and corruption in handling the affairs of banks, such 
as in granting business loans, all to satisfy individual or group interests. The 
second aspect relates to organisational self-interest with the motive of maximising 
profit, which leads to the overstating of financial statements or the understating of 
risk exposures, often misleading public users of such information. These self-
interested behaviours were revealed as constraining the effectiveness of corporate 
governance, and as one of the major causes of the various reforms and persistent 
corporate failures that have taken place in the banking sector over time.  
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(c) The lack of transparency aspect of human action represents what the participants 
considered as a lack of accounting and the inability of the auditing process to 
detect wrongdoing in the accounting processes of banks. These behaviours result in 
the manipulation of the financial and non-financial information of individual 
banks. Although the degree varies from bank to bank, its impact on overall 
corporate failure has been unimaginable in recent times. Indeed, self-interest and a 
lack of transparency is the culture in the banks, overriding acts of common good.  
 
(d) Lack of leadership is another factor found to influence corporate governance in 
banks. In this regard, the participants agreed that, as a consequence of some 
managers’ non-transparent behaviours and individualistic pursuits, the boards were 
unable to develop or encourage a corporate culture that would comply with the 
code, the regulatory framework and other directives. Thus, the corporate 
governance of banks is affected by the way these organisations are directed and 
managed. 
 
(e) The substantive theory also indicates that, due to the broader effects of the human 
actions and lack of leadership, the enforcement of the existing rules and other 
regulations has been difficult in the banking sector in Nigeria.  
 
(f) Given the effects of the identified human action and lack of leadership, the CBN 
and some banks have undertaken certain control strategies to address them. For 
instance, the CBN recognises banks’ boards as critical to the process of 
governance, particularly in terms of internal control, and has therefore introduced 
some transformational measures involving changes in board structure, and the 
tenures of board members. The CBN has also made compliance with the provisions 
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of the Code of Corporate Governance compulsory. In addition, the use of whistle 
blowing and other measures aimed at controlling risk-taking decisions have been 
introduced. In the interviews, both the CBN and the bank officials agreed that the 
introduction of changes in board structure, particularly the involvement of NEDs, 
had been timely. This relies on the understanding that competent and independent 
directors will serve as a check and balance in the board decision-making process. 
One interviewee referred to the changes in the tenures of board members as ‘the 
best thing that has ever happened in my long banking career’.  
 
(g) The findings further reveal that, apart from the problems associated with human 
action and the lack of leadership that posed difficulties in enforcing the 
codes/regulations guiding corporate governance practice in banks, there are also 
issues relating to overlaps between the provisions of the Code of Corporate 
Governance and other existing regulations and policy directives from the CBN, the 
SEC and the NDIC. Many participants from the banks felt that some of the 
provisions in the Code of Corporate Governance did not reflect the current reality, 
and as such were unenforceable. In order to address these constraints, the 
participants argued that a harmonisation and review of the overall framework was 
necessary, to give the mechanism a focus and clarity of purpose that could ease 
enforcement.  
 
(h) This research also shows that, although certain strategies have been put in place by 
the CBN and some banks, corporate governance practice in banks has not yet 
achieved the level expected by the CBN and other stakeholders. It has also been 
254 
 
suggested that the current measures are not only insufficient but also fail to 
recognise the root of the problem within the banks.  
 
(i) The substantive theory further indicates that the enforcement of and compliance 
with the various control strategies and other rules is selective, and moreover varies 
from bank to bank. As such, the success achieved also differs, and this is clearly 
demonstrated by the financial performance of the banks. 
 
(j)  The substantive theory, through the paradigm model, recognises the effect of the 
interplay between the core categories of human action (self-interest and lack of 
transparency) and lack of leadership (organisational factors – corporate culture, 
leadership problem and public pressure) on the corporate governance practices in 
Nigerian banks. 
 
(k) As a consequence of some of the strategies taken by the CBN and other banks, and 
the interaction between them, it is evident that a degree of corporate governance 
awareness has been instituted in the banking sector. Banks have started to 
recognise the benefits of effective corporate governance to performance and 
understanding the forces limiting the realisation of an effective governance 
practice.  
 
(l) Finally, the substantive theory suggests that the existing corporate behaviour in 
banks needs a holistic review, and that a process needs to be developed to 
overcome the identified impediments so as to serve the stakeholders, namely, the 
shareholders, the depositors, the employees and the regulator. The development of 
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such a process rests on the regulatory authority, as a stakeholder in the corporate 
governance mechanism for banks in collaboration with other key stakeholders 
including the boards of directors and management of banks. 
 
In summary, the substantive theory developed here considers the interplay of various 
forces preventing effective corporate governance in banks, and the measures that could be 
adopted to overcome them. It clearly shows that the existing Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks and other regulations are insufficient to control the identified 
phenomena that are embedded in the corporate system. The participants also recognised 
that some progress has been made as a consequence of the measures taken so far. Glaser 
and Strauss (2009, p.34) indicated that ‘within a substantive theory that has been 
developed, a formal grounded theory can still be located’, and doing so may help the GT 
to ‘refine, extend, challenge or supersede’ extant concepts (Charmaz, 2006, p.169). A 
substantive theory can also provide a ‘link to a more formal theory’ (D. K. Locke, 2003, 
p.36), which can help to produce arguments that make readers think about the explicitness 
of the substantive theory. Thus, the linkage of the substantive theory to the formal theory 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 Relevance of Culture and Leadership to Corporate Governance 9.3
Research 
 
The continued complexities of corporate governance issues have increased the need for 
alternative approaches or ‘new theoretical perspectives and models of governance’ (Daily 
et al., 2003, p.371). Although both culture and leadership may have been used differently, 
it can be argued that their integration within a given context allows for a more powerful 
explanation of organisational activities. Indeed, there are reasons for the use of culture and 
leadership to underpin this study and these are briefly explained below: 
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a) Both culture and leadership have been used to create powerful concepts that are 
also intrinsic to institutions (Howell, 2009) and strongly influencing the 
institutional setting (Parsons, 1991; Edgar and Peter, 2002; Bass, 1990; Geertz, 
1993). For instance, leadership is useful for examining behavioural aspects and 
their impact on organisations’ activities (Conger, 1990; Kanungo, 1988), while 
culture helps in the task of interpreting matters in hand or shared beliefs that 
influence actions (Geertz, 1993; Hofstede, 2001). The essence of an organisation’s 
activities is the focus of any corporate governance study. 
 
b) Culture deals with the phenomena that surround us all the time and those that are 
created by our interactions with others (Schein, 2004). It is this created culture that 
is shaped by the leadership within an organisation or corporate process. In this 
context, leadership is argued to be a ‘social and relational influence process that 
occurs within a social system’ (Parry, 1998, p.87).  
 
c) Leadership and culture enable the analysis of organisations through context 
(Avolio et al., 1995) as they can vary across different environments, situations or 
time (D. N. Den Hartog et al., 1999; Osborn et al., 2002). These qualities are 
compatible with the idea of corporate governance as a social phenomenon that 
varies according to the nature of the firm and the environment in which it is 
located. Moreover, corporate governance as a social process is affected by non-
economic factors whose analysis is uniquely affected by the surrounding 
environment (Letza et al., 2008)
42
.  
 
                                            
42
 This is one of the main criticisms of the traditional theorising on corporate governance. 
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d) Theories of culture and leadership have influenced several studies on management 
issues (Kuada, 2010). Although many of these studies have not been synthesised 
into coherent frameworks that might guide empirical investigations in the field, 
they do show fundamental insights that could be combined to explore related 
topics such as corporate governance (ibid.).  
 
e) Furthermore, the study of culture and leadership pays attention to the importance 
of behaviour and actions, and how they are used by actors in organisations to 
influence others so as to achieve their interests (Parry, 2011; Schein, 2004; Kotter 
and Cohen, 2002). These concepts of behaviour and action are therefore central to 
the basic traditional theories of the agency relationship that appear in corporate 
governance studies. In fact, corporate governance reforms and regulations are said 
to have ‘intensively channelled corporate behaviours and actions towards 
accountability and responsibility’ (Sun et al., 2011, p.4). Moreover, the influence 
of power and behavioural considerations has always been present in corporate 
governance (Sonnenfeld, 2002) and this ‘behaviour and culture are inextricably 
linked (Young and Thyil, 2011, p.374). As Hofstede (1991, p.170) stated, ‘no part 
of our lives is exempt from culture’s influence’. 
 
f) Previous research utilising culture and leadership emphasised their quality of being 
adaptable to the process of change (Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003). For 
instance, through leadership, one can nurture a culture that is adaptive to change 
(Kotter, 1997), especially when transforming corporate culture to improve 
performance (Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Bass, 1985; Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 
2003). This is compatible with corporate governance research that adopts an open 
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systems approach in order to develop a more holistic view (Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Young and Thyil, 2008).  
 
g) Significantly, both leadership and culture theories can be explored through the use 
of a qualitative research design (Parry, 1998; D. N. Den Hartog et al., 1999), which 
this research has employed. Moreover, in corporate governance, issues are diverse 
and require processes to be followed in order that the researcher may understand 
and uncover nuances, again something that the qualitative research design 
provides. 
 
h) Finally, theoretical perspectives on culture and leadership are becoming more 
popular among researchers studying management issues, as well as corporate 
governance issues, as shown in the following section.  
 Reviewing Corporate Governance Research Utilising Culture and 9.4
Leadership Theories 
 
Many pieces of research on corporate governance have utilised culture or leadership as a 
theoretical framework. The basic strategy here is to understand how these two factors 
jointly influence or is influenced by corporate governance practice. In a broader sense, 
both elements deal with specific issues or contexts in which corporate governance takes 
place. This also suggests that organisation and behaviour are central to governance 
activities. It is argued that cultural norms act as a guide to ‘corporate behaviour and impact 
on what is seen as responsible’ (Young and Thyil, 2011, p.368). Sison (2000), based on 
the Olivencia report on structural changes in the Spanish business environment, explored 
the cultural dimension of codes of corporate governance, producing insights into the role 
of culture.  
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Similarly, Elkelish (2007) used Hofstede’s (1980) five cultural dimensions of power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, masculinity/feminism and 
time orientation to investigate the relationship between cultural values and corporate 
governance systems across countries, and concluded that cultural values have an impact on 
several corporate governance systems used in various countries, with important 
consequences at both firm and country levels. This further supports Gorga’s (2003) 
conclusion that culture influences corporate governance systems by determining the 
ultimate goals and objectives of organisations.
43
 In addition, Licht’s (2001) cultural value 
dimension (CVD) is based on the assertion that national cultures can be perceived as the 
mothers of all path dependencies. He argued that national cultures may have an impact on 
both the origin and the development of corporate governance systems in different 
countries. Indeed, he explained that the role of culture in corporate governance and 
securities regulation is an issue of growing importance (ibid.). 
Viewing culture as a social factor, Sonnenfeld (2002) remarked, ‘the key to governance 
isn’t structural, it’s social’ (p.109). This further strengthens the view that cultural factors 
impact on corporate governance and can impede change and legal reforms ( Matoussi and 
Jardak, 2012). B. Tricker (2012, p.26), in recognising the influence of cultural factors on 
corporate governance, concluded that all activities of business are affected by culture, 
arguing that 
‘the way in which business is done, the extent to which legal contracts or 
interpersonal trust form the basis for business decisions, the reliability of the court, 
the powers of the regulatory authorities…and overall the traditions of the country 
and the expectations of its people, all influence the way in which corporate 
governance develops’. 
 
                                            
43
 For example, in some countries (e.g., the US or the UK) the ultimate goal of organisations is to maximise 
shareholders’ wealth, while in others the goal is to maximise the interests of all stakeholders, including the 
government, employees and the community. 
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Other researchers have utilised leadership concepts to study corporate governance at both 
the firm and country levels. For example, Thomas et al. (2004, p.64) used strategic 
leadership regarding ethical behaviour in business and argued that an executive’s strategic 
leadership responsibility should be seen as working ‘with others to initiate changes that 
will create a viable future for organisations’. Furthermore, Awamleh and Al- Dmour 
(2004) conducted a test of the transformational leadership theory among managers at a 
functional level in Jordanian banks, and confirmed that the use of the transformational 
style by bank managers boosts employees’ job satisfaction. Indeed, transformational 
leadership qualities stimulate higher-level needs among followers and result in feelings of 
satisfaction and better performance (Bass, 1985).  
In developing countries, Blunt and Jones (1997) explored the limits of Western leadership 
theory in East Asia and Africa. They found that, African managers are more concerned 
about the quality of their relationships with their bosses than with their organisational 
effectiveness. Also, in addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of leadership in 
organisations, Hennessey (1998) asserted that leadership plays a major role in helping to 
improve the implementation of specific government reforms, which leads to attendant 
increases in the effectiveness and efficiency of organisations. In addition, Caldwell et al. 
(2012) confirmed that transformational leadership honours the governance obligations of 
leaders by demonstrating a commitment to the welfare of all stakeholders, particularly in 
terms of seeking to optimise long-term wealth creation. This is because leadership itself 
resonates when leaders show a commitment to individuals’ welfare, growth and wholeness 
(Boyatzis and Mckee, 2005). 
These pieces of research indicate that culture and leadership are relevant to explaining the 
corporate governance phenomenon. However, despite the implicit and explicit linking of 
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leadership and culture in many works, including those on organisational theory (Fiedler, 
1967), little critical attention has been devoted to understanding the interface between the 
two concepts and the impact their association might have on aspects of corporate 
governance as a process rather than as an output. Moreover, previous studies show no 
focus on understanding behaviour within the social context in which it takes place. It is 
significant to note that culture changes over time, and such changes in organisations can 
only be achieved through leadership, otherwise, ‘if left alone, the culture may eventually 
become dysfunctional’ (Kilmann, 1985, p.354). Finally, since organisations and 
institutions can (and often do) have multiple roles in society, they must start the process of 
changing the existing culture where the corporate activities are located. 
 Limitations of the Literature Linking Culture and Leadership to 9.5
Corporate Governance 
 
As it is considered in this thesis, transformational leadership is an all-embracing and far-
reaching tool for social influence (Parry, 1998). Although leadership and culture concepts 
can be observed in a wide range of organisations (including business management 
organisations), it can also be argued that there are three main limitations in the literature 
on culture and leadership, in terms of its application to corporate governance research. 
First, its application may be constrained as a consequence of unusual attributes of 
organisations or cultures (Ardichvili and Kuchinke, 2002; D. N. Den Hartog et al., 1999; 
Blunt and Jones, 1997). Second, some attributes of leadership are universally seen as 
impediments to understanding leadership. This is because there is evidence that no single 
model of leadership can accommodate the significant variations in societal culture and 
their influence. Moreover, the transformational style of leadership utilised in many 
organisations is more effective in collectivist cultures than in individualist ones (Jung et 
al., 1995). This therefore suggests that the practice of leadership in organisation is often 
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aspirational. Finally, there are also methodological limitations in studying leadership and 
culture (Hunt, 1999). 
Notwithstanding these limitations, there are also overriding advantages of using the 
culture and leadership constructs. Many authors (e.g. Schein, 2004; Hofstede, 1991, 2001; 
Bass, 1985; Bass and Avolio, 1993; Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003) see culture and 
leadership as offering an excellent basis for exploring human actions within organisations 
or any other situation, as well as how such actions are socially constructed. Moreover, the 
qualitative research design utilised in this study has strengthen its limitations, which have 
been the major concerns of Hunt (1999) and by Beyer (1999). In conclusion, culture and 
leadership are found to be well-suited to exploring the findings of the substantive GT 
generated in this study for the reasons given above. More so, culture is compatible with a 
constructivist perspective in which the meanings of social events, behaviours or processes 
can be casually attributed (Geertz, 1993; Hofstede, 1991). Finally, most of the findings of 
the substantive theory are covered by the culture, leadership and corporate governance 
literature, which is explored in the next section.  
 Exploring the Substantive Theory within the Culture and 9.6
Leadership Framework 
 
This section discusses the findings of the substantive theory (see Section 9.2) in the 
context of culture and leadership. As indicated earlier, culture and leadership cover most 
of the findings of the substantive theory, as will be discussed in the following sections. 
 Examining corporate governance as a cultural process 9.6.1
The substantive theory holds that human actions affect corporate governance, which 
explains the influence of the self-interest of bank officials and the organisation itself, and 
the lack of transparency caused by the executive management’s non-accounting and 
263 
 
dishonesty in the auditing process. The substantive theory indicates that the self-interested 
behaviour observed in this research was influenced by three factors: individual greed, 
protecting one’s own or one’s family’s interests, and organisational self-interest aimed at 
maximising corporate profits. It is these behaviours exhibited by some officials and 
organisations that appear to have constrained the enforcement of various mechanisms in 
the banking industry over time. These elements have motivated most banks and 
individuals to resort to the manipulation of procedures, and to take various actions for 
individual or group material gain. 
Such behaviours also dictate which of the regulations/provisions of the Code of Corporate 
Governance the leadership and the banks comply with. The interpretation expressed by the 
participants relates to the definitions of various scholars (Rilley, 1982; Kangas, 1997; 
Brennan, 1994; Etzioni, 1988; Kohn, 1990; D. T. Miller and Ratner, 1996), which have 
labelled self-interest as that cardinal human motive or activity carried out in search of 
personal advantage or gain. The substantive theory shows that self-interest, as defined by 
the participants, accounts for several of the bank crises experienced in recent times. It also 
accounts for the lack of transparency relating to the quality of accounting and auditing of 
the financial records of various banks, which further questions the reliability and 
credibility of the financial information disclosed to stakeholders and other public users. 
Within a cultural context, the legitimacy of self-interested behaviour exhibited by 
executive managers has been incorporated into banking organisations as a distinctive and 
shared norm or collectively shared cultural value (Kohn, 1990; Miller and Ratner, 1996). 
This aspect of culture is consistent with what Bourdieu (1977) described as “Habitus”, 
which he explained as a system of durable transposable dispositions learned from 
everyday practices and experiences. It also relates to what Hofstede (1991) referred to as 
264 
 
the broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others, leading to the 
development of new rules of conduct, making groups more powerful and impeding 
organisational change (Gorga, 2003). Finally, it is consistent with the argument that 
cultural influence refers to the norms and values of such systems and the behaviour of 
groups in their interactions within and across systems (Perera, 1989). Indeed, these are the 
behaviours that have continued to influence corporate governance activities such as the 
transparent disclosure of financial information, the work of audit committees, and the 
compliance with and enforcement of the regulatory framework in the banking sector in 
Nigeria.  
Disclosure practice does not develop in a vacuum, but rather reflects the underlying 
environmental influences that affect managers and companies in different countries 
(Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992), environmental influences that include culture (Cook and 
Wallace, 1990). Moreover, disclosure is an accounting activity involving both human and 
non-human resources and techniques as well as the interaction between the two (Perera, 
1994). For example, the substantive theory indicates that the CBN introduced certain 
strategies to address human action and the lack of leadership. One such strategy was the 
introduction of the IFRS template to facilitate the disclosure of information by banks. 
Though such disclosures are made regularly in the banks’ annual financial reports, the 
CBN has found that most of the information does not represent the banks’ true accounting 
positions and hence unreliable. This mirrors studies by Zarzeski (1996), Jaggi and Low 
(2000), Hope (2003), Qu and Leung (2006) and Akman (2011) on the influence of culture 
on financial disclosure. For example, Akman (2011) investigated whether culture was still 
playing a role in financial disclosure following the adoption of IFRS. His findings 
confirmed that culture, and particularly the individualism dimension as originally used by 
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Hofstede (2001) and others, was significantly related to the disclosure of companies in all 
years.  
Similarly, Qu and Leung’s (2006) exploratory study on the impact of the changed cultural 
environment on the voluntary disclosure behaviour of Chinese listed companies found 
that, even since the change in culture, there had been no voluntary disclosures related to 
party transactions among the sample companies. The change studied by Qu and Leung 
was related to the “Code of Corporate Governance for listed Companies in China”. Their 
findings support an earlier study by Gray (1988) on the influence of Hofstede’s four 
cultural dimensions on accounting disclosure, which confirmed that environmental factors 
such as culture impact on accounting practice and financial disclosure. Based on the 
above, it can be argued that resistance or refusal by the banks’ leaders to comply with or 
enforce the provisions of the 2006 Code of Corporate Governance for Banks is due to the 
extent to which human action is embedded in the banking sector.  
Indeed, the substantive theory also acknowledges that the CBN’s actions in introducing 
various measures have led to some improvements in corporate governance activities. The 
measures taken cover critical areas such as whistle blowing, reforms relating to board 
structure (including NEDs on boards), and the reduction of the tenure of the CEO to a 
maximum of two terms of five years only, as well as risk management and the disclosure 
of financial information. The idea here has been to protect the larger stakeholders’ 
interests and restore the soundness and safeness of banks for the benefit of the Nigeria’s 
national economy. Within the context of culture, people’s actions that aimed towards the 
common good, led by the strategies adopted by the CBN and other banks, can be 
considered a product of culture (Allison, 1992a, 1992b; Margolis, 1982; Boyd and 
Richerson, 1985). As Margolis (1982) explained, people can be driven by the desire to 
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work towards a common good and as such hold societal contracts and norms in the highest 
regard. This is also consistent with V. L. Smith’s (1998) argument that Adam Smith’s 
proposition on human nature has two faces: both the desire for self-interest and working 
for the good of the society. Such actions also relate to the concept of culture ‘as those 
social, political and other factors that influence an individual’s behaviour and attitude’ (P. 
B. Smith et al., 2002, p.189).  
The intention behind the CBN’s and other banks’ strategies was to change the self-
interested behaviour and lack of transparency shown by executive managers, and 
consequently reduce internal agency problems. As H. Schwartz and Davis (1981) argued, 
firms with internal cultures that are supportive of their strategies are more likely to be 
successful. This means that it is desirable to change culture so as to improve performance. 
Here, the substantive theory sees the cultural changes as commencing with the political 
will of the regulating authority to initiate a corporate governance process for banks, 
through strategic measures introduced through the Code of Corporate Governance for 
Banks and other directives. 
 Achieving corporate governance through leadership 9.6.2
The substantive theory emphasises internal compliance with, and monitoring of, the 
strategies initiated by the CBN and other banks. It also reveals that the banks’ leadership 
has failed to steer corporate culture towards meeting the expectations of the regulatory 
authority, the shareholders and the depositors, as well as international standards. Here, the 
substantive theory indicates that the lack of an adequate corporate culture is due to the 
inability of boards of directors and CEOs to behave responsibly (being involved in 
widespread insider abuses and the manipulation of procedures for their own or corporate 
gain). Many studies have identified corporations where it is quite apparent that senior 
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executive self-interest dominates (Byrne, 2002), as in the case of Enron and WorldCom 
(Osborn et al., 2002). Indeed, the leadership of boards of directors, in terms of monitoring 
and directing compliance with regulatory provisions and other directives, is considered to 
be ‘the apex of the internal control system’ (Jensen, 1993, p.862). In the leadership 
context, especially in terms of transformational leadership, boards of directors are the 
leaders through which desired change can be accomplished. This is consistent with 
Filatotchev and Nakajima (2010), who stated that the board represents an organisation’s 
owners and is responsible for ensuring that the organisation is managed effectively 
through the adoption of control mechanisms aimed at ensuring that management behaviour 
is consistent with the interests of the owners.   
Thus, the control strategies initiated for the banks by the CBN can be considered as a vital 
leadership transformation process, because transformative leadership would honour the 
governance obligations by demonstrating a commitment to the welfare of all stakeholders 
by influencing monitoring and compliance. This further relates to the definition by 
Caldwell et al. (2012, p.176) of transformational leadership ‘as a leadership that integrates 
a commitment to value and outcomes, by optimising the long-term interest of stakeholders 
and society and honouring the moral duties owed by organisations to their stakeholders’. 
Under existing company law and the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks, boards of 
directors are responsible for the monitoring and supervision of the internal control of 
banks. This means that they have the power to change the organisation’s internal cultural 
forms and substance. Thus, leadership is a culture-influencing activity (Bass and Avolio, 
1994; Alvesson, 2011). From the context of leadership, all actors, but leaders especially, 
must embody the norms of their positions and persuade others in ways that are consistent 
with their normative obligations. In other words, they must protect societal and business 
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cultures, and set limits for the kind of managerial behaviour and arrangements that are 
acceptable (Alvesson, 2011). 
The substantive theory also reveals that the competence of a board of directors is assessed 
regularly, while training programmes are provided for management staff with the aim of 
improving their skills and competences. From a leadership perspective, such measures 
help to motivate followers by inspiring them, improving individual development, and 
increasing their intellectual stimulation, all aimed at increasing the corporate performance 
of their organisations (Avolio et al., 1995; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999). It is also argued 
that, since culture is established as an integral part of an organisation (Schein, 2004; 
Hofstede, 1980), the thinking, feeling and responses of leaders are invariably moulded by 
culture (Bass and Avolio, 1993; Schein, 2004). Of significance is the fact that leadership is 
not only the incremental influence of a leader over his/her subordinates but, more 
importantly, the collective incremental influence of leaders in and around the system 
(Osborn et al., 2002). Thus, leadership plays a significant role in changing organisational 
performance (Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003).  
Finally, the substantive theory acknowledges that, although there are constraints impeding 
corporate governance practice in the banking sector, the responses to the strategies and 
other control mechanisms implemented have created significant awareness of the 
importance of corporate governance to achieving greater corporate performance. 
Moreover, banks and their executive management are aware of the consequences of not 
heeding the corporate governance provisions. Indeed, using both culture and leadership 
offers an excellent basis for explaining the underlying reasons behind the corporate 
governance phenomenon, and how banks might improve their performance. This further 
confirms the arguments of previous studies that adopting culture and leadership in 
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corporate governance-related activities not only enhances performance and improves 
organisational growth (Ardichvili and Kuchinke, 2002; Parry and Proctor-Thomson, 2003; 
Kuada, 2010; Munley, 2011), but also guides the understanding of the changing dynamics 
in organisational activities in any given situation. Overall, this supports the findings of the 
substantive theory, which demonstrate that leadership is reflected in the values, policy 
making and cultural dimensions of the banking sector. 
  Relationship between the Developed Substantive Theory and Other 9.7
Formal Theories 
 
Although the main objective of this study was to develop a substantive theory of corporate 
governance derived from data generated from the experiences of the participants, the GT 
approach adopted requires the researcher to understand the relationship of the developed 
substantive theory for formal theories (Strauss, 1987).  Generally, substantive and formal 
theories exist at distinguishable levels of generality, differing only in terms of degree. 
Thus, the difference between substantive and formal theories is that the former ‘evolves 
from the study of a phenomenon situated in one particular situational context’ (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990, p.174) as in this case, while the latter ‘emerges from the study of a 
phenomenon examined under different types of situations’ (ibid.). As with many 
developed substantive theories, the applicability of the one developed in this study to other 
contexts may be limited if the constant comparative method of modifying a theory is 
neglected. The essence here to attempt to show how the substantive GT generated in this 
research fits into a formal theory. This is because relating the substantive theory to a 
formal theory enables the generalisation and transferability of the research results to other 
scenarios elsewhere.  
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Furthermore, the principle behind comparing the developed substantive theory to a formal 
theory is to enhance ‘the internal validity, generalizability and theoretical level of theory 
building’ (Eisenhardt, 1989b, p.545).  Glaser and Strauss (1967, p.34) added, ‘to enable 
GT findings to be transferable between contexts, substantive theory should be moved to 
formal theory’. In fact, this process makes GT a multi-area theory. To achieve this, the 
substantive GT is matched back to the extant literature (D. K. Locke, 2001; Parker and 
Roffey, 1997), as a result of which cases are allowed to talk to one another (Ahrens et al., 
2008). Indeed, doing so gives the theory ‘greater meaning’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, 
p.94). In fact, relating the developed substantive theory with formal theories can help to 
locate the arguments made in the substantive theory within the existing body of 
knowledge, thus making the substantive theory more explicit (Charmaz, 2006).  
 
As earlier stated, the substantive theory generated in this thesis rests on a number of 
fundamental forces that have influenced the nature, structure, process and quality of 
corporate governance practice in the banking sector. In Chapters 2 and 3 it was argued that 
traditional theories and practices of corporate governance were unable to offer the required 
level of understanding to consider the corporate governance phenomenon to be a social 
process (Letza and Sun, 2002; Letza et al., 2008; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Rossouw, 2005). 
Moreo so, Young and Thyil (2008) contended that, some previous frameworks used for 
corporate governance were not compatible with the changing nature of organisations or 
did not reflect the current realities in a given situation (Zingales, 2000; Podrug and Racic, 
2011). Moreover, the theoretical frameworks used previously were inadequate in dealing 
with the recent corporate governance scandals occurring on a global scale (G. Kirkpatrick, 
2009), especially in banks within the developing countries of Africa. As Layder (1993, 
p.43) stated, ‘all formal theories are dependent on initial substantive insight’. Thus, Figure 
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9.1 below shows how the substantive theory of this study can be located within the 
relationship of culture and leadership theories. These aspects, in essence, give a broader 
understanding of the implications of the substantive theory in terms of evolving a general 
theory for corporate governance practice in other contexts. 
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Figure 9-1 The Relationship of the Substantive within the Formal Theory 
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 Strategic Approach to Substantive Grounded Theory 9.8
 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stressed that a firm’s success is dependent upon the 
successful management of all of its relationships with its stakeholders. From the 
substantive GT, many approaches could be available to the banks and the regulatory 
authority to address the identified human action and lack of leadership. However, in this 
thesis, we suggest a strategic approach that they can develop to ensure an effective 
corporate governance mechanism. Here, the use of the social contract is found to provide, 
not only a moral precept that is implicit to realising the objectives of the substantive GT, 
but also a more rational and acceptable approach to the situation. In corporations, apart 
from the formally specified obligations, there also exists ‘a set of binding, abstract ones’ 
(T. Donaldson, 1982, p.36).  
 
The legitimacy of and justification for the social contract, which was founded on the early 
political theories of Hobbes 1651(1972), J. Locke 1690 (1980) and J. J. Rousseau 1762 
(1987) on human nature and the state of nature, aimed at ensuring peace in society and 
communities, is significant in today’s business environment. For instance, J. Lock’s 1690 
(1980) version of the social contract provides a reasonable guide to the legitimacy of 
government ‘as a trustee and umpire…and the creation of a people through an act of 
consent’ (Dienstag, 2001, p.1006). It is also significant in addressing issues related to free 
riders
44
 who exist within industries, national economies, trade groups and corporations (T. 
Donaldson and Dunfee, 2002). Similarly, Axelrod (1986) contended, the idea of a social 
contract has been a powerful image for the support of democratic forms of governance and 
                                            
44
 A free rider is someone who enjoys the benefits of others’ compliance with a rule but violates it for the 
sake of personal advantage. As such, if everyone were allowed to behave as the free rider does, then the rule 
of law would lose its social legitimacy. 
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as such ‘a mythical agreement can be used to give legitimacy to a very real set of laws and 
institutions’ (p.1106).  
 
In business organisations, this contract is seen as a process in which an individual’s 
environment is constantly adapting, revolving and evolving (Hung and Huang, 2010). In 
this context, we add that the construct of the social contract must reflect essential working 
elements such as cooperation
45
 if the consent among the parties is to work well, since in 
agreements parties are required to show their commitment through actions rather than 
words. For instance, in relation to insider abuses in banks, Sheppele (1993, p.151) 
confirmed that the social contract supports restrictions on insider trading by providing 
‘concrete guidance in working out how to think about the ethics of insider trading’. She 
argued that the restrictions were justified based upon a contractually derived desire to 
provide equal access to financial markets. Similarly, T. Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) 
indicated that the use of the social contract relationship led Shell Petroleum to recognise 
that people in Nigeria, and indeed citizens of other emerging economies, expect large 
multinationals to play a public role. In other words, Shell was forced to reconcile its own 
conception of responsibilities to the public conception. In effect, Shell eventually factored 
the social contract into its ethical decision making because, as a consequence of the 
Nigeria and Brent Spar episode, they came to view the ‘implicit agreements or “extant 
social contract” that evolved in Europe, Nigeria, and elsewhere as critical components of 
its business context’ (T. Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999, p.6). 
 
                                            
45
 Cooperation here refers to how people work together to advance group or organisational goals and is 
considered a central organising process with important implications for organisations. It is a theoretical 
construct that can fit into any situation defined by its users (Keller and Loewenstein, 2011), and as such may 
be applied in this context. 
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As such, it should be a central concern for all actors. Indeed, cooperative behaviours, 
when reciprocated, tend to spiral into ever higher levels of cooperation (Axelrod, 1990). 
Here, we define cooperation in relation to maximising the collective interest rather than 
individual or group interests
46
. The cooperative construct also requires the incorporation of 
trust, which is essential in interpersonal and intergroup work activities, including leader-
subordinate relationships  (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002)
47
. Furthermore, trust increases one 
party’s confidence that the other will act cooperatively rather than opportunistically, which 
then increases its own willingness to cooperate (Das and Teng, 2001). 
 
For instance, where the disclosure of financial information is found to be inadequate to 
varying extents, the presence of trust in social contract can play a very significant role. As 
Parkhe (1998) argued, a party must spend less monitoring highly trustworthy individuals 
than less trustworthy individuals. Similarly, with respect to leadership, trust helps to 
harness efforts towards achieving a common goal (Dirks and Skarlicki, 2004). Also, a loss 
of trust can not only threaten the norms of collaboration and commitment (Hofstede, 1980) 
but also leadership effectiveness (Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). In organisations such as 
banking institutions, the existence of trust builds optimism about others’ behaviour, which 
can lead to further gains based on mutual cooperation (Frank, 1990). As R. J. Macey 
(2008, p. vii) indicated, corporate governance is about promise, because ‘the idea of 
promise captures the primordial fact that trust rather than reliance on the prospect of 
enforcement is the focal point of a successful system of corporate governance’. Moreover, 
as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued, corporate governance is an economic and legal 
institution that can be altered through the political process. This argument is also linked to 
                                            
46
 Group interests in this context refer to the organisational drive towards its set objectives. 
 
47
 Behaviour is used here in a subjective context. It includes not just overt or covert actions, but may also be 
constituted by failure to act, or by passive acquiescence. 
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the view that corporate governance as a process includes not just the regulation of the 
activities of firms but the ‘web of relations that surround their operations between 
stakeholders, shareholders, employees and the state’ (Rhodes and van Apeldoom, 1998, 
p.407). Thus, a social contract principle based on trust could be useful for decision makers 
adopting the substantive GT of this thesis, especially in a business environment like 
Nigeria. 
 Conclusion 9.9
 
 
This chapter has described in detail the substantive theory of corporate governance that 
resulted from the application of the GT process to a series of interviews and a focus 
discussion conducted in 2011. It reflects the opinions of the executive managers of banks, 
CBN and NDIC officials, and other stakeholders, showing human action and a lack of 
leadership to be critical forces affecting corporate governance in banks. The substantive 
theory captures the complexities of relevant events and happenings, and shows why they 
occur in Nigerian banks. Indeed, it is these events and happenings that have led to the 
various corporate failures, and the reforms and other policy directives that have followed, 
in recent times. These measures have been explained as a response by the CBN and other 
stakeholders aimed at improving the governance practices in Nigerian banks by 
controlling managerial abuses, irrational risk taking and other actions across the 
management hierarchy. 
 
This chapter has discussed the relevance of culture and leadership to the study of corporate 
governance and reviewed corporate governance by utilising culture and leadership 
theories. It has also offered some limitations of linking them, while stressing that they are 
still relevant to understanding the corporate governance phenomenon, as explained by 
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Ardichvili and Kuchinke (2002), Parry and Protor-Thomson (2003), Kuada (2010) and 
Akman (2011). After this, the substantive GT was explored in the light of the culture and 
leadership theoretical framework. The chapter has also highlighted the relationship 
between the developed substantive theory and formal theories, in an attempt to give it 
more formality, making it into a formal substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss, 2009). 
This is illustrated in Figure 9.1. Finally, this chapter has suggested that social contract 
theory should be used, within the contexts of cooperation and trust, to address the findings 
of the substantive theory. This also forms the basis of the next chapter, which presents the 
conclusions of the thesis. 
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 Conclusions, Implications for Practice and Chapter 10.
Future Research 
 
 
 Introduction 10.1
 
This thesis has heeded the calls for an alternative corporate governance system reflecting 
the special nature of banks, particularly in developing countries such as Nigeria. Using the 
GT process, qualitative data were collected through interviews and a focus group 
involving bank officials and other stakeholders, and then systematically analysed. This led 
to the construction of a substantive theory aimed at enhancing our understanding of the 
corporate governance phenomenon in banks. This has met the objective of this study: to 
build a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks using a culture and 
leadership theoretical framework and the GT techniques of coding and comparative 
analysis. This study has therefore discovered and comprehended the nature of the 
corporate governance phenomenon and its interaction with certain processes, which led to 
various events and happenings within the banking sector. The substantive theory 
constructed herein joins the hierarchy of substantive/formal theories in corporate 
governance research. The formal GT of a corporate governance system for banks resulted 
from relating the substantive GT with culture and leadership theories and findings from 
other substantive areas. This final chapter offers some conclusions from the research and 
the theory, and discusses the contributions this study has made to knowledge. Drawing 
from the findings, the chapter also offers some implications for the achievement of good 
corporate governance using the social contract, trust and cooperation. The limitations of 
the study and recommended areas for future research follow. 
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 An Overview of the Research and the Theory 10.2
 
The contemporary evolution of corporate governance, from the managerial capitalism that 
fuelled the US stock market crash in 1929 (Berle and Means, 1932), to the recent global 
financial crisis of 2007–2010, continues to play a role in public discourse and as a 
reference among scholars, policy analysts and corporate practitioners (Sun et al., 2011). 
While several corporate governance theories and practices have evolved over the years 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishnny, 1997; 
Daily et al., 2003), they have generated much debate over which is the best model for 
addressing emerging corporate governance issues (Eisenhardt, 1989a; M. O’Sullivan, 
2000; Daily et al., 2003; Letza et al., 2004, 2008). Overall, these are indications of failures 
that have led to repeated calls for an alternative governance mechanism that reflects 
individual social/economic environments (Learmount , 2002; Sonnenfeld, 2002; 
Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003; Okike, 2007; Letza et al., 2008; Inyang, 2009), 
especially for institutions such as those in the banking industry (J. Macey and O’Hara, 
2003; Barth et al., 2006; Ariely, 2009; K. Alexander, 2010; Tomasic, 2011).  
 
In developing countries, the experience of corporate failures in the banking industry is not 
especially different from the events in developed economies that have already established 
corporate governance systems (Arun and Turner, 2004. Even though reform initiatives 
such as regulatory measures, privatisation and consolidations have been undertaken by 
different regimes, including international organisations (the World Bank, IMF, ROSC and 
BCBS), such measures have in most cases been found inadequate (Reaz and Turner , 
2006). For instance, in Nigeria, despite the existence of the Code of Corporate Governance 
and other regulations, the growing concern over banking failures has increased the calls 
for an alternative governance mechanism for banks (Wilson, 2006; Okike, 2007; Adegbite, 
280 
 
2010; Nworji et al., 2011). This thesis heeds these calls, and has as its main objective the 
development of a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks. To achieve this, 
the thesis adopted a theoretical framework of culture and leadership, which provided a 
unique opportunity to comprehend the underlying reasons for the corporate failures in the 
banking industry.  
 
Furthermore, GT techniques were used in the systematic data collection and analysis, 
based on a series of interviews and a focus group discussion with bank officials and other 
stakeholders involved in corporate governance policy and implementation. GT has been 
found to offer new insights into old problems and can also open up entirely new areas for 
study. Moreover, it is an ideal methodology in domains where disparate substantive and 
frequently conjectured theories claim ultimate relevance while ignoring other theories that 
may contradict their own (Yee, 2001). Indeed, the use of GT helped with the development 
of the substantive theory of corporate governance (see Chapter 9), and the discussion of its 
relationship with the formal theory of culture and leadership. The cardinal reason for 
looking at this relationship was that, as valuable as the contribution of the substantive 
theory is, it is the contribution to formal theory that reveals the most powerful aspect of 
GT analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In other words, it is the utilisation of the formal 
theory in this research that has confirmed the influence culture and leadership have on the 
corporate governance of banks, and enhanced the other contributions to knowledge.   
 The Contributions of the Study 10.3
 
In the literature review section of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3), a body of knowledge was 
introduced relating to the concerns regarding an alternative corporate governance 
mechanism, especially for banks. Evidence was presented of a lack of research addressing 
the phenomenon of corporate governance in the banking sector. The extant literature also 
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identified a number of other issues relating to the inadequacy of the shareholder or 
stakeholder paradigm for understanding the corporate governance phenomenon. The main 
reasons suggested for this were that corporate governance issues lie on a continuum, 
changing over time and across different environments, and with the nature and 
peculiarities of institutions, especially for banking organisations in developing countries 
and, as is relevant to this thesis, Nigeria. This further emphasises the need for an 
alternative methodology to uncover the nuances of corporate governance practice within 
the banking sector. This study has produced a number of contributions to knowledge, 
relating to methodological, theoretical and practical aspects, as will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
 Methodological contributions 10.3.1
 
Methodologically, using GT heeded to the call of Daily et al. (2003) for the adoption of a 
new methodological approach in corporate governance, in an unexplored context. It also 
responded to the calls to use a qualitative research design when synthesising leadership 
and culture (Parry, 1998; Hunt, 1999). By attempting to understand the nature of the 
corporate governance of banks in Nigeria, and to interpret and construct it through the use 
of GT, this thesis has generated a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks in 
Nigeria. This has been achieved by basing the study on culture and leadership, as an 
alternative underpinning theoretical framework to the conventional agency or stakeholder-
shareholder theories. In this context, the study has extended the application of GT based 
on the social constructivist paradigm of inquiry, leading to a fresh and faithful 
understanding of corporate governance in a new area. Overall, the substantive theory 
generated through the application of GT has added to the few extant studies of corporate 
governance that had utilised GT previously namely: Xiao et al. 2004:  Goddard and Assad, 
2006: Nwanji, 2005; Sorour, 2011. 
282 
 
The use of GT has also shown, through a variety of data sources,
48
 how the interaction 
between culture and leadership explains the underlying phenomenon of corporate 
governance in banks. More so, GT-based qualitative data analysis added to the validity of 
the qualitative form of research used to explore these corporate governance issues, which 
was especially useful for the context of banks, which are distinctly specialised institutions. 
It also showed that using a constructivist approach to analyse participants’ views 
qualitatively can help to better address aspects relating to human behaviour in a business 
environment (Fisher, 2007). Fourthly, employing GT in this study reaffirms its importance 
for investigating management issues. This is consistent with D. K. Locke’s (2001) view 
that the methodology is an accepted and particularly appropriate theoretical approach for 
research in management studies aimed at producing ‘action oriented theoretical products’ 
(ibid., p.107). Finally, in relating the substantive findings to a formal theory using the 
culture and leadership theoretical framework, this research has further validated the 
significance of the GT approach in business management issues. Moreover, in this study, 
the explanation of the move from substantive to formal GT shows that the findings of a 
substantive theory can be cumulative (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987; Parker and 
Roffey, 1997).  
 Practical contributions 10.3.2
 
This research has a number of practical implications for policy makers involved in the 
corporate governance of banks, including the Nigerian regulatory authorities (the CBN 
and the NDIC). First, the substantive theory has identified the challenges that are currently 
impeding corporate governance practice in banks, namely the self-interested behaviour of 
certain individuals, and to some extent of the banks themselves, the lack of transparency, 
the difficulties of enforcing the existing code / regulatory frameworks, and the lack of an 
                                            
48
 Interviews and focus groups complemented by reports and relevant documents. 
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acceptable corporate governance culture in banks. These are essential elements that will 
need to be addressed in developing a corporate governance mechanism for banks. For 
instance, some rules appear not to be used in practice due to deficiencies in terms of their 
adequacy and their overlaps with other provisions, a problem that requires both reviews 
and harmonisation. The research has also indicated the deep influence of both culture and 
leadership in directing corporate governance activities in banks. This needs to be 
understood if the corporate governance of banks is to be improved upon. This adds to 
criticisms of the reliance on regulatory or market mechanisms alone in designing corporate 
governance for banks. Moreover, this study has shown that in each environment there may 
be specific factors that impede governance practice, despite the existence of regulations. 
Finally, due to the complexities of culture and leadership, this thesis proposes the 
utilisation of social contract theory, along with the constructs of cooperation and trust, in 
order to actualise the findings of the substantive GT, as will be discussed in Section 10.4 
below. 
 Theoretical contributions 10.3.3
 
The combination of the GT technique and the culture and leadership theoretical 
framework in studying corporate governance has added to the theoretical relevance of 
each for understanding organisations and how they are managed. It has also added to the 
theoretical arguments of Sun et al. (2011), Sonnenfeld (2002) and Letza et al. (2008) that 
corporate governance is a social process rather than an economic one. Moreover, it 
validates the idea that corporate governance is culture and leadership-laden, and socio-
politically influenced (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic , 2002; Licht, 2001). Furthermore, 
it justifies the need for a broader mechanism for banks that has been proposed by many 
scholars, including J. Macey and O’Hara (2003) and Tomasic (2011), and aids our 
understanding of the complexity of the internal agency problem (Eisenhardt, 1989a ).  
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This study also makes a distinct contribution by exploring and affirming the general 
validity of certain agency theory assumptions in the banking sector – in particular the self-
interested motives of economic agents such as executive directors/managers in Nigerian 
banks. Even though some evidence was found of some banks and other individuals 
cooperating and complying with the corporate governance codes and other rules, they are 
certainly failing to meet the overall corporate governance expectations. Finally, the 
findings can be considered a starting point for other researchers of culture and leadership 
in organisations, particularly in the banking sector. They provide researchers with an 
opportunity to present a more complete picture of corporate governance for banks, within 
the framework of culture and leadership, as well as for other countries that share similar 
difficulties to those faced by banks in Nigeria. 
  Implications of the Substantive Theory for Practice 10.4
 
A substantive theory is a single-area theory developed for a substantive/situational context 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987). As such, stating its implications for practice 
forms an important aspect of GT studies. The findings of the substantive GT in this 
research have several implications for the achievement of good corporate governance 
practice in banks in Nigeria. However, to utilise the substantive findings through the social 
contract, trust and cooperation, it is recommended that the policy makers regarding 
corporate governance for banks (i.e., the regulatory body the CBN, and the boards of 
directors and management of banks) consider the following: 
 
1) By encouraging social contracts, the boards of directors of banks, along with the 
regulators, should develop the idea of rational agreement, which would work 
simultaneously in two directions. Firstly, it would give moral reasons for 
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perceiving the institution from an impartial and impersonal standpoint. Secondly, it 
would show the direct implications of personal incentives and motivations that 
could be implemented in practice. 
 
2) They should encourage individual boards to take a moral perspective; this could be 
ensured through codes of practice specific to individual banks, as well as more 
generic ones relating to the whole of Nigeria. 
 
3) The boards of directors/management and the regulatory agency (the CBN) should 
also create a stimulating and high-trust environment that will restore trust within 
the hierarchy and between the banks and their stakeholders. It is important that  the 
boards of directors and indeed the stakeholders involved in corporate governance 
process are willing to accept the challenges of change and improve their 
commitment to banking organisations. 
 
4) The board members/management should be encouraged to be continually aware of 
and sensitive to the impact their self-interest and lack of transparency has on the 
banking system. This will be possible if they are constantly made aware of and 
more knowledgeable about the need for integrity. As Hung and Huang (2010,  
p.81) contended, ‘the concept of integrity is closely bound to morality’. 
 
5) In addition, the boards of directors and the regulatory body should convert their 
own  perceptions into beliefs and attitudes among the bank employees through 
cooperation and trust so as to forge greater commitment towards good governance 
practice. This step would ensure long-term corporate performance and the 
rebuilding of business confidence in the banking sector. 
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6) The substantive theory findings offer suggestions about the underlying motives 
behind the current culture that is unreceptive to leadership, and ruled by self-
interested attitudes and a lack of transparency. To improve the situation, the boards 
of directors and indeed the management should exhibit a spirit of transparency and 
the desire for common good.. This can be achieved through the entrenchment of 
trusting elements and mutual cooperation in the corporate culture of banks.  
 
7) To achieve leader transparency, boards of directors should ensure that they share 
relevant information during their interactions with their followers, that they are 
open to giving and receiving feedback, and that they are forthright about the 
reasons behind their decisions. 
 
8) Finally, without overlooking the legal and economic efficiency requirements of the 
present framework, it is indicative that the desired corporate governance for banks 
should consider the broader social products of corporate governance by 
incorporating an understanding of the continually changing cultural and leadership 
dynamics that impact on the effectiveness of corporate governance practice in 
Nigerian banks.  
 
Moreover, this research recognises that some strategic efforts have been made by some 
banks and the CBN to improve corporate governance practice. This shows that there is 
some good stewardship and a desire to work diligently for the common good of the 
banking sector. However, it has also been proven that the human action and leadership 
issues cannot be addressed sufficiently through code/regulation alone; the governance 
system must continue to incorporate other social processes. 
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  Limitations of the Study 10.5
 
The main limitations of this study cover four areas: generalisation, time span, the 
application of the substantive theory and the research sites. These are highlighted in the 
following paragraphs. 
a) Generalisation of the findings 
In an interpretive study, the generalisation of the substantive theory is not a major concern. 
As such, the contributions to knowledge are explained in alternative terms. As Charmaz 
(2006, p.153) argued, ‘if you offer a fresh or deeper understanding of the studied 
phenomena, you can make an original contribution. Grounded theorists can contribute to a 
speciality field and simultaneously extend general theoretical interpretations that cut 
across fields’. Along these lines, this interpretive study has provided a deep understanding 
of the effects of corporate governance for banks and does not aim to facilitate any wide-
ranging generalisation.  Moreover, due to the nature of corporate governance as a process, 
as well as the underpinning theories of culture and leadership, the wider application of the 
substantive theory may be limited as no two situations are the same.  
b) Time span 
The data collection for this research focused on the period from post-consolidation to 
2011. This may have limited the understanding of the corporate governance events 
studied. Moreover, some of the respondents might not have worked in the industry before 
the consolidation era, while others may not have been involved in critical areas of 
governance. Nevertheless, these limitations were reduced to a minimum through the use of 
a broad range of interviews and the focus group discussion. In addition, some documents 
were obtained from the banks to complement the interviews, and these provided valuable 
insights into the governance practices in the banks. 
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c) Research sites 
The research sites included the banks and the offices of other parties related to policy and 
the implementation of corporate governance in the banking sector. A more in-depth 
investigation would have included social elements, such as university academics who had 
contributed to governance issues, and other non-quoted financial institutions that share 
similar constraints. However, this was not feasible, owing to the time period within which 
the study had to be completed.  
d) The application of the substantive theory  
Finally, the conclusions reached through the substantive theory should not be assumed to 
constitute a concrete or highly “objective” reality but rather an interpretation, a credible 
and convincing reality that has been mediated and constructed by the researcher through 
set-out procedures and analysis. Indeed, this is very much an exploratory study that has 
nevertheless responded sufficiently to the established research questions and the main aim 
of the study. As such, areas for possible future developments that might extend and 
expand upon the findings are proposed in the next section.   
 Areas for Further Research  10.6
 
This thesis has explored the general literature relating to the main theories and practices of 
corporate governance, especially for banks, in an effort to gain a greater understanding of 
its practice in Nigeria. Through the application of GT procedures within a social 
constructivist paradigm of inquiry, a substantive theory of corporate governance for banks 
in Nigeria was developed. An approach of this sort considers social reality not to be 
objective and as such able to be comprehended and constructed through subjective 
interactions between the researcher and the social world. The objective of this thesis has 
been to provide further understanding of the corporate governance of Nigerian banks 
within the context of a culture and leadership theoretical framework. This approach has 
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allowed the author to propose solutions to a number of problems identified with various 
corporate governance systems and their application in the banking sector.  
 
However, a significant point to note is that the substantive theory developed here is only a 
construction of the opinions of the study participants drawn from within the banking sector 
in Nigeria. Although this substantive theory was given more formality through further 
exploration using the culture and leadership theoretical framework, this does not 
automatically upgrade the theory to a formal one. This will only be achieved by studying 
corporate governance for banks within many different substantive areas. Indeed, other 
researchers can consider, firstly, investigating the corporate governance of banks in 
different banking sectors, and expanding and refining the GT applied in this study, using 
culture and leadership as an alternative framework to examine the explanation of the 
corporate governance of banks.  
 
Secondly, the findings of this thesis are based on a qualitative research design, which 
opens up the possibility for other researchers to use alternative research designs to 
investigate the determinants of corporate governance practice in banks that have been 
identified here.  Thirdly, the utilisation of GT to investigate corporate governance in banks 
is only a starting point. It does not provide full conceptual descriptions, factual accuracy or 
verification of the phenomenon. This suggests the need for further theoretical 
developments through continued conceptual modifications and verifications, since 
corporate governance itself is an evolving process. Fourthly, the substantive theory 
focuses on Nigerian banks and, since culture and leadership parameters are by no means 
homogeneous (Rossouw, 2005), researchers can use these findings as a guide to applying 
the theory elsewhere. In addition, though we propose social contract principles to guide 
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the implementation of the findings of the substantive theory, alternative strategies could be 
considered depending on the context.  
 
Fifthly, although the research process followed here did reduce the effects of the above 
limitations, future studies should still consider how to address them further. In addition, 
since corporate governance itself is an evolving phenomenon, similar research in any 
developing country, particularly other African countries, may provide further explanations 
of the corporate governance process for banks. Finally, despite the attention being paid to 
banks’ corporate governance at present, the expected change in practice will only happen 
if policy makers (the CBN, the banks and other stakeholders) can learn significantly from 
the substantive theory presented herein. It is our understanding that research findings are 
more meaningful if they are used to some degree in the area concerned, and we hope very 
much that our findings will be used by policy makers as recommended earlier. 
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Appendix A: Post Consolidation Banks  
 
 
 
SN. Bank Remark 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
 
Access Bank 
Afribank 
Diamond Bank 
EcoBank 
Equitorial Trust Bank 
First City Monument Bank 
Fidelity Bank 
First Bank Plc. 
First Inland Bank 
Guaranty Trust Bank 
IBTC Chartered Bank 
Intercontinental Bank* 
Oceanic Bank* 
Platinum Bank* 
Sky Bank 
Spring* 
Stanbic Bank 
Standard Chartered Bank 
Sterling Bank 
United Bank for Africa 
Union Bank 
Unity Bank 
Wema Bank 
Zenith Bank Plc. 
Note: The asterisk banks were in 
the process of being acquired 
during data collection and 
analysis of this thesis. As such, 
the banks may likely assume 
different name or status.  
       
       25 
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Appendix B: Ten Statements Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please answer by ticking one:  Strongly Agree; Agree; No View; Disagree; Strongly Disagree   
              Ans    1            2           3          4                    5       
 
Please Specify the Bank:  
 
       1.  Corporate governance practice in your company has improved since the introduction of the 
 new code of corporate governance for banks in 2006. 
            Ans     1            2          3           4                    5 
 
      2.    The code of corporate governance for banks does not meet your corporate objectives.  
                          Ans.    1        2              3           4                   5 
 
      3.   The role of the audit committee for your bank has performed well in its activities 
            Ans.     1        2              3           4                     5 
 
       4.  Your board considers best corporate governance practice as a priority in your   
 organisation.          Ans.     1        2          3           4                   5 
 
       5.  Your employees have not understood the essence of corporate governance in the organisation. 
                                       Ans.     1        2          3             4                     5 
 
       6.  Your boards’ main strategic goals relate to a culture of compliance to ensure rules and 
 regulations that  achieve effective control. 
           Ans.      1            2           3             4                      5 
 
       7.   Disclosure of information in the organisation has been the major challenge the Board of Directors 
 expected to address. 
         Ans.        1        2            3            4                      5 
 
        8. Your bank still needs improvements in some aspects of corporate practice in order to meet 
 expectations of the code of governance. 
         Ans.         1        2            3               4                    5 
 
         9.  Your corporate governance challenges are a reflection of some cultural elements than  
 with the provisions of the code. 
          Ans.         1           2                3               4                    5 
 
       10.  The nature of policy making and monitoring organisations are the main problems in  
 achieving your corporate objectives                        
          Ans.         1           2                3               4                    5 
 
 
Your time is sincerely appreciated in completing this form. We assure you of confidentiality and personal 
details will not be included in any part of the research or made public. 
 
Please if you would like to take part in an interview for 25-30 minutes, indicate your contact below: 
 
Name: _______________________________Email:________________________________ 
 
 
A Survey of CEOs and Managers on Corporate Governance Practice of 
their Organisations 
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Appendix C: The University Introductory Letter 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern 
 
 
This letter is to introduce Mr Umar Abbas Ibrahim, a PhD research student at the 
University of Plymouth Business School in the UK. Mr Ibrahim is conducting research on 
corporate governance in Nigerian banks. The purpose of the enclosed survey questionnaire 
is to help identify and understand the effects of the corporate governance mechanism for 
banks in Nigeria. Your thoughts on this issue will contribute towards the development of a 
substantive theory on corporate governance for Nigerian banks. It would be appreciated if 
you would identify a senior manager in your bank who is knowledgeable about the issues 
in the questionnaire. We also wish to confirm that the university’s Research and Ethics 
Committee has reviewed this study; any information obtained will be treated with the 
utmost confidentiality. In addition, organisations and persons providing information will 
not be mentioned or disclosed, and participants will be provided with a summary of the 
interviews, analysis and interpretations of the research, if they so require. The university 
counts on organisations and communities to assist research students in their data collection 
for research purposes. We would therefore appreciate your organisation’s assistance. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
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Appendix D: Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in 
Nigeria Post Consolidation 
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Appendix E: A Sample of Conceptual Memos 
 
 
Harmonisation of Regulatory Frameworks (Memo) 
Bank participants expressed concern over the diverse provisions of the code and the 
regulatory mechanism with which they are expected to comply. They may not be able to 
cope with the challenges that emerge in practice. The banks are, however, of the view that 
the provisions of the various codes and regulations could be more meaningful if they were 
harmonised and, in some cases, reviewed. This finding indicates the connection between 
one of the difficulties in achieving compliance with the existing Code of Corporate 
Governance for Banks and its enforcement. 
Accountability and Auditing (Memos) 
Lack of accountability as a property of lack of transparency was variously echoed by the 
participants. Indeed, it has consistently been found to be one of the major failures in the 
banking sector, affecting the quality and reliability of financial and non-financial 
disclosure by banks to both shareholders and the general public. The lack of accountability 
property emerged from what the participants expressed as “manipulations of financial 
information” by some banks. Similarly, a lack of auditing quality indicates compromises 
in relation to auditing ethics within the banking sector.  
Code/Regulation (Memo) 
The growing number of banking weaknesses in the early 2000s influenced the Federal 
Government of Nigeria through the CBN to initiate consolidation reforms of the banks, 
which results in the establishment of the Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in 2006 
to improve banks’ internal control and enable the banks perform its responsibilities. While 
the Code and other regulatory frameworks are understood to have improved certain 
aspects of corporate practice, various participants raised concerns over the inadequacy of 
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the Code to influence corporate governance practice in banks effectively. The concerns 
relate to various difficulties identified by the participants, ranging from deep-rooted self-
interest and a lack of transparent corporate behaviour by the leadership, to difficulties in 
operationalising the provisions of the Code in a changing business environment.  
Training and Skills Development (Memos) 
This relates to improving internal control in banks through training and skills development 
programmes for management and board members. It is believed that adequate and relevant 
skills are required by those responsible for policy decisions and implementation, so as to 
enhance their organisational corporate practice.  
Lack of Corporate Culture (Memo) 
The concept of a “lack of corporate culture” is defined in terms of the inability of the 
boards of directors of banks to produce an effective mechanism so as to ensure good 
corporate governance practices in their organisations. The consensus among the 
interviewees and the focus group participants was that the underlying effect of corporate 
governance in banks rests on the ability of the leadership to change the preferences of 
banks’ employees in favour of its set goals. 
 
As a result of the interplay between self-interest and a lack of transparency, and the 
various control mechanisms initiated by the CBN and the banks, certain consequences 
emerged, such as the gradual recognition of the benefits of good corporate governance. 
However, also revealed were certain issues that constrain the realisation of an overall 
culture of good governance practice in the banks.  
